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The shift towards sustainable power systems is one of the grand challenges of the
twenty-first century. Decentralized production from renewable sources, electric mobility,
and related advances are at odds with traditional power systems where central large-scale
generation of electricity follows inelastic consumer demand. Smart Markets and intelligent
Information Systems (IS) could alleviate these issues by providing new forms of coordina -
tion that leverage real-time consumption information and prices to incentivize consumer
behaviors that remain within the grid’s operational bounds. But the best design for these
systems, and the societal implications of different design choices is largely unclear. This
disser tation makes three contributions to the debate. First, we propose and evaluate a
design theory for Brokers, a novel class of IS-based intermediaries in retail electricity
markets that provide participants with additional information and fine-grained economic
incentives. Second, we study in greater detail the Broker’s core problem of learning from
past customer choices as basis for future decisions. We propose a probabilistic preference
model that addresses important features of electricity markets, and we demonstrate the
performance of this model on electricity tariff choice tasks. And third, we propose and
study Competitive Benchmarking, a novel research method for effective IS artifact design in
complex environments like power systems, where the social cost of failure is prohibitive.
Our results provide guidance on IS design choices for sustainable electricity systems, and
they contribute to the foundations for new Smart Grid business models.
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Foreword
When I started my PhD trajectory in 2011, it was for the joy of contemplating questions that
few have thought about before. What I had not expected was the additional joy that comes
from exploring the hidden world of those who do science for a living. I have been fortunate
to be guided by true experts in my explorations, and I gladly acknowledge their contributions
to this dissertation.
I am grateful to my promotor Wolf Ketter for providing the vision upon which this work
is built, for his enthusiasm in supervising it, and for becoming a good friend in the process.
Wolf has a rare ability to see opportunities where others see risks, and he was among those
who dared to believed in a thirty-three year old entering graduate student right from the
start. His positive attitude is contagious, and his matchless ability to connect with people
has opened doors for this work on more than one occasion. Wolf generates more ideas than
a generation of doctoral students could possibly explore, but he also gives his students the
liberty and the means to develop his ideas into something that excites them. Thank you!
Maytal Saar-Tsechansky was among those who guided my ﬁrst ventures into academic
research and publishing, and I was delighted about the opportunity to collaborate with her
again on the ﬁnal article of this dissertation. Maytal patiently helped me circumnavigate
the pitfalls of scientiﬁc writing, and she never ran out of challenging questions to hone our
arguments. The reader will ﬁnd that Chapters 2 and 3 are signiﬁcantly better for her contri-
butions! I am particularly grateful for Maytal’s willingness, without a moment’s hesitation,
to travel the long way from Austin to Rotterdam to serve on my doctoral committee.
John Collins co-authored two of the articles in this dissertation (Chapters 2 and 4), and
he is one of the leaders of the Power TAC project that provides their greater context. John
is an inexhaustible source of smart grid and software engineering knowledge, which he con-
tributed to many interesting discussions throughout my time at Erasmus University. Re-
markably, his recent retirement from the University of Minnesota has not lessened his zest
for action in the least, and he continues to translate his vast experience into Power TAC in-
novations whenever he is not converting his home into the most self-sufﬁcient, sustainable
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patch of Wisconsin. It has been a pleasure to with work with a scholar of John’s expertise
and dedication.
Perry Groot and Tom Heskes guided me through the technically most difﬁcult parts of
this work, and they are co-authors of the article in Chapter 3. I am thankful for Perry’s
efforts to keep me from despairing over the intricacies of efﬁcient Bayesian inference. On
more than one occasion, his uncanny ability to recall the appendix of just the right article
has proven indispensable. I appreciate Tom’s feedback on this work, and his willingness to
serve on my doctoral committee.
Eric van Heck, Patrick Groenen, and Oliver Kramer have been generous in their will-
ingness to serve as members of my doctoral committee. In his capacities as head of the
Business Information Management (BIM) group at the Rotterdam School of Management,
and as secretary of the inner doctoral committee, Eric has additionally provided me with
valuable guidance on positioning this dissertation in the Information Systems landscape.
Alok Gupta kindly provided strategic guidance on the Competitive Benchmarking article
in Chapter 4. In many ways, this technically inconspicuous chapter proved the most difﬁcult
to write, and I am thankful for his perspectives on it.
Many other colleagues have inﬂuenced my thinking about the subjects presented in this
dissertation or have indirectly contributed to the presented results. In particular, I would like
to thank the members of the Learning Agents Research Group (LARGE), including Micha
Kahlen, Yixin Lu, Laurens Rook, Tommi Tervonen, Konstantina Valogianni, Jan van Dalen,
and Gertjan van den Burg for interesting presentations and discussions on topics in Machine
Learning, Learning Agents, and Decision Analysis.
The empirical work in Chapter 4 would not have been possible without the contributions
of numerous Power TAC participants worldwide. In particular, I would like to thank the
Power TAC development team at Erasmus University, Govert Buijs, Jeroen Ruigrok van der
Werven, and TijnWitsenburg. In addition to their work on Power TAC, these colleagues have
operated the computing infrastructure on which all of the experiments in this dissertation
were conducted.
The Department of Technology & Operations Management at the Rotterdam School of
Management is a great place to work, and more colleagues are to be commended for this than
can possibly be named in a foreword. I would like to extend my thanks to my fellow doctoral
students and to the department’s faculty for creating this uniquely positive atmosphere. In
particular, I would like to thank Bas Giesbers, Morteza Pourakbar, Konstantina Valogianni,
and Christina Wessels for being great roommates and neighbors, and Cheryl Blok-Eiting,
Carmen Meesters-Mirasol, and Ingrid Waaijer for their tireless efforts in administering the
department’s affairs.
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I am thankful for the comprehensive support I have received from the Erasmus Research
Institute of Management (ERIM). Throughout my studies, I beneﬁtted from a unique line of
services ranging from course guidance, to conference funding, to grant writing, and to ﬁnally
publishing this book. I especially appreciate the support of the colleagues who provide these
services on a daily basis: Natalija Gersak, Kim Harte, Eliane Haseth, Miho Izuka, Tineke
van der Vhee, Marisa van Iperen, and Veerle van Laere.
Finally, I am indebted to my family for their support. To my mom and dad for raising
me curious, and for encouraging me to remain so; to Christian for volunteering to be my
paranimf; and to Ariane for being my dearest scientist. Thank you!
Markus Peters
Rotterdam, August 2014
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Civilization advances by extending the number of important
operations which we can perform without thinking about them.”
Alfred N. Whitehead, as quoted in Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society
Recent advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have caused un-
precedented changes in how ﬁrms and their customers transact business. Surely the most
familiar face of these changes is the growing volume of business-to-consumer (B2C) trans-
actions conducted electronically. Estimated at $4.2 trillion for the G20 states in 2016, these
transactions stand for a growing share of economic activities worldwide. For example, in the
United Kingdom more than 12% of GDP will be earned through electronic B2C transactions
by 2016 (Dean et al., 2012). Less visible, but arguably more incisive, are similar devel-
opments in the business-to-business (B2B) sphere, for which market studies in the United
States estimate that it now has more than twice the size of its B2C counterpart (Hoar et al.,
2012).
It is hardly surprising to ﬁnd businesses harnessing straightforward advantages of elec-
tronic commerce like lower transaction costs. But at the same time that businesses are using
ICT to convert and transform individual business models (Anderson, 2009), a fundamen-
tal shift is taking place in how economic activity is coordinated overall. In many domains,
smart markets – an emerging class of markets based on computational intelligence – are
now replacing existing hierarchical forms of coordination (Bichler et al., 2010, Kambil and
van Heck, 2002, McCabe et al., 1991).
One important instance of this shift can be seen in the form of modern wholesale elec-
1
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
tricity markets, which have evolved out of a system of regional monopolistic electricity
providers. In North America1, vertically integrated monopolies dominated the generation,
transport, and distribution of electricity until the late 1990s when the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission (FERC) mandated that every generator was to be given equal grid access.
Previously, the network-based electricity business had been perceived and regulated as a
natural monopoly in its entirety. But suddenly ICT advances made the separation of trans-
mission networks from users feasible, and policymakers were keen on unleashing market
forces on the electricity business to the beneﬁt of consumers (Kirschen and Strbac, 2005).
Most present-day wholesale electricity markets fall into the smart markets category. For ex-
ample, their clearing process usually involves a computational procedure known as security-
constrained unit commitment (Stoft, 2002), which ensures that power is produced by the
lowest-cost generators while respecting complex technical side-constraints such as genera-
tors’ ramping times and system-wide security margins.
But while wholesale electricity markets have revolutionized the coordination of eco-
nomic activity between large generators, transmission system operators, and electricity dis-
tributors, other parts of the electricity business have remained largely unaffected. For in-
stance, most American electricity is still generated in central power plants from fossil (68%)
or nuclear (20%) fuels in response to inelastic consumer demand (US Energy Information
Administration, 2013a). The average US power plant converts only one third of its primary
fuel into usable electricity, while 6% of generated electricity is lost to the aging power lines
that connect generators with consumers (US Department of Energy, 2003). Generation from
renewable or decentralized sources could alleviate these problems, but they are difﬁcult to
integrate when consumers have little information about their electricity usage and few in-
centives to invest in smart appliances that adapt to the changing availability of wind and sun.
Technologies for mitigating these issues – real-time metering, bidirectional communication,
home automation, etc. – are now commercially available. But intelligently coordinating
the intricate interplay between individual behaviors and tight physical constraints remains
difﬁcult in complex modern power systems with millions of self-interested participants.
Researchers have consequently advocated the implementation of smart retail electricity
markets as a way of providing this coordination (Ketter et al., 2014) based on an information
layer (sometimes called “Internet of Energy”) residing on top of the physical infrastructure.
Smart markets make use of this information layer, and they leverage ICT innovations to pro-
vide consumers with additional information, and to economically incentivize behaviors that
1Below, North American examples will be used to illustrate key issues in power systems. While there are a
number of differences compared to, e.g., European power systems in terms of their physical structure, the structure
of their supporting markets, and the strategic agenda that policy makers follow in developing them, these differences
are inconsequential to the main argument, except where noted. See Coll-Mayor et al. (2007), for example, for a
comparison between the European Union and the United States in this regard.
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1.1. Research Question and Main Contributions 3
are aligned with overarching goals such as the integration of renewable sources. A criti-
cal part of this vision are retail electricity brokers2, Information Systems (IS) artifacts that
intermediate in the smart markets connecting retail customers with large-scale generators,
either autonomously or in support of a human decision-maker. Brokers serve in many of
the same capacities as current electricity retailers, but their IS-based nature allows them to
provide participants with real-time information and ﬁne-grained economic incentives that
are currently unfeasible. For example, brokers could offer electric vehicle owners in certain
areas temporarily reduced charging rates in exchange for the option to use their batteries
as local buffer against solar production drops when cloud covers are erratic. Through such
targeted use of information, brokers encourage more efﬁcient use of existing infrastructures,
and they enable behaviorally driven change (Watson et al., 2010).
What is currently still unclear, is how brokers are best designed and evaluated. Here, de-
sign refers to both, the design process (design as a verb) and the concrete design that follows
from this process (design as a noun). This dissertation aims to contribute to answering this
question. In the remainder of the introduction we proceed as follows. Section 1.1 contains
the research question and a short summary of the main contributions. Section 1.2 provides an
introduction to the electricity domain as background for the following chapters. Section 1.3
similarly introduces Machine Learning, the science of building computer programs that im-
prove through experience (Mitchell, 1997), and the key reference discipline in our studies.
And Section 1.4 provides an outline of the remainder of the dissertation.
1.1 Research Question and Main Contributions
The goal of this work is to advance the development of IS design theories for brokers, and
its main research question is:
How should IS-based brokers for retail electricity markets be designed?
We aim to answer this question through a theory for design and action (IS theory type V; Gre-
gor, 2006), and we follow a design science approach (Simon, 1996, Hevner et al., 2004,
Gregor and Jones, 2007) to establish it. A theory for design and action is a prescriptive
theory that informs the choices of artifact designers. As such, its principal components are
constructs (e.g., brokers, markets, customers) and relationships between those constructs
2We use the shorter term brokers instead of retail electricity brokers henceforth. In the power systems literature,
brokers are sometimes also referred to as aggregators, or load serving entities (LSEs).
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Figure 1.1. Areas of contribution for the three studies that comprise the
dissertation
that are prescriptive in nature, backed by causal explanations, and empirically testable. Our
contribution is divided into three separate studies (see also Figure 1.1):
Chapter 2 – Broker Design: We propose and evaluate a new design theory for brokers
based on ideas from Machine Learning. The unit of analysis in this study is the broker
itself, and we derive one particular design theory. Our work improves over existing
designs, e.g., (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b) through a more realistic problem setup, and
through improved performance in spite of the additional challenges we consider.
Chapter 3 – Preference Learning: We study in greater detail the broker’s core problem of
learning from past customer choices as the basis for future decisions. The unit of
analysis in this study is the broker itself, and we derive one particular design theory.
Speciﬁcally, we propose and evaluate a probabilistic model that addresses important
peculiarities of preference learning in electricity markets, and we demonstrate the per-
formance of this model on electricity tariff choice tasks.
Chapter 4 – Competitive Benchmarking: We propose and study a novel research method
for accelerating progress on future broker designs and similar complex IS design tasks
where the underlying real-world phenomena evolve rapidly, and where the social cost
17_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
1.2. Smart Electricity Markets 5
of failure is high. The unit of analysis in this study is the overall design task, and we
use a case study approach to demonstrate the efﬁcacy of Competitive Benchmarking
for broker design. Our data furthermore allow us to provide preliminary insights into
the societal consequences of deploying competing brokers in retail electricity markets.
Scientiﬁcally, this work contributes to the implementation of smart markets in energy retail-
ing, and to the nascent IS research stream on Energy Informatics (Watson et al., 2010). Its
managerial and societal relevance lie in its contributions to the design and evaluation of bro-
kers. Brokers incentivize consumers to act within the grid’s operational bounds, and thereby
provide “an opportunity to create shared value – that is, a meaningful beneﬁt for society
that is also valuable to the business” (Porter and Kramer, 2006). This intelligent form of
intermediation is one possible business model for utility companies in future Smart Grids.
1.2 Smart Electricity Markets
Figure 1.2. Physical and control structure of the electric grid (today). The
top half of the model shows the high-voltage transmission level, the bottom
half the low-to-intermediate-voltage distribution level.
To better understand the business environment that brokers operate in, let us consider
the structure of current power systems and some associated challenges. The model in Fig-
ure 1.2 shows the physical and control structures resulting from the introduction of whole-
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sale electricity markets.3 As is customary in power systems, the model is separated into a
transmission system where large-scale generators like coal and nuclear power plants feed
high-voltage electricity into a transmission network, and a distribution system responsi-
ble for regional electricity provisioning to commercial and residential end-customers. Some
large industrial loads capable of operating at high voltage levels (e.g., blast furnaces) may
be connected directly to transmission networks, but the bulk of loads in terms of volume
and number are served through distribution systems. The two types of system vary widely
in the number and sophistication of connected stakeholders, the sensing abilities built into
the physical infrastructure, the current level of ICT deployment, and the dominant control
paradigm. These differences are further characterized in Table 1.1.
1.2.1 Transmission Systems
Transmission systems are highly evolved in terms of sensory capabilities and ICT deploy-
ment. The Independent System Operators (ISO) running these systems and other participants
such as large industrial loads and generating companies have signiﬁcant incentives for in-
vesting in state-of-the art sensing, optimization, and decision-support capabilities due to the
tremendous costs and beneﬁts behind their capital-intensive businesses (including the cost
of outages). A key difference between electricity provisioning and other businesses is the
presence of two separate layers of control that participants engage in: economic and physical
control.
Economic control at the transmission level is provided through the aforementioned
wholesale markets where generating companies sell energy to aggregated distribution-level
loads or large industrial users of electricity. Transactions in these markets are tied to a spe-
ciﬁc delivery time and location, because electricity is currently not stored at scale. Ideally,
forward markets would provide allocation ahead of time and spot markets would provide
efﬁcient real-time allocation of residual imbalances. But due to ramping and other physical
constraints of power plants, generators can only sell their capacity forward, i.e., there is no
conventional, competitive spot market for electricity. The upshot of all wholesale market
transactions is a tentative schedule of production and consumption that does not yet account
for real-time deviations from market participants’ forecasts (e.g., plant and line failures),
3The model is an idealized representation and signiﬁcant regional differences exist. For example, not all parts
of the United States have introduced competitive wholesale markets, yet. The Independent System Operator (ISO)
referenced in the model is a Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) in some parts of the US, and a Transmission
System Operator (TSO) in most of Europe. In some markets, independent third parties take over parts of the
ISO’s resposibilities, as in the case of Scheduling Coordinators (SC) in California (Cameron and Cramton, 1999).
And, at the time of this writing, approximately half of the American states have tentatively introduced competitive
elements at the retail level. While these differences are important for understanding concrete power systems and
their respective performances, they are inconsequential to our argument.
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Attribute Transmission System Distribution System
Number of
nodes and
stakehold-
ers
Low - Approximately
• 102 large-scale generators
• 103 transmission lines
• 104 substations
per system
High - Approximately
• 5×104 distribution feeders
• 107 customer meters
• 5×108 appliances
per system
Stakeholder
sophistica-
tion
High - Commercial generators use
sophisticated forecasting and opti-
mization routines to compute opti-
mal bids in wholesale markets; In-
dependent System Operators (ISO)
use advanced power ﬂow analy-
sis tools for operations and contin-
gency planning
Low-to-Medium - Distribution
Utilities (DU) use relatively simple
forecasting schemes; Residential
customers make ad-hoc consump-
tion decisions and potentially
sporadic, manual tariff decisions;
Commercial customers may exhibit
some sophistication in tariff ne-
gotiations and use of controllable
capacities
Sensing
ability
Medium-to-High - Mature com-
mercial sensing devices are avail-
able and widely deployed; increas-
ing deployment of Phasor Measure-
ment Units (PMU) for wide-area
monitoring
Low-to-Medium - Commercial
customer on-site sensing devices
available but questions remain
with respect to standards, optimal
level of functionality, etc.; DUs are
gradually installing feeder sensors
ICT deploy-
ment
High - ISOs use sophisticated En-
ergy Management Systems (EMS),
Supervisory Control and Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) systems, and
Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs)
Low-to-Medium - Customer-site
deployment efforts are still tenta-
tive; uncertainty with respect to
standards, regulatory framework,
required functionality, and busi-
ness cases; DUs use Distribution
Management Systems (DMS) but
proprietary technology makes them
difﬁcult to extend to new applica-
tions
Control
paradigm
Market-based / Direct - Long-
term matching of supply and de-
mand, as well as ancillary services
such as regulation, load-following,
and various types of reserves; Real-
time operation starts from previous
market transaction, applies direct
control to handle real-time devia-
tions and contingencies
Direct - Predominantly passive
management to match supply to de-
mand; some use of direct control for
load shedding
Table 1.1. Summary of current transmission and distribution system charac-
teristics. Numeric examples for a typical U.S. system are taken from (Wider-
gren et al., 2004)
20_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
physical network constraints, and some system-level considerations, such as reliability re-
serves or contingency planning.
Based on the preliminary wholesale market allocation, the ISO manages the real-time
operation of the grid (for which markets are too slow) including all remaining system-level
considerations (for which markets do not account) through physical control. Physical con-
trol is a highly involved, distributed process executing on multiple timescales that aims to
optimize economic performance and power quality under physical constraints.4 Parts of this
process are, in turn, based on market mechanisms. For example, the ISO’s acquisition of
reserves from generators is mediated through wholesale markets.
1.2.2 Distribution Systems
Distribution systems are comparatively less evolved due to to their smaller volumes of en-
ergy supplied over wider areas, and due to the large number of unsophisticated participants
connected to them. While equipment for real-time customer metering, and for sensing and
automatically controlling distribution feeders is commercially available, incentives to invest
in it remain low in many parts of the world. Residential and commercial customers have
historically enjoyed an anytime supply of electricity and are wary of paying for new meter-
ing equipment that will take years to amortize, and that has the potential to complicate their
lives. Distribution Utilities (DU), the monopolistic retailers and operators of distribution net-
works, are subject to strict economic regulation of their offerings and have little incentives
for inducing behavioral changes among their customers, or to improve their service quality
beyond mandated levels.
Consequently, most distribution networks follow a hierarchical control approach where
customers subscribe to ﬁxed or simple time-of-use tariffs, make consumption decisions in-
dependently of the availability of electricity, and receive monthly bills based on sporadic
meter readings. Little use is made of economic control through retail markets, and physical
control is at most exercised over larger commercial customers who allow the DU to remotely
control parts of their loads (curtailment). The DU forecasts the aggregate consumption of
its customers based on historical data and procures offsetting generation commitments in
the wholesale markets. These markets then invoke the right number of generators through
security-constrained unit commitment.
While this simple approach to distribution system operation has worked well for decades,
it has lately been criticized for several reasons. First, shielding customers from true electric-
4Sub-activities include security-constrained economic dispatch, unit commitment, allocation and invocation of
several types of reserves, governor control, voltage control, automatic generation control (AGC), and controlled
load reduction (load shedding). See Kirschen and Strbac (2005) for further details.
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ity prices leads to inefﬁcient allocations (Watson et al., 2012). For example, customers have
no incentives to shift their non-time-critical capacities to periods of high production from re-
newable sources (demand response). Second, capacity planning within the grid is based on
peak demand, with the consequence that 10% to 18% of American power systems’ capacity
is currently utilized less than 1% of the time. Such under-utilized capacity is both environ-
mentally harmful (e.g., excess line corridors) and costly (Kassakian and Schmalensee, 2011).
Responsive customer demand has the potential to reduce peak demand by up to 20% until
the end of the decade (Department of Energy, 2012). And third, unresponsive demand in
combination with competitive wholesale markets leads to opportunities for exercising mar-
ket power on the side of highly reactive marginal generators. It is therefore important that
at least some customers can react to electricity scarcity in real time to avoid market failures
like the California energy crisis (Borenstein, 2002, Cramton, 2003).
1.2.3 Challenges and Opportunities
From an IS vantage point, the differences between transmission and distribution systems are
unsurprising. Transmission networks with their comparatively small number of sophisticated
participants and extensive real-time sensory and control capabilities are naturally amenable
to central optimization and dispatch. The methods required to perform such optimizations
are highly involved, to be sure. But the problem of transmission systems operations is es-
sentially one of optimizing power ﬂows among a small number of strategizing participants
under physical side-constraints and it remains well within the realm of central optimization.
In distribution systems, on the other hand, central optimization is impeded by a number
of practical and conceptual issues:
• The DU as system operator has virtually no information about the dynamic electricity
consumption of individual grid participants. Currently available data include sporadic
meter readings and aggregate loads on distribution feeders, but the granularity of those
data is insufﬁcient for real-time control schemes. Much less than real-time visibility
do distribution systems provide real-time controllability of customer capacities. Some
commercial customers may have load curtailment arrangements in place, but this level
of control remains elusive for the majority of electricity customers without dedicated
data connections and smart appliances.
• Customers have few incentives to adapt their behavior. While it seems unlikely that
customers would be willing to monitor, for example, electricity prices in real time,
there is signiﬁcant untapped potential for smart appliances that optimize their electric-
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Figure 1.3. Physical and Control Structure of the Electric Grid (Smart Grid)
ity usage proﬁle while respecting their users’ preferences.5
• Even if more granular data was available, a centralized control scheme would likely
not scale to the point of making optimal decisions involving tens of millions of cus-
tomers and hundreds of millions of appliances in real time.
Alleviation for these issues could come in the form of Smart Grids (see Figure 1.3), with
among other features (Massoud Amin and Wollenberg, 2005):
Sensing and Control Capabilities at the network level and among customers through the
large-scale deployment of advanced metering capabilities.
Renewables and Decentralized Generation which could reduce the environmental impact
of electricity production.
Electricity Storage which can increase asset utilization, match the non-dispatchable power
ﬂows from renewable sources with demand, and enable new grid topologies like Smart
Energy Neighborhoods (Ibrahim et al., 2008, Sioshansi et al., 2009).
5A 2010 market research report by a commercial consulting ﬁrm concludes that “the U.S. smart appliance
market will expand from $1.42 billion in 2011 to $5.46 billion in 2015, representing a nearly 40 percent growth
rate. Clothes washers and dryers are expected to make up 36 percent of the market while refrigerators and freezers
are forecast to comprise 24 percent of the market. Further, Whirlpool expects to make all appliances smart grid
capable by 2015.” (EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute, 2011)
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Retail Competition which provides the institutional foundation for new approaches to dis-
tribution system control. Retail competition decouples economic control (through
tariffs or forward contracts between independent retailers and customers) from the
real-time operation of the distribution grid, and it provides retailers with incentives for
offering customers competitive, innovative electricity services.
These Smart Grid features can facilitate a market-based alternative to current distribution
system control schemes by increasing visibility and controllability. For example, real-time
sensing capabilities in feeders and households could be used for allocating infrastructure
costs based on peak usage (the true cost driver), not overall usage (the information that is
currently available). Decentralized generation could satisfy electricity demand with small
ramping times and without the need for costly long-range transmission. And electricity
storage in batteries or electric vehicles could provide highly responsive ancillary services
that otherwise require the idle operation of large generators.
If there was no mention of transmission system innovations in the previous paragraph, it
is because the greatest remaining opportunities for smart markets lie at the distribution level.
Transmission systems hold a great number of important challenges, to be sure,6 but the no-
tion of making systems smarter to make them better is inherently limited at the transmission
level (Joskow, 2012). Transmission systems are a balancing mechanism of last resort, and
coordination should be established locally before delegating it to the transmission level. Sig-
niﬁcant smartness and ﬂexibility must therefore reside at the edges of the grid. This insight
is mirrored by industry estimates that 70% of required Smart Grid investments will accrue at
the distribution level (EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute, 2011). High-impact oppor-
tunities for smart retail electricity markets also arise from the closeness between distribution
systems and customers. Given the relative ease of inﬂuencing a customer appliance com-
pared to building new power plants, more effective use should be made of the human factor
instead of treating it as a disturbance term, as is current practice in power systems engineer-
ing (Palensky and Dietrich, 2011).
6The 2003 Northeast Blackout, for example, was at least partially caused by a lack of human and techni-
cal communication between neighboring systems operators (Fox-Penner, 2005, Joskow, 2012). How precisely
transmission-level Energy Management Systems (EMS) should be designed to optimally support users in compli-
cated, real-time decision-making tasks therefore is an important question worthy of scientiﬁc study. Furthermore,
“the impact of ... ICT systems on controllability and observability [of the Smart Transmission Grid] is poorly un-
derstood ... [and] the exact relationship between critical ICT components and the power system needs improved
methods for analysis.” (Vanfretti et al., 2011)
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1.3 Machine Learning Algorithms
A question that immediately follows from the preceding discussion is how the increased vis-
ibility and controllability afforded by Smart Grids can be turned into practical, new control
mechanisms. The scale and complexity of electric grids cast doubts on the prospects for
manual control, but IS-based mechanisms are equally unlikely to be effective if built from
a limited set of ﬁxed, predeﬁned rules cast into computer algorithms. While it might be
possible to formulate goals for the behavior of such algorithms, it is entirely unclear which
of the myriad possible actions (sensing, changing prices, acquiring small-scale generation
capacities, etc.) should be effected at what time to achieve those goals.
A promising alternative to predeﬁning behaviors is the use of Machine Learning, a
collection of techniques for the “[construction of] computer programs that automatically im-
prove with experience.” (Mitchell, 1997) By observing activities in their environment, often
labeled as more or less desirable, these techniques learn to recognize and react to regularities
without an explicit set of rules ﬁxed at design time. Machine learning techniques have been
applied successfully in complex, dynamic settings ranging from autonomous game-playing
to self-driving cars (Kober et al., 2013).
A comprehensive introduction to Machine Learning is beyond the scope of this introduc-
tion. Instead, we give an outline of the major task categories, and refer the reader to Bishop
(2006) and Murphy (2012) for further details.
1.3.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) deals with control tasks where the goal is to maximize long-
term rewards by repeatedly taking actions in a stochastic environment (Sutton and Barto,
1998). A Reinforcement Learning algorithm observes the state of the environment, chooses
an action, and is subsequently rewarded or penalized. Then the environment progresses
to the next state and the process repeats itself. In general, both the rewards and the state
transitions made by the system can be stochastic, which means the algorithm has to learn
about them. In particular, reward maximization could entail foregoing immediate rewards to
instead explore the environment and to obtain higher rewards in the future.
Our main research question asks for a design theory for brokers in an environment with
stochastic reactions from customers and other wholesale market participants. In Chapter 2,
we will show how the RL framework can be applied to this challenge.
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1.3.2 Supervised and Unsupervised Learning
In Supervised Learning, pairs of data D= {(xi,yi)}, i= 1, . . . ,N are given, where the xi are
the values of one or more input variables, and the yi are the values of an associated output
variable. Often, the xi are real-valued feature vectors and the yi are categorical (classiﬁca-
tion) or continuous (regression). But in general, both xi and yi can be vectors or more richly
structured objects. The goal in supervised learning is to discover the mapping between the xi
and the yi so that the outputs for previously unobserved inputs {xnew} can be predicted accu-
rately. Unsupervised Learning differs from supervised learning in that only unlabeled data
D= {xi} are given, and the goal is to characterize these data, or to ﬁnd patterns of interest in
them. It is therefore also referred to as pattern recognition or knowledge discovery (Webb,
2003, Bishop, 2006).
While little use is made of unsupervised learning in this dissertation, Chapter 3 presents
a novel method for learning customer preferences in a supervised fashion. In the study, a
learner observes customer choices and generalizes from these observations to improve future
decisions involving customer preferences.
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1.4 Outline
We now describe the setup we use to answer the main research question “How should IS-
based brokers for retail electricity markets be designed?” (see also Figure 1.1)
Chapter 2 – Broker Design7
Our ﬁrst step is to develop and evaluate a high-level design for brokers in retail electric-
ity environments. An important insight from autonomous systems design is that endowing
brokers with all possible successful behaviors at design time is futile, because these be-
haviors are impossible to enumerate and will quickly become obsolete. Instead, we aim to
design brokers that learn effective behaviors by observing their environment, taking actions,
monitoring the long-run consequences that these actions entail, and updating their behavior
accordingly. This is essentially a problem in optimal control, and Reinforcement Learning
(RL, see Section 1.3.1) offers a suitable framework for addressing it.
In retail electricity markets, brokers publish electricity tariffs to customers, who sub-
scribe to them based on latent preferences. Different tariff terms incentivize different kinds
of customer behaviors, and the resulting consumption and production add up to a portfo-
lio of obligations that the broker seeks to cover by trading in the wholesale market. Both
markets are competitive, and any net imbalances remaining after these trades are handled by
the operator of the distribution grid, the Distribution Utility, at typically higher costs to the
broker.
While RL has previously been used to learn electricity wholesale trading strategies (Nan-
duri and Das, 2007, Ramavajjala and Elkan, 2012), retail electricity trading has received
considerably less attention. Reddy and Veloso (2011b) were the ﬁrst to note that RL offers
an appropriate broker design framework. The design we propose and evaluate in Chapter 2
improves over their work in that it requires signiﬁcantly less manual tuning, better accom-
modates the rich data available in smart market environments, and better incorporates new
types of information as market conditions change. We identify the most effective design con-
ditional on prevailing market conditions. Because of the high dimensionality of a broker’s
observations, we show how feature selection and regularization techniques can be leveraged
for better performance under these conditions.
Our simulation-based evaluations of these designs use SEMS, a data-driven Smart Elec-
tricity Market Simulation, developed speciﬁcally for this study. SEMS is built on data from
7This work was published as: Markus Peters, Wolfgang Ketter, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky, and John E. Collins, A
reinforcement learning approach to autonomous decision-making in smart electricity markets. Machine Learning,
92:539, 2013. Preliminary versions of this work appeared in, or were presented at: Peters (2012), Peters et al.
(2012a,b,c,d).
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the Ontario wholesale market, a complete micro-level model of appliance usage in private
households (Gottwalt et al., 2011), and several benchmark designs for brokers proposed in
the literature (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b).
Chapter 3 – Preference Learning8
A particular challenge for brokers are the idiosyncratic preferences (Lichtenstein and Slovic,
2006) of their (prospective) customers. To incentivize favorable behaviors, brokers must
be capable of reasoning about customer responses to changes in tariff terms. But the prior
experiences they can draw from to this end are limited, because each current customer makes
only few choices, even though the sum of choices observed across all customers is large.
Furthermore, the observed choices are usually subject to behavioral inconsistencies, such as
inertia.
A broker must respect these inconsistencies, because the uncertainty arising from them
is a crucial ingredient for autonomous decision-making: brokers should only make high-
value decisions autonomously if past evidence suggests that they will be correct with high
probability, and prompt their users for additional information otherwise. However, brokers
cannot demand their human operators’ attention too frequently and a preference model must
therefore begin to make accurate predictions from limited training data.
To address these requirements, we propose a Bayesian preference model based on Gaus-
sian processes (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006) in Chapter 3 that learns from limited data
by pooling the data of similar users. Our model quantiﬁes the certainty of its predictions
as input to the broker’s autonomous decision-making task, and it infers probabilistic user
segments based on observed choices in the process. Probabilistic inference in nonparametric
Bayesian models is often computationally expensive, but by combining properties of the bro-
ker’s task with advances in sparse (Quinonero-Candela et al., 2007) and structured (Saatci,
2011) Gaussian processes we are able to reduce the costs of inference substantially. We eval-
uate our model on several real-world choice datasets used in an earlier study (Houlsby et al.,
2012), and on electricity tariff choice data that we collected speciﬁcally for the purposes of
this study on a commercial crowdsourcing platform.
8This work has been submitted for publication as: Markus Peters, Perry Groot, Wolfgang Ketter, Maytal Saar-
Tsechansky, Tom Heskes: A Scalable Preference Model for Autonomous Decision-Making Involving Consumer
Choices. Preliminary versions of this work appeared in, or were presented at: Peters and Ketter (2012, 2013a,b,c,
2014).
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Chapter 4 – Competitive Benchmarking9
In the last study, we shift our focus from one particular broker design to a method for accel-
erating the overall progress on broker design theories made by a community of competing
researchers. With this study we aim to address the growing concern that challenges like
sustainable electricity provisioning progress quicker than researchers’ ability to counteract
them (Hey et al., 2009). Design science studies like the ﬁrst two studies of this dissertation
are well-suited for initially identifying and studying promising designs, but their homoge-
neous setup limits their ability to quickly detect promising alternatives and possible social
negatives. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM; Axelrod, 2006) and Agent-Based Computational
Economics (ACE; Tesfatsion 2006) have previously been used to shed light on social nega-
tives, but real-world brokers will inevitably evolve under competitive pressure, and neither
of these methods account for this competitive co-evolution.
We propose to address this limitation through Competitive Benchmarking (CB), a novel
method for IS artifact design in high-complexity environments. CB is rooted in the com-
petitive research approach pioneered by the Trading Agents community (Ketter and Syme-
onidis, 2012) which challenges researchers to devise software agents for complex, uncertain
environments like supply chains (Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005) and advertisement auc-
tions (Jordan and Wellman, 2010).
The ﬁrst instantiation of CB as we deﬁne it here is the Power Trading Agent Competi-
tion (Power TAC, Ketter et al. 2014), in which more than a dozen research groups from four
different continents now jointly devise, benchmark, and improve broker designs. The Power
TAC platform models a competitive retail power market in a medium-sized city, in which
consumers and small-scale producers may choose from among a set of alternative electric-
ity providers, represented by competing brokers. These brokers are built by individual re-
search groups with expertise in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Electrical Engineering, Information
Systems, Machine Learning, and other areas, and their heterogeneous design approaches
have contributed to a rich repository of design ideas and executable broker artifacts.
Cornerstones of Power TAC’s CB process are annual championships, and pilots that
provide additional informal benchmarking opportunities. To date, pilots have been held
at IJCAI 2011 in Barcelona, at AAMAS 2012 in Valencia, and at IEEE SG-TEP 2012 in
Nuremberg. The ﬁrst two ofﬁcial Power TAC championship were held at AAAI 2013 in
Bellevue, WA, and at AAMAS 2014 in Paris.10 Using ﬁne-grained records of the Power
9This work has been submitted for publication as: Wolfgang Ketter, Markus Peters, John E. Collins, Alok Gupta,
Competitive Benchmarking: An Information Systems Research Method for Societal Challenges. A related research
note is under review as: Wolfgang Ketter, Markus Peters, John E. Collins, Alok Gupta, Power TAC: Competitive
IS Research on Sustainable Electricity Systems. Preliminary versions of this work appeared in, or were presented
at: Ketter et al. (2013c), Peters et al. (2013a,b).
10AAAI = Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Artiﬁcial Intelligence; AAMAS = International
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TAC community’s results, we quantify performance differences between alternative broker
designs, and between subsequent iterations of the same designs to give preliminary empirical
evidence of CB’s efﬁcacy as a research method.
Chapter 5 – Conclusions
The ﬁnal chapter of this dissertation concludes with a discussion of the impact and limita-
tions of the three studies, and with directions for future work.
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; IJCAI = International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence; SG-TEP = IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Technology, Economics, and Policies.
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Chapter 2
A Reinforcement Learning
Approach to Autonomous
Decision-Making in Smart
Electricity Markets
2.1 Introduction
Liberalization efforts in electricity markets and the advent of decentralized power generation
technologies are challenging the traditional ways of producing, distributing, and consuming
electricity. The Smart Grid “aims to address these challenges by intelligently integrating the
actions of all users connected to it . . . to efﬁciently deliver sustainable, economic and secure
electricity supplies” (ETPSG, 2010). This ambitious vision requires substantial advances in
intelligent decentralized control mechanisms that increase economic efﬁciency, while keep-
ing the physical properties of the network within tight permissible bounds (Werbos, 2009).
A fundamental objective of the Smart Grid is to maintain a tight balance of supply and de-
mand in real-time. Presently, the task of balancing the output of large-scale power plants with
customer demand is handled via centralized control mechanisms. The increasing penetration
of small-scale production from renewable sources like solar and wind, however, introduces
inherently intermittent, variable, and geographically dispersed supply, and renders real-time
balancing signiﬁcantly more challenging. In addition, proposals for Demand-side Manage-
ment (DSM) and for tariffs with time-of-use or dynamic pricing complicate the prediction of
19
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consumption patterns. Existing centralized control mechanisms are unable to accommodate
this combination of intermittent and variable supply, a grid of staggering scale including
vast numbers of small-scale producers, and dynamic changes in demand in response to price
variations.
A promising approach to effective balancing in the Smart Grid is the introduction of
electricity brokers (Ketter et al., 2012b), intermediaries between retail customers and large-
scale producers of electricity. Brokers offer a distributed alternative to the centralized sys-
tem of today’s grid, facilitate localized markets that reduce inefﬁciencies from wide-area
transmission, and attain socially desirable market outcomes in response to appropriate eco-
nomic incentives. Because brokers serve as intermediaries, they must also trade in multiple
interrelated (e.g., retail and wholesale) markets simultaneously – a structure that Bichler et
al. (2010) refer to as Smart Markets. Smart Markets constitute a novel class of complex, fast-
paced, data-intensive markets, in which participants ought to employ (semi-)autonomous
trading agents in order to attain good trading results.
It is imperative that the design of an electricity broker agent can adapt to a wide vari-
ety of market structures and conditions. This is because there is considerable variability in
the structure that a future Smart Electricity Market might have, and also because such ﬂex-
ibility is generally beneﬁcial for high performance in dynamic environments. We present
several important innovations beyond the class of autonomous electricity brokers for retail
electricity trading that we presented in (Peters et al., 2012a). Our brokers can accommodate
arbitrary economic signals from their environments, and they learn efﬁciently over the large
state spaces resulting from these signals. Existing approaches (Reddy and Veloso, 2011a,b)
are limited in the state space size they can accommodate, and are thus constrained in terms
of the economic environments they can be deployed into. These works have also not con-
sidered customers’ variable daily load proﬁles (instead, assuming ﬁxed consumption), or the
broker’s wholesale trading – both core challenges for real-world electricity brokers. Our
design alleviates these limitations.
The research we report here extends our previous work (Peters et al., 2012a) by explor-
ing alternatives for the data-driven identiﬁcation of particularly informative signals from the
broker’s data-rich Smart Electricity Market environment. We explore the role that feature
selection and regularization techniques play in the broker’s adaptation process. Speciﬁcally,
we explore the beneﬁts of two different feature selection procedures based on Genetic Al-
gorithms and greedy forward selection, and compare them to L1-regularized online learning
techniques over the full state space. We ﬁnd that the inexpensive regularization approach
yields satisfactory results under some market conditions; however, the more extensive fea-
ture selection techniques can be highly effective across different market regimes (Ketter
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et al., 2012a) if adequate precautions are taken against environmental overﬁtting. Based on
our empirical results, in this paper we also provide guidance on how such overﬁtting can be
alleviated, as well as discuss approaches which are specialized to the Smart Grid challenge
we study here. Our empirical evaluations are based on real-world electricity market data
from the Ontario Wholesale Market and a revised model of individual customers’ consump-
tion decisions. The customer model we employ captures intra-day variability in demand and
has been shown to yield realistic aggregate load curves, rendering our empirical results sig-
niﬁcantly more meaningful as compared to earlier studies, including our own work (Peters
et al., 2012a). Our empirical results demonstrate that our broker design is highly effective
and that it consistently outperforms prior approaches despite the additional challenges we
consider.
More generally, research on autonomous electricity brokers for the Smart Grid consti-
tutes a nascent, emerging ﬁeld, in which most of the challenges are largely unexplored.
Improving our understanding of methods that address these challenges has far-reaching im-
plications to society at large. For example, our broker design contributes to current research
on economic mechanism design for the Smart Grid by providing effective strategies against
which such mechanisms can be validated, e.g. (de Weerdt et al., 2011). Our extensive evalu-
ation of feature selection techniques raises new and interesting questions about connections
between overﬁtting and market stability in the presence of autonomous trading strategies.
We also offer an example of how Machine Learning research can inform important develop-
ments in the future Smart Grid in Section 2.5.5. In addition to the development of a novel
broker agent design, important objectives of this paper are to contribute to our understanding
of key design decisions that enable broker agents to operate effectively in the Smart Grid,
and to inform future work of challenges and promising research directions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we give an overview of our Smart
Electricity Market Simulation (SEMS). Section 2.3 describes foundations in Reinforcement
Learning, feature selection, and regularization that our approach builds on. Section 2.4 intro-
duces SELF, our class of Smart Electricity Market Learners with Function Approximation.
A thorough empirical evaluation of our learners in comparison to strategies proposed in the
literature follows in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 we review relevant literature. Finally, we
conclude with directions for future research.
2.2 Smart Electricity Market Simulation
Smart Electricity Markets aim to intelligently integrate the actions of customers, generating
companies, and the Distribution Utility, cf. Figure 2.1. We developed SEMS, a data-driven
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Figure 2.1. Smart Electricity Market structure
Smart ElectricityMarket Simulation, based on wholesale prices from a real-world electricity
market1 and a complete, micro-level model of appliance usage in private households. An
important property of our simulation, with implications for the broker we design to operate
in this environment, is to relax the assumption in previous work that consumers exhibit ﬁxed
demand (Reddy and Veloso, 2011a,b). Fixed demand simpliﬁes the broker’s task, however
the resultant brokers may not offer an adequate response to the realities of electricity markets.
In particular, a key challenge for real-world brokers is to effectively deal with patterns in
consumer demand. This is important for effective grid balancing, as some patterns, such as
high consumption during midday peak-hours, are signiﬁcantly more costly for the broker to
offset in the wholesale market (cf. Figure 2.2).
Below we outline the key elements of a Smart Grid, along with the models that represent
them in our simulation.
• Customers C = {Cj} are small-to-medium-size consumers or producers of electric-
ity, such as private households and small ﬁrms. Each Cj denotes a group of one or
more customers with similar characteristics and a joint, aggregate consumption pro-
ﬁle. Customers buy and sell electricity through the tariff market, where they subscribe
to standardized tariff offerings, including ﬁxed-rate, time-of-use (ToU), and variable-
rate tariffs. We describe our customer model in more detail below. Presently, only
a small proportion of electricity is produced decentrally, and central production will
1For this study we used data from Ontario’s Independent System Operator, http://www.ieso.ca, which has
also been used in a related study (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b).
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continue to play a signiﬁcant role in the near future. As a liberal upper bound consider
that, of the 592 TWh of electricity produced in Germany in 2009, merely 75 TWh
were produced decentrally under the country’s Renewable Energy Act (12.6%) (Euro-
stat, 2011). Accordingly, the customers in our model act exclusively as consumers of
electricity.
• Generating Companies (GenCos) are large-scale producers of energy, such as oper-
ators of fossil-fueled power plants and wind parks. GenCos are wholesalers of elec-
tricity production commitments. Because changes in power plant production levels
have signiﬁcant lead times, wholesale electricity is traded forward from several hours
to several months in advance.
• The Distribution Utility (DU) is responsible for operating the electric grid in real-
time. In particular, the DU manages imbalances between the total energy consumption
and the total outstanding production commitments at any given time. To this end, the
DU provides or absorbs energy on short notice and charges the responsible broker
imbalance penalties. In SEMS, the DU charges balancing fees that are roughly twice
as high as the long-term average cost of electricity in the wholesale market, and thus
provides brokers a strong incentive to build easily predictable portfolios of subscribers.
• Electricity Brokers B= {Bi} are proﬁt-seeking intermediaries, trading for their own
account.2 Brokers are retailers of electricity in the tariff market, and they offset the
net consumption of their tariff subscribers by acquiring production commitments in
either the tariff (small-scale producers) or wholesale market (GenCos). The portfolio
of contractual arrangements that brokers obtain in this way is executed in real-time
by the DU. Brokers aim to compile a portfolio of high-volume, high-margin tariff
subscriptions with predictable consumption patterns, that can be offset with production
commitments at a low cost. In SEMS, brokers publish one ﬁxed-rate tariff at any given
time. This design reﬂects the fact that ﬁxed rates are currently still the dominant tariff
model, mainly due to the absence of advanced metering capabilities among electricity
customers. We are interested in the performance of methods for autonomous retail
electricity trading. To this end, we endow both, our own strategies and our benchmark
strategies, with a ﬁxed wholesale trading algorithm based on Neural Network load
forecasting, and brokers learn to develop a proﬁtable retail trading strategy against
this backdrop. Our choice of Neural Networks is mainly due to their good out-of-the-
box performance in timeseries forecasting tasks. Alternatives, e.g. based on ARIMA
2Electricity Brokers are sometimes also referred to as Load Serving Entities (LSEs) or Aggregators in the elec-
tricity market literature.
36_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
24 Chapter 2. Autonomous Decision-Making in Smart Electricity Markets
models (Conejo et al., 2005), exist but we do not consider them further as they would
impact the performance of all examined strategies in the same way.
The SEMS Simulation Environment is responsible for coordinating brokers, customers,
and the DU. It manages the tariff market, and provides a wholesale market based on actual
market data from Ontario’s Independent System Operator. The wholesale market in SEMS
determines prices by randomly selecting a window of sufﬁcient size for the simulation run
from almost ten years of real-world wholesale market pricing data. Figure 2.2 shows the
long-term daily price distribution as well as daily price curves for 10 randomly selected days
from that dataset. Once these prices have been determined, broker orders have no impact on
them. Modeling brokers as price-takers is reﬂective of liberalized retail electricity markets,
where an increasing number of small brokers compete against each other. For 2008, for
example, the European Commission reported close to 940 non-main electricity retailers in
Germany that shared 50% of the German market (Eurostat, 2011).
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Figure 2.2. (a) Price distribution (mean ± one standard deviation) for 10
years of price data from the Ontario wholesale market; (b) Price curves for
10 randomly selected sample days
A SEMS simulation runs over N timeslots 1, . . . ,n, . . . ,N which are structured as de-
scribed in Figure 2.3.
1. Each broker Bi receives information about its current customers Cn(Bi), the history of
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Figure 2.3. Sequence diagram for one simulation timeslot
wholesale prices W1, . . . ,Wn−1, the tariffs offered by all brokers at the end of the last
timeslot Tn−1 = {τB1 , . . . ,τB|B| }, and its current cash account balance.3
2. Each broker indicates the volume of energy Vˆ cn that it wishes to procure in the current
timeslot. Note, that the broker has no previous knowledge of its customers’ actual con-
sumption nor of the wholesale prices for the current timeslot. There is no acquisition
uncertainty; the indicated volume Vˆ cn is always ﬁlled by the simulation.
3. Each customer Cj decides the volume of electricity Vcn (Cj) to consume given its cur-
rent tariff, and announces this volume to the simulation. The volume consumed,
Vcn (Cj), is derived from the corresponding customer’s consumption model, which we
describe below.
4. Based on the consumption decisions of its customers, its current tariff, and its acqui-
sition in the wholesale market, each broker’s cash account is credited (debited) with
a trading proﬁt (loss) τc(Vcn )− Vˆ cn ·Wn, where τc(Vcn ) denotes the cost of consuming
Vcn under the current tariff τc to the customers (i.e., the revenue of the broker), and
Vˆ cn ·Wn denotes the cost of procuring Vˆ cn units of energy at the prevailing wholesale
price Wn. Any imbalance between the broker’s forecast, and the actual amount of
energy consumed by its customers is made up for by the Distribution Utility. An im-
balance penalty of I per unit of mismatch, or |Vcn − Vˆ cn | · I in total, is debited from the
cash account of the broker for this service.
5. Each broker receives ex-post information on the actual aggregate consumption volume
3We summarize the mathematical notation used here and below in Table 2.1.
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of its customers in the current timeslotVcn , its trading proﬁt, its imbalance penalty, and
its cash account balance at the end of the timeslot.
6. Each broker is queried if it wishes to change its offered tariff. A ﬁxed amount reﬂect-
ing administrative costs on the side of the broker is charged for each tariff update.
7. Each customer is queried if it wishes to subscribe to a different tariff.
Customers in SEMS are represented by a customer model, each instance of which rep-
resents the aggregate behavior of a group of customers. The customer model consists of a
consumption model, which computes the amount of energy consumed in a given timeslot,
and a tariff evaluator, which deﬁnes how customers select a tariff from a set of offered
tariffs. Separating the consumption decision from the tariff selection decision in this way is
economically well-motivated. In the short run, the electricity demand of private households
is unresponsive to changes in price level. There is some empirical evidence for customers’
willingness to shift electricity consumption over the day in response to changing electricity
prices, e.g., (Herter et al., 2007). However, this phenomenon does not apply to our scenario
of a ﬁxed-rate tariff.
The consumption model in SEMS employs a micro-level simulation of electric appli-
ance usage in private households based on the work of Gottwalt et al. (2011). This model
incorporates statistical data on household types, household sizes, appliance saturation, sea-
sonality on multiple timescales, vacations, etc. to replicate consumption decisions of a real-
world customer population, and has been shown to yield realistic aggregate load curves. Our
model makes use of all of these features, except for long-term seasonal effects which have
no signiﬁcant impact on the broker’s primary challenges of short-term demand forecasting
and balancing. Figure 2.4 shows weekly consumption proﬁles generated by our consump-
tion model for populations of 10 and 1000 households, respectively. The proﬁles reﬂect the
characteristic consumption peaks exhibited by private households around noon and during
the early evening hours, seasonality effects between weekdays and weekends, as well as the
typical consumption averaging behavior in large customer populations (Figure 2.4, Panel (b))
with signiﬁcant reductions in the aggregate consumption’s noise level.
Our tariff evaluator is based on current insights about customers’ tariff selection be-
havior and works as follows:4 If the tariff that a customer is currently subscribed to is still
4Standard models of electricity tariff selection behavior are currently still an open question in Behavioral Eco-
nomics and Smart Grid research. Our model captures two central characteristics of customer choice that are thought
to lead to sub-optimal tariff choices by human decision-makers: Inertia or switching probability refers to customers’
tendency to remain in their current tariff even if better alternatives surface, e.g. (Nicolaisen et al., 2001), and cus-
tomer irrationality refers to sub-optimality resulting from a range of behavioral factors, e.g. (Wilson and Price,
2010).
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Figure 2.4. Simulated load curves from the SEMS customer model. Panel (a)
shows the individual consumption proﬁles of 10 households, Panel (b) illus-
trates how the averaging effect leads to a smoother aggregate consumption
pattern in a population of 1000 households.
available, the customer considers selecting a new tariff with a ﬁxed probability q. With
probability 1− q it remains in its current tariff without considering any other offers. This
behavior captures customers’ inertia in selecting and switching to new tariffs. If the tariff
that the customer is currently subscribed to is not available any longer, the customer selects
a new tariff with probability 1. To select a new tariff, the customer ranks all tariffs according
to their ﬁxed rates; ties are broken randomly. A perfectly informed and rational customer
would simply select the lowest-rate tariff from this ranking, because the lowest-rate tariff
minimizes the expected future cost of electricity. In reality, however, customer decisions
will tend to deviate from this theoretical optimum for reasons that include (1) customers do
not possess perfect information about all tariffs, either because it is unavailable to them, or
because they eschew the effort of comparing large numbers of tariffs; and (2) they make
decisions based on non-price criteria such as trust and network effects that are absent from
our model. We capture these deviations from a simple price rank-order using a Boltzmann
distribution.
Assume a customer has to decide among a total of |T| tariffs. Then the probability of
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Figure 2.5. CDF for the Boltzmann distribution. The parametrized discrete
distribution is used to model departures from rationality in tariff selection.
selecting the r-th best tariffs is:
Pr(Rank= r) =
e−r/τ
∑|T|i=1 e−i/τ
Here, τ is the so-called temperature parameter with τ ∈ (0,∞). The temperature can be
interpreted as the customers’ degree of irrationality relative to the theoretically optimal tariff
decision. Consider the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) depicted in Figure 2.5 for
different values of τ . For τ → 0, only the best-ranked tariff has considerable mass, i.e., the
tariff decision is perfectly rational. For τ →∞, the distribution approaches a discrete uniform
distribution, i.e., customers select their tariff at random.
2.3 RL and Strategies for High-Dimensional State Spaces
To operate effectively in the Smart Electricity Market outlined in Section 2.2, an electricity
broker agent ought to learn from its environment in multiple ways. In particular, it must
learn about potential customers and their behavior in terms of tariff selection and electricity
consumption. A broker should also learn the behavior of its competitors, and derive tariff
pricing policies that strike a balance between competitiveness and proﬁtability. Furthermore,
because a broker also acts in the wholesale market, it must learn ways to match its tariff
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market actions with wholesale trading strategies in order to maximize its proﬁt. Note, that
the broker’s only means of learning is its ability to act in the markets it trades in, and to
observe the (long-term) consequences that its actions entail.
2.3.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) offers a suitable framework to address the challenges faced
by a broker acting in environments with unknown dynamics, and with the objective to col-
lect the highest net present value over all current and future rewards. This can entail fore-
going some immediate rewards for higher rewards in the future (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
More formally, the Reinforcement Learning task we consider here is deﬁned as a ﬁnite
Markov Decision Process (MDP) with observable states and a known, ﬁxed set of ac-
tions: MDP=< S,A,P,R> where S denotes a ﬁnite set of states, A denotes a ﬁnite set
of actions, and P and R deﬁne the transition probability function and immediate reward
function as follows:
Pa(s,s′) = Pr(sn+1 = s′|sn = s,an = a)
that is, Pa(s,s′) gives the probability of the environment choosing s′ as the following state
when s is the current state and the learner chooses action a. And
Ra(s,s′) = E(rn+1|sn = s,an = a,sn+1 = s′)
that is, Ra(s,s′) denotes the expected immediate reward received from the environment when
choosing action a in state s and being sent to state s′ by the environment thereafter. The
solution to such an MDP is the optimal policy π∗ that maximizes the net present value of
all current and future expected immediate rewards, i.e.,
π∗ = argmaxπ
∞
∑
n=0
γnRan=π(sn)(sn,sn+1)
where the learner follows the policy π that gives, for each state s, a corresponding action
a= π(s) to pursue. 0≤ γ < 1 denotes the discount parameter where smaller values of γ lead
to greater emphasis on current rewards.
Many algorithms have been proposed for ﬁnding good policies (Szepesva´ri, 2010). For
our agent, we use SARSA: a Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm, that is designed for online
control problems, such as our retail electricity trading task. The algorithm starts out with
some initial model of an action-value functionQ(s,a), which captures the learner’s estimate
of the net present value of being in state s, choosing action a next, and following the policy
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Symbol Deﬁnition
A= {ai} Constant set of actions available to the SELF reinforcement learner
αmax, α ′ Initial learning rate and decay of learning rate (1.0 = linear, 0.5 = square root,
etc.)
B= {Bi} Set of all competing brokers
C = {Cj},
Cn(Bi)
Set of all retail customers, customers of broker Bi at time n
δ Temporal difference in Q(s,a) between subsequent observations
e(λ ), λ Eligibility trace vector, e(λ ) has the same dimensionality as F(s,a), θ and
measures the eligibility ofθ ’s elements for temporal difference updates based
on recent observations; 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 determines the degree of recency, with
greater values leading to a longer memory of observations
εmax, ε ′ Initial exploration rate and decay of exploration rate (1.0 = linear, 0.5 =
square root, etc.)
F(s,a),θ Vector of features of the state-action pair (s,a) and their weights in a linear
action-value function, respectively
γ MDP discount parameter
μ Markup parameter of the benchmark strategies TableRL and Fixed
π , π∗ (Optimal) policy of a given MDP
Φ ∈ {0,1}n Vector indicating the features actually employed out of the set of all available
features
Ψ ∈ R⊆ Rm Vector of learning parameters such as αmax, λ , etc.
q Customer switching probability; probability that a customer model considers
a new tariff in any given timeslot
Q(s,a) Action-value of state s given action a
rn = Ra(s,s′) Immediate reward earned in timeslot n when the current state is s, the learner
takes action a, and is sent to state s′ by the environment
S= {si} Discrete set of all possible states of the environment
T Set of all tariffs offered in the tariff market
τ Customer irrationality τ ∈ [0;∞), where greater values represent less rational
or less informed tariff selection behavior
P= Pa(s,s′) Transition probability of the environment moving the learner to state s′ when
in s and choosing action a
Vcn , V
c
n (Cj) Actual net electricity consumption in time n and net consumption of cus-
tomerCj, respectively; from the perspective of one broker
Vˆ cn Estimate of one broker for its customers’ electricity consumption at time n
Wn Actual wholesale market price of electricity at time n
Table 2.1. Summary of mathematical notation
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implied by Q thereafter. The learner acts (approximately, except for occasional exploration)
greedily with respect to the policy implied by Q, and updates Q with the true feedback it
receives from the environment in each timeslot according to
Q(s,a)← Q(s,a)+α [rn+1+ γQ(sn+1,an+1)−Q(sn,an)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
temporal difference
(2.1)
where α denotes the learning rate. With probability ε , the learner chooses explorative actions
instead of the greedy action implied by Q(s,a) to investigate the value of other state-action
pairs. In our experiments below we let α and ε decay over time to obtain stronger learn-
ing and more aggressive exploration towards the beginning of the simulation.5 In general,
SARSA only converges to an exact estimate of Q when each state-action pair is visited an
inﬁnite number of times, and when the policy followed by the learner converges to a ﬁxed
policy. In our empirical evaluation we show that our learner performs well in spite of not
fully meeting these theoretical requirements.
A key challenge of using RL for the problem we address here is the deﬁnition of an
effective state space. Because it is not well understood which environmental features are
useful for capturing changes in the action-value, it is beneﬁcial to employ a wide array of
features so as to avoid the exclusion of particularly relevant ones. However, even with a
limited number of features, the state space quickly becomes too large to hold in memory.
Furthermore, when the state space is large, the extent of exploration required for the learner
to arrive at a reliable estimate of the action valuesQ(s,a) for each a∈A becomes prohibitive.
Previous work has dealt with this challenge by introducing derived features that combine
multiple environmental features into a single feature for the learner (Reddy and Veloso,
2011a,b). However, these derived features are inherently less informative for learning, and
there is no principled approach to constructing them. We address these challenges through a
two-pronged strategy: (1) We employ function approximation to enable the learner to deal
with potentially large state spaces; and (2) we explore the performance of feature selection
and regularization techniques that reduce the (effective) state space size.
2.3.2 Function Approximation
Function approximation refers to a parametrized, functional representation of Q(s,a) that
allows the broker to explore the effectiveness of strategies over a wider array of potentially
relevant states (see, e.g., (Rummery and Niranjan, 1994) for one of the earliest uses of func-
5We use αmax and εmax to denote maximal rates, and α ′ and ε ′ to denote the degree of the parameter decay
monomial, where α ′, ε ′ > 0 and a value of 1.0 stands for linear decay, 0.5 for square root decay, 2.0 for quadratic
decay, and so forth.
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tion approximation in online RL). The most common type of function approximation uses
the representation
Q(s,a) = θF(s,a)T
where Q(s,a) is linear in F(s,a), a vector of selected features of the current state s given
an action a. The reinforcement learner continually updates the weights in θ to make Q
more representative of the experiences gathered from the environment. With linear function
approximation this gradient descent update of θ takes the particularly simple form
θ ← θ +αδe(λ ) (2.2)
where α again denotes the learning rate, δ denotes the temporal difference (equivalent to
the update term in Equation 2.1), and e is the so-called eligibility trace which captures the
weights eligible for a learning update based on the recently visited state-action pairs. The
degree of recency is determined through the parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 with λ = 0 representing
updates only based on current observations, whereas greater values of λ introduce increas-
ing degrees of memorization into the update process. Note, that the features in F(s,a) can
themselves be nonlinear functions of features from the environment. Other types of function
approximation have also been proposed instead of this linear scheme, e.g. (Busoniu et al.,
2010, Pyeatt and Howe, 2001).
2.3.3 Feature Selection and Regularization
To improve our broker’s learning performance in its information-rich Smart Market environ-
ment, we complement function approximation with a principled reduction in (effective) state
space size. To this end, we explore different feature selection techniques as well as regular-
ization, and examine their performance and resulting trade-offs in our setting. It is important
to note that an MDP’s state space size must be ﬁxed and that the reduction referred to above
is achieved in two fundamentally different ways: The feature selection techniques we study
select a subset of relevant features ofﬂine, before the MDP is constructed. Once the relevant
features are selected, the learning process proceeds on a ﬁxed MDP with a state space that is
reduced as compared to the space over all original candidate features. Regularization, on the
other hand, aims to reduce the dimensions of the state space that are effectively used. That
is, while the MDP is constructed using a large ﬁxed state space, a regularized learner will
likely assign zero weights to many of these features.
While both approaches have been studied extensively in supervised learning, e.g. (Guyon
and Elisseeff, 2003), they have only recently been considered in RL (Loth et al., 2007,
Painter-Wakeﬁeld and Parr, 2012, Parr et al., 2008, Petrik et al., 2010), and it is impor-
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tant to understand their contributions to the effectiveness of the broker’s actions and any
implications for future work.
Feature selection here refers to methods that select informative projections F′(s,a) of
the complete feature vectorF(s,a) as basis for learning. Formally, letF(s,a) be a vector of n
candidate features of the current state-action pair, and Ψ a vector of m learning parameters.
Then
BLinFA = {BLinFA(φ1, . . . ,φn,ψ1, . . . ,ψm)‖Φ ∈ {0,1}n,Ψ ∈ R⊆ Rm}
is a class of linear function approximation based RL brokers that use the feature (F(s,a))i as
part of their state space iff the indicator φi = 1. Note, that we combine the feature selection
task (i.e., ﬁnding good values ofΦ) and the related parameter learning task (i.e., ﬁnding good
values for Ψ), because they can be conveniently tackled simultaneously during the heuristic
optimization described below.
We evaluate how well a particular broker B ∈ BLinFA competes in a given environment
by the ﬁtness function F : B 
→ [0,1] which measures the empirical average proﬁt share that
B captures in a given number of sample simulations. This procedure is also known as the
wrapper approach to feature selection (Blum and Langley, 1997). The best broker B∗ for
the given environment is then B(argmaxΦ,ΨF(B(Φ,Ψ))).6
Optimizing F with respect to B is, in general, intractable due to the lack of structure in
F and the size of its domain {0,1}n×R. To alleviate this challenge, we employ one of two
types of heuristic optimization:
• Greedy Feature Selection / Hill Climbing: Starting with a cohortC1 = {B11, . . . ,B1n}
of all possible single-feature brokers, we determine their ﬁtness values F(B11), . . . ,F(B
1
n)
and select the broker B1∗ with the maximal F value. We then construct the next cohort
C2 by augmenting B1∗ with each possible second feature and evaluate F(B21), . . . ,F(B
2
n−1)
for the n−1 resulting brokers. We repeat the process until no further improvement in
F values is achieved between cohorts, or until a predeﬁned time limit is reached. We
select the feature set Φ∗ of the overall F-maximizing broker B∗. This process is com-
monly known as forward selection (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003).
To select the broker’s parameters we use a hill-climbing procedure where we ﬁrst draw
p parameter vectors Ψ1, . . . ,Ψp and corresponding gradients ∇Ψ1, . . . ,∇Ψp at ran-
dom. We then construct the ﬁrst cohort asC1 = {B(Φ∗,Ψ1), . . . ,B(Φ∗,Ψp)} and sub-
6Note, that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁtness function does not preclude other social desiderata such as fairness, efﬁ-
ciency, or sustainability considerations from our Smart Market. By properly setting the market’s economic mecha-
nisms, market designers can create incentive structures that lead self-interested, proﬁt-maximizing brokers to jointly
aim towards socially desirable outcomes. Because we are primarily interested in the performance of autonomous
retail electricity trading strategies themselves, we consider these economic mechanisms to be given and refer the
reader to, e.g., (Dash et al., 2003, Parkes, 2007) for further details.
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sequently develop each broker along the predetermined gradient until no further im-
provement is possible. For example B(Φ∗,Ψ1) from C1 is developed into B(Φ∗,Ψ1+
∇Ψ1) in C2, B(Φ∗,Ψ1 + 2∇Ψ1) in C3, and so forth. We ﬁnally select the learning
parameters Ψ∗ of the overall F-maximizing broker.
• Genetic Algorithms: Genetic Algorithms are a well-suited heuristic optimization pro-
cedure for our problem given their good performance over large binary domains, such
as that of our feature indicators (De Jong, 1988). Starting with a randomly initialized
cohortC1 = {B11, . . . ,B1q} we apply a Genetic Algorithm with Mutation and Crossover
operators deﬁned as usual, and a small number of elite individuals that is carried over
from one cohort to the next (Liepins and Hilliard, 1989). As with the greedy procedure
outlined above, the Genetic Algorithm runs until no further improvements in ﬁtness
value take place or a predeﬁned time limit is reached. Note that the Genetic Algorithm
modiﬁes features and parameter values of the individuals concurrently, whereas our
greedy approach selects features and parameters in two separate tasks.
Regularization, in contrast to feature selection, shrinks or penalizes the weights in θ so
as to obtain sparse inner products θF(s,a)T . The resulting approximations are less prone to
overﬁtting the peculiarities in action-values because strong, repeated evidence is required for
a particular weight to become and remain non-zero. Regularized function approximations
are also quicker to evaluate due to their inherent sparsity. One of the key advantages of
regularization over feature selection is its natural integration into online learning processes
which obviates the need for a separate ofﬂine learning phase.
Despite its seeming appeal, little theoretical groundwork has so far been done on the use
of regularization in online RL. One of few exceptions is the work by Painter-Wakeﬁeld et
al. (2012) who extend the regularized batch RL algorithm LARS-TD (Kolter and Ng, 2009)
into L1TD, an L1-regularized online RL algorithm. L1TD adds the shrinkage operation
θ ← sgn(θ)max{|θ |−ν ,0}
(with all operators deﬁned component-wise) to the gradient descent update from Equa-
tion 2.2. The shrinkage operation effectively moves each component of θ towards zero
by ν on each update, and the combined procedure can be shown to yield equivalent results
to the L1-regularized regression formulation in the batch case (Painter-Wakeﬁeld and Parr,
2012).
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2.4 Learning Strategies
In this section, we introduce SELF, our class of Smart Electricity Market Learners with
Function Approximation. A thorough empirical evaluation of our learners in comparison to
strategies proposed in the literature follows in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 SELF
Our candidate strategy SELF is a class of SARSA reinforcement learners with linear func-
tion approximation. The state set of each SELF instance reﬂects selected aspects of its
observable economic environment (e.g., its own tariff rate, competitors’ tariff rates, market
competitiveness indicators, etc.), and its action set contains possible actions in the tariff mar-
ket. The learning objective is to ﬁnd a policy π that approximately maximizes the learner’s
long-term reward in a Smart Electricity Market environment, while competing against other,
both learning and non-learning, strategies.
As outlined in Section 2.3.1, one of the key challenges in our Smart Electricity Market
setting is the deﬁnition of an effective state space for the learner to learn over. We ad-
dress this challenging problem by deﬁning a large set of candidate features that captures as
much environmental detail as possible, and then applying feature selection and regulariza-
tion techniques to identify a suitable subset of features that beneﬁt learning. Table 2.2 shows
a grid of features (vertical) and related encodings (horizontal), and shaded cells mark the
feature/encoding pairs that are available to the SELF learner for learning.7 This example list
of candidate features provides a good coverage of all economic information available from
the environment. It is important to note that because a primary goal of our design is to sub-
stitute laborious, manual state space construction with principled optimization techniques,
our methods can accommodate arbitrary additions to this feature set.
Another important element of an electricity broker design are the actions it can take in
the retail market. Generally, a broker can either (a) set a new rate on its tariff, or (b) maintain
its existing rate. The canonical model for this action set is a continuous or a discretized set
of plausible target rates. However, our evaluations revealed that simultaneously learning the
variability in the wholesale price-level and the variability among its competitors in this way
overburdens the learner. To facilitate learning, we propose a set of economically meaningful
actions for the broker to choose from. In particular, SELF brokers can choose among the dis-
crete action set shown in Table 2.3, which is normalized relative to the prevailing wholesale
market price level: A SELF broker can set its tariffs relative to other tariffs in the market. In
7In the table, Plain denotes the unencoded feature, RBF and RBF(T) denote Radial Basis Function encoding
(optionally with thresholding) (Sutton and Barto, 1998), and Bin denotes a sign binary encoding which, given a real
value x, transforms x 
→ (I(sgn(x) =−1),I(sgn(x) = 0),I(sgn(x) = +1)) ∈ {0,1}3.
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Feature / Encoding Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Description
Bias Constant 1.0
ActionIndex Index of the selected action
ActionOneInK One-In-K representation of the
selected action
BetterConsumptionRates Number of better (lower) rates in
the tariff market
CashGradient Change in cash account balance
over the last 48 hours
CustomerGradient Change in number of customers
over the last 48 hours
MarketBreadth Range from lowest to highest rate
in the tariff market
MarketShare Percentage of all customers sub-
scribed to SELF
MarkupLeader Relative margin, as percentage
of smoothed wholesale price, be-
tween SELF and the cheapest tar-
iff in the market
NumberCustomers Number of subscribed customers
RateChangeIndicator 1 if selected action would result
in a rate change, 0 otherwise
TargetMargin Margin over smoothed wholesale
price after performing a given ac-
tion
WholesalePrice Smoothed electricity wholesale
price
WorseConsumptionRates Number of worse (higher) rates
in the tariff market
Table 2.2. Candidate features for SELF state-action spaces
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Action Margin over Wholesale Price
MarginLeader Slightly lower than cheapest competitor
MarginAvg Average of all competitors
MarginTrailer Slightly higher than most expensive competitor
LowMargin Constant 10% margin
HighMargin Constant 20% margin
NoOp Keep the current tariff rate. Could lead to changes in margin if whole-
sale prices change.
Table 2.3. Available actions for SELF instances
doing so, the broker can choose among attacking its competitors (MarginLeader), position-
ing itself in the middle of the market (MarginAvg), or avoiding competition altogether by
posting the most expensive tariff (MarginTrailer). Alternatively, rather than setting its tariffs
relative to the market, the broker can set its tariffs in an absolute fashion, choosing between
LowMargin and HighMargin, irrespective of the competing tariffs in the market. We chose
the margins in Table 2.3 for their good observed performance in our experiments. The broker
may also leave its current tariff unchanged (NoOp).
2.4.2 Reference Strategies
We evaluated SELF against the learning and non-learning strategies proposed in (Reddy and
Veloso, 2011b). To address the need for a limited state space, the reference learning strat-
egy uses derived features, referred to as PriceRangeStatus and PortfolioStatus. Importantly,
the simulation model for which this strategy was evaluated did not include an explicit rep-
resentation of a wholesale market, represented consumers demand as ﬁxed throughout, and
the brokers’ only sources of electricity production commitments were small-scale producers.
Brokers offer one producer tariff in addition to the consumer tariff used by the brokers in
our study. These differences make some of the published results for this strategy difﬁcult to
interpret in the context of the market settings we consider here.8
The relevant benchmark strategies for evaluating our SELF Electricity Broker Agent are
• Learning a table-based reinforcement learner operating over the reduced, manually
constructed state space outlined above. For clarity, we henceforth refer to the Learning
strategy as TableRL.
8To incorporate these strategies in our simulation setting we used wholesale prices for producer prices, and
suppressed actions pertaining to small-scale producer tariffs. We also excluded the PortfolioStatus feature, which
is not meaningful for learning the TableRL strategy in our simulation model.
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• Fixed a strategy which charges a constant markup μ over the smoothed wholesale
price
• Greedy an adaptive strategy which charges either the highest rate in the market or an
average rate, depending on the current PriceRangeStatus PRSn. PRSn is deﬁned to be
Rational if the difference between consumption and production rates in the market is
at least μ (i.e., if the market charges a reasonable markup). In this case, the strategy
opportunistically chooses the currently highest rate in the market. Otherwise, PRSn is
Irrational and the strategy chooses an average rate next.
• Random a strategy which chooses the next action at random
We refer the reader to (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b) for complete details on these strategies.
2.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our SELF broker against the benchmark strategies from Section 2.4.2 in a se-
ries of experiments. Each experiment ran over 10 simulated days (240 timeslots) since longer
durations had very little impact on performance differences. The performance of each indi-
vidual broker was computed as the share of the overall proﬁts they captured. We repeated
each experiment 70 times to obtain conﬁdence intervals; all conﬁdence intervals and signiﬁ-
cance claims reported below are at the 95% conﬁdence level. The customer population was
ﬁxed to ﬁve customer groups based on our customer model, each representing the aggregate
behavior of a group of ten households.9 Each customer model instance was parametrized
with the same switching probability q and degree of irrationality τ as indicated below. Note,
that the parameter settings only imply equal levels of switching probability and irrationality
among customer groups, whereas the actual decisions vary among groups. The markup pa-
rameter μ of the reference strategies Fixed and TableRL was set to 0.10, at which we found
that these strategies performed best.
2.5.1 Manual broker construction
We ﬁrst constructed several instances of SELF manually by selecting learning parameters
and features based on our best knowledge of the problem domain. One rather typical example
conﬁguration is summarized in Table 2.4 where gray cells mark candidate feature/encoding
combinations, and black cells mark pairs that were actually used as part of the state space.
9We found that a larger numbers of customer groups had no signiﬁcant impact on the results as they did not
change the diversity of the population, while fewer customer groups produced an unrealistic “winner takes it all”
competition (see also Section 2.5.5).
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This particular instance uses features that reﬂect the broker’s own proﬁtability (CashGra-
dient) and customer base (NumberCustomers), the competitiveness of the market (Market-
Breadth), as well as the broker’s own aggressiveness in the market (MarkupLeader) – ar-
guably some of the fundamental variables in tariff pricing decisions.
Feature Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Parameter Value
Bias αmax 0.40
ActionIndex α ′ 1.00
ActionOneInK εmax 0.20
BetterConsumptionRates ε ′ 0.70
CashGradient
CustomerGradient γ 0.90
MarketBreadth
MarketShare
MarkupLeader
NumberCustomers
RateChangeIndicator
TargetMargin
WholesalePrice
WorseConsumptionRates
Table 2.4. Conﬁguration of a SELF instance constructed manually. Gray
shading indicates all candidate features, black shading represents features that
were manually selected using domain knowledge.
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Figure 2.6. Performance of the manually constructed SELF instance from
Table 2.4. While it is possible to manually select features that perform well
over a limited parameter range, constructing a broker that performs univer-
sally well proves challenging.
52_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
40 Chapter 2. Autonomous Decision-Making in Smart Electricity Markets
The empirical performance of the manually constructed instance in competitions against
a Fixed and a TableRL benchmark broker is shown in Figure 2.6. The tariff switching prob-
ability q was set to a low value (q = 0.1, left panel) and a moderate value (q = 0.5, right
panel), and we recorded the broker’s performance while varying the customer irrational-
ity parameter τ . SELF beats the reference strategies Fixed and TableRL by a statistically
signiﬁcant margin in many of these environments. It is interesting to note that TableRL’s
performance lags not only behind SELF, but also behind the Fixed strategy. This does not
contradict the good performance reported in (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b), as the settings we
explore here differ from those for which TableRL was constructed (see Section 2.4.2). How-
ever, this result underscores the importance of a well-chosen state space, and the need for a
broker design that is able to identify and accommodate any effective state space for a given
environment.
Importantly, our results also demonstrate a common outcome for manually constructed
SELF brokers: While it is possible to construct broker instances that perform very well
under some market conditions, achieving robustness over a wide range of market conditions
is exceedingly difﬁcult. For high levels of customer irrationality, the performance of the
manually-constructed broker approaches that of the Fixed strategy. This result may seem
counter-intuitive, because even for the challenging case of customers choosing their tariffs
at random, there is a winning strategy: by raising tariff rates, a broker can increase its proﬁt
margin without affecting its customer base. The diminishing performance of SELF for large
values of τ stems from an implicit assumption behind its manually constructed state space.
Recall that this broker’s state space is constructed from the number of subscribed customers,
a proﬁtability measure (CashGradient), a competitiveness measure (MarketBreadth), as well
as a measure of the broker’s own aggressiveness in the market (MarkupLeader). This is a
well-chosen feature set for capturing rational, consistent market conditions; however, these
features are far less informative or even distracting in settings with signiﬁcant randomness
in customers’ choices.
In further experiments we analyzed the performance of manually constructed SELF in-
stances for a wide array of settings by varying the simulation length, the number of cus-
tomers, values of the markup parameter μ of the reference strategies, and the settings of the
learning parameters. We omit details here for the sake of brevity, but we note that this SELF
instance performs competitively in all cases except for pathological choices of learning pa-
rameters.
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2.5.2 Feature Selection
To further improve the SELF broker’s learning and to overcome the challenges that arise
from manual feature and parameter selection, we explored the use of the feature selection
approaches described in Section 2.3.3 to automatically adapt SELF instances to different
market conditions. We ﬁxed a customer population with relatively low switching probabil-
ity (q = 0.1) and irrationality (τ = 0.1) and employed greedy feature selection or a Genetic
Algorithm to identify high performing SELF instances. Both methods were allotted a max-
imum of 24 hours for practical reasons; during the search, the ﬁtness of each candidate
instance was evaluated over 25 simulation runs.
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Figure 2.7. Performance of the SELF instance obtained through greedy fea-
ture selection, see also Table 2.5. Its performance compares favorably to the
manually constructed instance over a wide range of environmental parame-
ters.
Figure 2.7 shows the performance of the broker conﬁguration obtained with the greedy
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feature selection process. In contrast to the manually constructed instance, the data-driven
feature-selection instance consistently outperforms the Fixed strategy over the full range of
environmental settings, even while declining noticeably in high-noise environments (higher
values of τ). The latter behavior may suggest an adaptation to the low-τ environment used
for feature selection, and may also reﬂect inherently greater difﬁculty of deriving a proﬁtable
policy when customers exhibit random behaviors.
Feature Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Parameter Value
Bias αmax 0.73
ActionIndex α ′ 0.22
ActionOneInK εmax 0.45
BetterConsumptionRates ε ′ 0.04
CashGradient
CustomerGradient γ 0.71
MarketBreadth
MarketShare
MarkupLeader
NumberCustomers
RateChangeIndicator
TargetMargin
WholesalePrice
WorseConsumptionRates
Table 2.5. SELF instance conﬁguration obtained through greedy feature se-
lection. The resulting state space is sparse, the parameter values hint at a
strong overﬁtting effect, however.
Evidence for the former hypothesis can be found in the conﬁguration summary in Ta-
ble 2.5. The extremely high initial learning rate αmax = 0.73, along with slow decay (α ′ =
0.22), and a high exploration rate hint at strong overﬁtting. This result is a direct consequence
of the relatively stable environment for which the SELF instance’s features are optimized.
In fact, in most simulation runs we observed under this conﬁguration, SELF learned to price
its tariff slightly below the Fixed strategy’s rate very early on, and remained in that position
for the rest of the simulation. While this policy does well in many settings, it will not likely
perform well in environments with high levels of wholesale market volatility or customer
irrationality (see the remarks on winning strategies in these environments above). We give a
complete example of such a simulation run in Appendix A.1.
Support for the overﬁtting hypothesis also comes from the performance shown in Fig-
ure 2.7. Somewhat surprisingly, SELF’s performance in high-τ environments ﬁrst decreases
with increasing values of q (closing gap on right side in panels (a) though (c)) but then im-
proves signiﬁcantly for q= 0.9 (widening gap in panel (d)). We interpret this as a low-bias /
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high-variance phenomenon with high variance results away from the original feature selec-
tion environment. This insight gives rise to opportunities for increasing the robustness of the
feature selection outcome, which we explore below.
Feature Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Parameter Value
Bias αmax 0.66
ActionIndex α ′ 0.37
ActionOneInK εmax 0.16
BetterConsumptionRates ε ′ 0.62
CashGradient
CustomerGradient γ 0.83
MarketBreadth
MarketShare
MarkupLeader
NumberCustomers
RateChangeIndicator
TargetMargin
WholesalePrice
WorseConsumptionRates
Table 2.6. SELF instance conﬁguration obtained through GA feature selec-
tion, overﬁtting effects are less pronounced than with greedy feature selection
but still noticeably present.
The performance of the SELF instance constructed using Genetic Algorithm feature
selection is shown in Figure 2.8. This broker signiﬁcantly outperforms its benchmarks, but
it performs slightly worse than the SELF instance derived with greedy feature selection.
Here, as in the greedy case, we ﬁnd evidence of overﬁtting in the empirical results and in
the learning parameters, with very high learning and exploration rates (Table 2.6) and high-
variance behavior in environments that are different from those for which the broker was
optimized. Moreover, the GA produces solutions to the feature selection problem that are
signiﬁcantly denser than the greedy solutions and it takes the algorithm longer to ﬁnd them.
In all our experiments, the GA feature selection exhausted the maximum allotted 24 hours,
while greedy feature selection typically terminated within 5 - 10 hours, well below the limit.
We therefore recommend the use of greedy feature selection over Genetic Algorithms and
henceforth employ the greedy procedure exclusively.
2.5.3 Market Stability / Guarding against Overﬁtting
Our ﬁndings above have signiﬁcant practical implications for the Smart Grid domain and
beyond: Overﬁtting, either from automatically adapting autonomous trading strategies to
certain environments or from comparable manual optimization, threatens the stability of
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Figure 2.8. Performance of a SELF instance obtained through GA feature
selection, see also Table 2.6. The more thorough search for the best state
space does not result in better performance as compared to a simple greedy
approach.
Smart Markets. As such, measures against overﬁtting are important to both designers of
autonomous trading strategies and policy makers. In this section, we ﬁrst consider two
measures that can be built into the optimization process, bootstrapping and noise injection,
before we turn our attention to regularization as an alternative to ofﬂine feature selection in
Section 2.5.4.
In the experiments above, all SELF instances were initialized with zero weights for their
value functions, corresponding to an initially random policy that evolves into a meaning-
ful decision-making strategy over time. Initializing brokers with a random policy has two
important implications in our setting. In the case of ofﬂine optimization, this initialization
encourages the selection of features and parameters that allow for very fast learning early
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on, at the cost of not generalizing well. In addition, this sets SELF instances at a signiﬁcant
disadvantage relative to non-learning strategies, such as Fixed, which can take reasonable
actions from the very beginning.
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Figure 2.9. Performance of a SELF instance obtained through greedy feature
selection with bootstrapping. Bootstrapping leads to a performance increase
due to the lowered impact of costly initial explorations.
To counteract the overﬁtting tendency of greedy optimization, we explored the use of
bootstrapping within the optimization process. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst trained the candidate
on one run of the simulation, as before. The ﬁtness measure, however, was then evaluated
on a second run of the simulation in which we bootstrapped the candidate using the policy
learned during the ﬁrst run. This procedure can be interpreted as a form of cross-validation
of the broker’s conﬁguration.
An examination of the conﬁgurations obtained in this manner reveals that several auto-
matically selected parameters now have more moderate values compared to when bootstrap-
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ping is not used. Importantly, with bootstrapping the decay rates α ′ = 1.41 and ε ′ = 1.09
are both super-linear, yielding a quick decline in learning and exploration, and correspond
to a stable learned policy towards the end of each simulation. While the initial learning rate
αmax = 0.37 and the initial exploration rate εmax = 0.34 are relatively high, they are both
signiﬁcantly lower than those produced without bootstrapping.10
In comparison with the non-bootstrapping case (Figure 2.7), the broker’s performance
shown in Figure 2.9 is promising in two important ways. First, as shown, the broker’s per-
formance towards the left of the graphs (low-τ , the environment for which the broker is
optimized) is better than with the non-bootstrapping instance. This results from the bro-
ker taking informed actions from the beginning. In addition, as shown in Figure 2.9, while
performance towards high-τ values declines, it does so in a consistent, predictable fashion
across different values of q. Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that bootstrapping is an
effective countermeasure against the overﬁtting effects associated with plain greedy feature
selection.
We now consider noise injection, which has long been recognized for its potential bene-
ﬁts in alleviating overﬁtting and improving generalization in supervised settings, e.g. (Bishop,
1995). A challenging choice with this approach is setting the level of noise to be injected
into the learning process, such that generalizable patterns remain while spurious patterns
are masked by noise. We propose that in competitive Smart Market settings this problem
can be circumvented by introducing additional brokers into the market. In particular, in the
experiments that we present here, we included in the environment additional brokers which
follow a Random strategy. While purely random brokers cannot be expected to be present
in actual Smart Electricity Markets, they are interesting to consider because they allow the
separation of noise injection effects from the effects of additional competition, i.e., random
traders inject noise while not capturing any signiﬁcant market share.11
The performances with noise injection are presented in Figure 2.10, and reveal several in-
sightful differences to the performance of the broker learned with bootstrapping. Perhaps the
most signiﬁcant of those is that the broker’s performance for high-τ regimes is not only dras-
tically improved over brokers learned with bootstrapping and plain greedy feature selection,
but it is also better over a wider range of environmental settings. At the same time, without
the use of bootstrapping, the broker must initially learn a policy at the cost of uninformed
exploration; hence, the proﬁt share of the SELF instance is lower in the low-τ regimes for
which it is optimized, as compared to when bootstrapping is used. Interestingly, the bene-
10The full conﬁguration is given in Appendix A.3, Table A.1.
11We also considered the case of additional smart trading strategies. Speciﬁcally, we let two instances of SELF
compete against each other, as well as against the benchmarks used earlier to explore whether our broker’s strategy
remains stable under self-play. Our results indicate that both SELF strategies deliver stable performance over a
wide range of environments. We refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for details.
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Figure 2.10. Performance of a SELF instance obtained through greedy fea-
ture selection with noise injection. Note, that all three random strategies are
superimposed at the zero-line.
ﬁts from bootstrapping and noise injection are complementary. In subsequent experiments,
we show that the beneﬁts of noise injection and bootstrapping can indeed be combined to
obtain even more robust strategies that achieve both improved performance in their target
environment, as well as lower-variance performance for environments that differ from the
anticipated ones. We refer the reader to Appendix A.3 for further details on these studies.
Finally, our ﬁndings above raise several useful questions for Reinforcement Learning
scholars as well as for designers of Smart Market mechanisms. We show that better and
more robust learning performance can be achieved via the injection of additional noise from
randomized brokers, who, importantly, do not capture market share at all. The mere presence
of these brokers prompted the greedy optimization procedure to choose a more robust con-
ﬁguration and the resulting broker to act more proﬁtably. While the introduction of purely
60_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
48 Chapter 2. Autonomous Decision-Making in Smart Electricity Markets
randomized traders is infeasible in Smart Markets, there may well be market designs that
introduce equivalent noise to be perceived by brokers (e.g., trading delays, artiﬁcial noise on
price and volume data, etc.). From a market design perspective, it is interesting to consider
whether such distortions can in fact lead to better allocation outcomes in the presence of au-
tomated trading strategies. From a theoretical perspective, reinforcement learners typically
face stochastic reward and transition functions, and they introduce additional randomness
through their own action selection (exploration). However, to our knowledge, the potential
beneﬁts of noise injection into the learner’s observations have so far only been explored for
supervised learning tasks.
2.5.4 Regularization
As an alternative to the feature selection techniques discussed above we explored the use of
weight regularization for our function approximator. Regularization automatically selects an
effective subset from the set of all available features during online learning, and obviates the
need for an explicit, ofﬂine feature selection phase. It is conceptually simple, and it can be
easily integrated into the online learning process.
Figure 2.11 shows the performance of a SELF instance using regularization as roughly
comparable to that of the manually constructed instance shown in Figure 2.6. While reg-
ularization is not uniformly effective, it is important to note that this level of performance
has been achieved with far less domain knowledge and without a model of the environment
against which the broker instance could be optimized. Our regularized broker performs well
for environments with high customer switching probabilities (q = 0.9, right panel) and low
levels of customer irrationality (τ small, left end of both panels). Both ﬁndings are intuitive:
a regularized function approximation requires frequent, strong, and consistent feedback to
form an effective policy; in our example such environments arise when customers exhibit
high switching probabilities (high q, more frequent retail market feedback) and low levels of
irrationality (low τ , more consistent retail market feedback). Thus, while regularization is
not consistently effective, it appears to be a beneﬁcial low-cost strategy for learning without
explicit feature selection in stable market environments.12
2.5.5 Impact of customer characteristics
In a ﬁnal experiment, we aim to highlight an interesting case of how Machine Learning re-
search can further inform policy decisions in the Smart Grid domain. This does not aim to
12An anonymous reviewer offered the following potential explanation for the comparatively weak performance
of regularization: Shrinkage tends to drive weights to zero in areas of the state space that the learner is currently not
exploring (based on the sequential nature of exploration in online RL). In other words, the learner “forgets” about
regions of the state space not recently visited. We ﬁnd this explanation quite plausible.
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Figure 2.11. Performance of a SELF instance using regularization. The in-
stance performs at par with a manually constructed broker instance but does
not require domain knowledge.
offer a full-ﬂedged policy analysis, but a demonstration of how Machine Learning research
can contribute to shaping this important, challenging domain. Consider the concept of mi-
crogrids, self-organizing communities of small-scale electricity consumers and producers,
who act as one customer in the retail market, and who only trade net imbalances (i.e., con-
sumption they are unable to meet with own production, or production they cannot absorb
with own consumption) in the upstream grid (cf. Figure 2.1).
Important open questions pertaining to microgrids are whether their introduction is ben-
eﬁcial to market stability; and, if so, what are the expected implications of the number,
size, and sophistication of microgrids in the market. One can also interpret these factors
as follows: the number of microgrids captures the lumpiness of decision making (where
fewer microgrids corresponds to fewer independent decisions in the retail market); the size
of microgrids reﬂects idiosyncratic risk, because the aggregated behavior of a larger num-
ber of households tends to appear smoother, cf. Figure 2.4; and, ﬁnally, the sophistication
of microgrids pertains to the degree of rationality in their decision-making, and is inversely
related to τ in our notation. Higher levels of sophistication can be a consequence of im-
plementing advanced decision-support within each microgrid, but can also be related to the
amount of information ﬂowing from the upstream market into the microgrid. We expect the
autonomous retail trading task to become measurably harder as the lumpiness of decision-
making increases (up to the limiting case of “winner takes all” competition), as the size
of each microgrid decreases (up to the limiting case of single households, as in traditional
electricity retail markets), and as sophistication decreases.
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We studied the implications of these factors on the performance of SELF, as it represents
a state-of-the-art autonomous retail trading agent. The left column in Figure 2.12 shows
increasing numbers of microgrids with low levels of sophistication (high τ values), whereas
the right column presents microgrids with higher sophistication; each panel shows the per-
formances of the broker across different sizes of microgrids. One insight from these results
is that the number and sophistication of microgrids are key factors in the performance of
our strategy, whereas the implications of each microgrid’s size is less signiﬁcant. Speciﬁ-
cally, the performance curves for SELF and the alternative strategies are roughly ﬂat, with
no clear trend as microgrid sizes change. The only exceptions are the single-grid cases in
panels (a) and (b), where SELF starts to perform consistently from about 10-20 households.
This result is partly due to a degenerate “winner takes it all” competition as reﬂected in
the wider conﬁdence bounds, and partly due to the Fixed strategy generally ignoring con-
sumption patterns and tariff selection decisions. A second useful insight is the decisive role
that the sophistication of individual microgrid decisions plays in autonomous retail trading
strategies’ performance. For low sophistication (left column), SELF performs comparably
to a simple Fixed strategy in most cases; only for relatively large numbers of microgrids
does SELF perform signiﬁcantly better than the alternative strategies. In contrast, the right
column shows SELF outperforming other strategies almost across the board.
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Figure 2.12. Impact of microgrid characteristics on broker performance, left
column: low level of microgrid sophistication (τ = 1.0) for increasing num-
bers of microgrids, right column: ditto for higher level of microgrid sophisti-
cation (τ = 0.1)
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It is important to note, that the superior performance of SELF is not merely beneﬁcial
to the self-interested broker. Rather, it also reﬂects higher overall economic welfare: con-
sumers’ own preference of SELF over competing strategies is indicative of its desirable,
competitive tariff offerings, especially as compared to the customer-agnostic Fixed strategy.
Furthermore, higher proﬁt shares are a result of better balanced portfolios with lower imbal-
ance charges, and ultimately contribute to a more efﬁcient and stable grid. From a policy
perspective, our results indicate that further research into decision-support systems for mi-
crogrids will likely beneﬁt both consumers and the grid overall. Speciﬁcally, further inquiry
is needed into the beneﬁts that accrue to microgrids from using data-driven, decision-support
technology; into whether microgrids would invest in such technology by their own choice;
and, alternatively, if public-sector investments into novel decision-support systems could
lead to increased economic welfare and a more stable Smart Grid in the future.
2.5.6 Summary of Results
Figure 2.13 summarizes the characteristics of the methods we proposed by juxtaposing their
performance in a Smart Market environment, their capacity to generalize, and their compu-
tational requirements.
Figure 2.13. Summary of results. Darker colored ellipses indicate higher
computational demand
The simple manual and regularized approaches performed reasonably well for the en-
vironments for which they were constructed, but their performance deteriorated quickly as
environmental conditions changed. The regularized approach generalized slightly better and,
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importantly, required signiﬁcantly less domain knowledge in the design process. Both ap-
proaches are computationally efﬁcient and can be applied without a model of the target
environment.
When an environmental model is available, feature selection techniques can be lever-
aged to obtain signiﬁcantly better performance in the target environment and beyond. Both,
greedy and GA feature selection, led to strategies that generalized signiﬁcantly better than,
e.g., the simple regularized approach. Generalization is desirable because of potential shifts
in a Smart Market environment, but also to effectively accommodate potential mismatches
between the environmental model used for feature selection and the actual target environ-
ment. Both feature selection techniques require signiﬁcant computation before executing
the strategy, but have little impact on the derived strategies’ runtime requirements. In our
experiments we found greedy feature selection to deliver generally better, sparser results at
lower computational costs and we therefore recommend it over GA feature selection for our
application.
Finally, we demonstrated how bootstrapping and noise injection can be integrated into
the feature selection process to improve performance (bootstrapping) in a given environment,
and generalizability (noise injection). Importantly, we show that both techniques can be
combined to beneﬁt both objectives.
2.6 Related Work
To date, research on retail electricity trading has received relatively little attention. To our
knowledge, Reddy and Veloso (2011b) were the ﬁrst to suggest RL as an appropriate frame-
work for constructing brokers for retail electricity markets. A key distinguishing feature of
our approach is the automated, data-driven construction of the state space. In contrast, the
strategies developed in (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b) are derived from manually constructed
features and are limited in the number of economic signals they can accommodate as well
as in their ability to incorporate new signals when the market environment changes. Another
key distinction is that the brokers presented in (Reddy and Veloso, 2011b) are derived for
an environment with ﬁxed rates of electricity consumption and production for all market
participants where brokers source electricity exclusively from small-scale producers. Con-
sequently, the broker learns to steer towards an optimal consumer/producer ratio among its
subscribers by changing tariff rates. These settings yield a broker which is unable to develop
appropriate responses to any variability of consumption and production over time or between
different customers.
Reinforcement Learning has been used on a wide range of problems in electronic com-
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merce in which agents aim to learn optimal policies through interaction with the environ-
ment. For example, Pardoe et al. (2010) develop a data-driven approach for designing elec-
tronic auctions based on notions from RL. In the electricity domain, RL has primarily been
used to derive wholesale trading strategies, or to build physical control systems. Exam-
ples of electricity wholesale applications include (Rahimiyan and Mashhadi, 2010), who de-
rive bidding strategies for electricity wholesale auctions, and Ramavajjala et al. (2012) who
study Next State Policy Iteration (NSPI) as an extension to Least Squares Policy Iteration
(LSPI) (Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003) and demonstrate the beneﬁts of their extension on the
day-ahead commitment problem of a wind farm. Physical control applications of RL include
load and frequency control within the electric grid and autonomous monitoring applications,
e.g., (Venayagamoorthy, 2009).
Feature selection and regularization have been studied widely in supervised settings,
e.g., (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003), but have only recently gained momentum in the Rein-
forcement Learning community. In our experiments we implemented the L1 regularized
version of LARS-TD by Painter-Wakeﬁeld (2012) due to its conceptual simplicity. An alter-
native approach is Sparse TD with Equi-Gradient Descent (EGD) by Loth et al. (2007) and
we are planning on exploring its relative merits in future work. Wrapper approaches to fea-
ture selection are commonly used in RL as they are easily integrated as a pre-processing step
to the actual RL task. For example, Whiteson et al. (2005) present FS-NEAT, an extension of
the well-known NEAT algorithm, to incorporate feature selection capabilities. They demon-
strate the beneﬁt of this approach on two standard RL benchmarks. Another feature selection
technique speciﬁcally targeted at RL applications is the LSTD-RP method by Ghavamzadeh
et al. (2010). They extend the classic Least Squares TD (LSTD) algorithm (Bradtke and
Barto, 1996) to work with random projections of high-dimensional state spaces, and show
how their work translates to online RL settings by replacing LSTD with LSPI.
Whiteson et al. (2011) provide interesting insights into the role of environment overﬁt-
ting in empirical evaluations of RL applications. They argue that ﬁtting, i.e., the adaptation
of a learner to environmental conditions known to be present in the target environment, is an
appropriate strategy. Overﬁtting, i.e., the adaptation of the learner to conditions only present
during evaluation, on the other hand, is inappropriate. Our experiments suggest techniques
that strike a good balance between ﬁt and performance levels for autonomous trading strate-
gies.
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2.7 Conclusions and Future Work
The Smart Grid vision relies critically on decentralized control methods that can balance
electric grids in real-time. Developing an understanding of such methods is one of the cor-
nerstones of an efﬁcient, safe, and reliable Smart Grid, with far-reaching beneﬁts for society
at large.
We presented SELF, a novel design for autonomous Electricity Broker Agents built on
insights from Reinforcement Learning, and from Machine Learning more generally. The
key design objectives behind SELF are ﬂexibility and robustness. We framed the broker
challenge as optimal control problem and used RL with function approximation to derive ro-
bust long-term policies for our SELF brokers. Towards the ﬂexibility objective, we explored
the use of feature selection and regularization techniques to automatically adapt brokers to
a broad range of market conditions. Using these techniques, SELF brokers can identify
and accommodate arbitrary sets of informative signals from their environment, resulting in
signiﬁcantly better performances compared to previous designs. We also evaluated com-
plementary bootstrapping and noise-injection methods to reduce overﬁtting, and we showed
how their use leads to more robust, generalizable feature selection outcomes.
Our work formalizes a class of Smart Electricity Markets by means of our simulation
model SEMS, which is a contribution in its own right. SEMS employs real-world wholesale
market data and a complete, micro-level model of electric appliance usage in private house-
holds, making it a more realistic model of future Smart Electricity Markets than those used
in previous studies. We demonstrated the efﬁcacy of our broker design for a range of Smart
Electricity Markets which varied substantially in terms of tariff choice behaviors among their
customer populations. Our experimental results demonstrate that both, the broker’s capacity
to accommodate arbitrary state spaces, and its selection of informative features, are impor-
tant for learning robust policies. Our SELF brokers are signiﬁcantly more ﬂexible in this
regard than previously suggested strategies.
Research on autonomous electricity brokers for the Smart Grid is an emerging ﬁeld.
Hence, beyond the development of a novel broker agent design, we aimed to generate use-
ful insights on key design decisions that enable broker agents to operate effectively in the
Smart Grid. For instance, we studied the use of L1 regularization and found that it offers
a viable alternative to manual broker construction under stable market conditions. We con-
trasted regularization with greedy and GA feature selection and found that a simple, greedy
feature selection approach can yield signiﬁcant performance improvements when a model
of the environment is available, and when overﬁtting can be avoided. We presented effec-
tive strategies for counteracting overﬁtting, including an innovative approach for injecting
effective noise via random broker strategies.
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In future work it would be beneﬁcial to further explore SELF’s performance in increas-
ingly sophisticated Smart Electricity Markets. Key features to explore include advanced
tariff structures, renewable energy sources, and storage devices such as electric vehicles. A
question of great practical import is whether the performance of the learner we present here,
possibly extended with more advanced RL techniques, will translate to these more complex
environments as well. Customers, for example, may eventually adopt electronic agents of
their own. In fact, this is commonly thought to be a prerequisite for the success of more
complicated tariff models. Our preliminary analysis in Section 2.5.5 gives reason to believe
that the use of such agents might actually beneﬁt broker agents if they act closer to perfect
rationality. How broker agents cope with strategic departures from perfect rationality is,
however, unclear.
Our noise injection experiments entail the question whether the extensive work on over-
ﬁtting that the Machine Learning community has done can be connected to questions about
market stability that are under study in the Finance ﬁeld. Smart Market designs could, for
example, be drastically improved if artiﬁcially introduced noise (e.g., trading delays) could
indeed be proven to be generally beneﬁcial in the presence of autonomous trading strategies.
To our knowledge, this connection has not been studied previously.
Another related, and possibly complementary, objective is to derive policies that are
comprehensible for human decision-makers. Comprehensible policies serve as a further
safeguard against overﬁtting. But they also increase the trust of human decision-makers in
autonomous trading strategies, an important precondition to the adoption of Machine Learn-
ing techniques in the safety-conscious Smart Grid domain.
We believe that our proposed strategies offer important benchmarks for future work and
that this work offers a meaningful contribution to our understanding of key design decisions
for broker agents to operate effectively in the Smart Grid.
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Chapter 3
A Scalable Preference Model for
Autonomous Decision-Making
Involving Consumer Choices
3.1 Introduction
Enhancing individual and organizational performance through information technology is
one of the fundamental promises of Information Systems (IS). Consumers can now choose
among a wide variety of affordable products and services, and managers routinely make de-
cisions based on rich, differentiated real-time information. However, while IS has become in-
creasingly adept at provisioning decision-relevant information, autonomous decision-making
remains elusive under all but the most highly structured circumstances. Two prominent ap-
plication areas, dynamic ﬂight pricing and automated credit approvals, now apply automated
business rule engines to make most operative decisions quickly, cheaply, and reliably (Dav-
enport and Harris, 2005, Baker, 2013). Yet, in less structured settings – from planning the
next vacation to trading in complex multi-echelon markets – autonomous decision-making
through software agents remains an open problem, and an active research area, e.g., (Ado-
mavicius et al., 2009).
What hampers autonomous decision-making in unstructured settings is not the inability
of information technology (IT) to select good decisions, but rather its inability to detect what
constitutes a good decision in a user’s eyes. In many settings, individuals are unaware of
the mechanisms underlying their own preferences (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006), and data-
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driven preference models that elicit unknown preferences by generalizing from observed
choices are therefore particularly beneﬁcial (Bichler et al., 2010).
As an example, consider smart grids, where IT is anticipated to play a key role in im-
proving the efﬁciency of electricity distribution and use (Kassakian and Schmalensee, 2011).
Particular challenges in this context are electric vehicles that are charged in varying locations,
and the incorporation of intermittent and variable renewable electricity sources, such as so-
lar and wind (Valogianni et al., 2014b). Data-driven modeling of electricity consumption
preferences is essential for predicting consumption patterns, and for effectively incentiviz-
ing consumers towards sustainable behaviors (Watson et al., 2010, Peters et al., 2013c). For
example, a preference model can learn and predict that a given user is unlikely to use her
electric vehicle (EV) in the afternoon. If renewable energy from solar and wind is scarce, the
system can offer the owner personalized incentives to make the battery’s energy available
to nearby consumers. The beneﬁts from data-driven preference learning and autonomous
decision-making in EV coordination can be signiﬁcant, with estimated electricity cost re-
ductions of 3 to 14%, and CO2 emission reduction of up to 3.5% (Kahlen et al., 2014).
Prior work on preference learning has made signiﬁcant advances in generating accurate
predictions from noisy observations such as electricity meter readings that exhibit inconsis-
tencies, heterogeneity, and bias (Kohavi et al., 2004, Evgeniou et al., 2005). In particular,
recent non-parametric models automatically adapt to the complexity of real-world obser-
vations, and they embrace inconsistencies in human choices rather than imposing stringent
rationality assumptions. The ability to accommodate inconsistencies in observed choices
allows these models to distinguish between instances where estimates are certain enough to
justify an autonomous action, and instances where the model should actively acquire addi-
tional evidence or transfer control to a human decision-maker (Saar-Tsechansky and Provost,
2004, Bichler et al., 2010).
However, additional progress is necessary for preference models to become widely adopted
in practice. First, important domains such as energy commerce and healthcare require meth-
ods that are computationally efﬁcient, and that scale gracefully to millions of observations.
Contemporary electric distribution systems, for example, connect up to ten million consumer
meters, each transmitting observations every few minutes (Widergren et al., 2004). Such
meters produce large amounts of data that must be processed quickly and with high gran-
ularity (i.e., not aggregated). Observations must be processed quickly because consumers’
needs are momentary, and the time window for incentivizing desirable behaviors is small.
Similarly, observations must be processed at high granularity because ﬁne-grained, local so-
lutions to supply bottlenecks are superior to global solutions that require costly wide-area
transmission. To achieve these goals, preference models must provide short and consistent
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training times, and incorporate and act on new data in a timely manner. Second, preference
models and corresponding inference methods should be conceptually simple and easy to
validate to promote adoption, e.g., (DeLone and McLean, 2003). Signiﬁcant progress has
been made on automated inference in simpler predictive models, where automated tools now
generate inference algorithms based on declarative descriptions, e.g., (Koller and Friedman,
2009). However, more complex settings, such as electricity preference learning, still entail
manual implementation, which is challenging even for highly trained professionals. Both
scalability and conceptual simplicity are important in a wide variety of applications, ranging
from marketing (van Bruggen et al., 1998, Cui and Curry, 2005), to personalization (Murthi
and Sarkar, 2003, Birlutiu et al., 2012), and public infrastructure, e.g., autonomous trafﬁc
congestion pricing (Yang, 1998).
As shown in our empirical results, existing approaches exhibit a clear trade-off between
computational cost and scalability on the one hand, and predictive accuracy on the other.
Simple methods have the beneﬁts of exhibiting low computational cost and high scalability.
However, they also offer substantially lower accuracy than more complex and computation-
ally expensive ones. We present a novel approach, the Gaussian process Trade-off Model
(GTM), that strikes a new balance between scalability, predictive accuracy, and conceptual
simplicity.
GTM offers an order-of-magnitude improvement in scalability, which makes it compet-
itive with simple models in terms of computational cost. However, unlike these simple
models, GTM exhibits predictive accuracies that compare favorably to the most accurate and
computationally expensive approaches. GTM uses a conceptually simple inference proce-
dure with important implications for ease of adoption in practice. It is a member of the
Bayesian family of models, which have recently gained popularity in the preference mod-
eling community, including in IS. Inference in Bayesian models thus far has been either
fast but conceptually expensive (such as with variational methods, for example), or ele-
gant but computationally slow (such as with sampling-based approaches; Montgomery and
Smith 2009). Our proposed GTM makes use of a simple approximate inference scheme
known as Laplace’s method, and we leverage common features of consumer choice settings,
particularly the small number of relevant product attributes and limited attention to each
attribute, towards vastly improved scalability.
We empirically demonstrate these improvements on three real-world consumer choice
datasets. Speciﬁcally for this study, we collected an electricity tariff choice dataset on a
commercial crowdsourcing platform based on data from a US retail electricity market. We
use two choice datasets from other domains (political elections and automobile purchases)
to conﬁrm our ﬁndings. In our evaluations, we ﬁnd that GTM is more than an order of mag-
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nitude faster than some existing methods, and highly scalable in the number of observations.
Moreover, the accuracy of GTM’s predictions compares favorably to other state-of-the-art
preference models despite GTM’s greater simplicity and speed.
GTM introduces a new benchmark to the preference learning toolset. In consumer choice
settings, where alternatives can be described by a small number of relevant attributes, it
produces accurate estimates over an order of magnitude faster than previous methods, and it
scales to the large numbers of users and choices common in IS applications. Its probabilistic
design is especially suitable for applications that aim at autonomous decision-making. And
its conceptual simplicity makes GTM signiﬁcantly more accessible to modeling practitioners
who wish to apply the model to new domains.
3.2 Background and Related Work
Human preferences have long been a subject of interest for scholars from amultitude of ﬁelds
including Information Systems, Computer Science, Psychology, Marketing, and Economet-
rics.
3.2.1 Information Systems
Within IS, our work is most closely related to the literature on recommender systems, which
are concerned with ﬁnding and recommending items of interest, e.g., in electronic commerce
settings (Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005). We adopt several of their usefulness criteria,
in particular accuracy, computational tractability, and scalability for use in real-world IS.
But the problem we study is different, and in some sense harder than the recommendation
problem:
1. Our model targets autonomous decision-making and decision-making supported by
software agents instead of giving recommendations, a difference that is reﬂected in
its probabilistic design. Autonomous decisions are becoming increasingly important
in fast-paced, data-intensive electronic marketplaces (Peters et al., 2013c), and we
contend that these settings will require a principled quantiﬁcation of uncertainty that
allows software agents to return control to their users in cases of doubt. Some previ-
ous recommender systems studies make use of probabilistic models, e.g., (Liu et al.,
2009), but these works are not easily generalized to the preference learning setting we
consider, because they do not predict users’ choices between arbitrary combinations
of items.
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2. Most recommender systems operate based on ratings which have several drawbacks
in the context of preference learning. While reasoning based on ratings is signiﬁ-
cantly easier, there are four important motivations for studying direct, pairwise com-
parisons between alternatives. First, pairwise comparisons do not force users into
self-consistency. Whereas rating systems suppress, e.g., intransitivity, GTM embraces
inconsistencies and lets them unfold in the form of uncertainties. Second, pairwise
choice situations are cognitively easier for users and evoke a qualitative reasoning
mode in contrast to the quantitative reasoning evoked by ratings, making them an in-
teresting subject of study in their own right (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). Third,
pairwise comparisons are often readily derived from users’ actions, which reduces the
users’ burden compared to providing explicit training information. Finally, ratings
are subjective in the sense that two users may share the same preferences but assign
different ratings to alternatives (Liu et al., 2009).
Other related research includes work on personalization (Murthi and Sarkar, 2003) which
studies methods for adapting products and services, often in digital environments where the
associated costs are low. For example, Atahan and Sarkar (2011) propose a Bayesian method
for the accelerated learning of user proﬁles through dynamic adaption of navigation options.
Several other IS scholars have worked on discrete methods that span across multiple aca-
demic disciplines. For example, Huang et al. (2012) propose a discrete choice prediction
method based on Machine Learning techniques, and Roy et al. (2008) combine ideas from
Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) and Operations Research to learn utility func-
tions. These works are related to ours in isolated aspects, but they generally follow different
objectives. To our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst IS study to propose a preference learning
model suitable for large user populations, that gives highly accurate predictions, principled
probabilistic estimates, and in which learning is efﬁcient and conceptually simple.
3.2.2 Computer Science
Researchers in Artiﬁcial Intelligence have a long-standing interest in preferences as a ﬂex-
ible alternative to goals, reviewed in (Brafman and Domshlak, 2009). It may not be clear
from the outset whether a certain goal is attainable, but using a preference relation, a soft-
ware agent can work towards the most favorable outcome that is attainable under given
circumstances. Artiﬁcial Intelligence researchers realized the importance of preferences for
autonomous decision-making agents early on (Maes, 1994), and they proposed a series of
innovative representations for preference relations and associated reasoning schemes, e.g.,
CP-Nets (Boutilier et al., 2004). However, most of these representations make strong ratio-
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nality assumptions, and reasoning consequently becomes difﬁcult when they are confronted
with actual human preferences.
Machine Learning takes a data-driven, predictive approach to preferences, and re-
searchers in the ﬁeld have proposed models based on a broad variety of learning tech-
niques (Fu¨rnkranz and Hu¨llermeier, 2011). Of particular interest to us is work on prob-
abilistic preference models that yield uncertainty estimates based on noisy preference ob-
servations. Chu and Ghahramani (2005) were the ﬁrst to model preference learning using
Gaussian processes. However, their model lacks the ability to capture heterogeneity across
users. More recent work (Guo et al., 2010, Birlutiu et al., 2012, Houlsby et al., 2012) has
alleviated this shortcoming, but it does not easily scale to the large numbers of users and
observations we are targeting. In Section 3.5, we benchmark our work against several of
these models to demonstrate these differences.
3.2.3 Psychology
Scholars in Psychology have primarily taken an explanatory interest in human preferences.
One of the key achievements of the discipline has been the establishment of positive theories
of human preferences, e.g., (Tversky and Simonson, 1993, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006)
next to the normative theories from Economics (von Neumann et al., 2007). These positive
theories attest that human preferences are inconsistent, constructed as needed, and that the
construction process depends on situational framing and environmental factors. The proba-
bilistic nature of our model acknowledges these inconsistencies and lets them unfold in the
form of uncertainties. These uncertainties are an important output of our model: a software
agent can use them to return control to the user when uncertain about a high-value decision.
3.2.4 Marketing and Econometrics
Finally, our work is related to the Marketing and Econometrics literature where preference
measurement methods such as conjoint analysis, Logit/Probit models, and several other dis-
crete choice prediction techniques were pioneered (Greene, 2012). Early preference mea-
surement was limited to population-level estimates, but more recent techniques accommo-
date heterogeneity across consumer segments (Allenby and Rossi, 1998, Evgeniou et al.,
2007). The primary target audience of these models are human decision makers, and their
outputs are therefore interpretable coefﬁcients. By contrast, our work focuses on preference
learning for IS, and has to consider scalability, incremental updates, and other practical is-
sues that arise when moving from passive preference measurements to autonomous decision-
making (Netzer et al., 2008). In Section 3.5, we illustrate these differences by benchmarking
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Symbol Deﬁnition
◦ Hadamard (element-wise) matrix product
⊗ Kronecker matrix product
C =
{
(u,x1,x2,y)
}
Choice situations: when presented with alternatives x1 and x2, user
u chose y=+1 (ﬁrst alternative), or y=−1 (second alternative)
γcu , Γ User u’s possession of characteristic c; Γ ∈ RnU×nc collects all γcu
dT , dX Dimensionality of elements in T , X
fu, f c, ft = f (t) Users’ latent evaluation of trade-offs and characteristic evaluation
of trade-offs, evaluation of f at trade-off t, respectively
θ = {ld} Lenghtscale hyperparameters
I Identity matrix
K Covariance matrix, K ∈ R(ncnT )×(ncnT )
L : LLT =W Lower Cholesky factor ofW
nc Fixed number of characteristics
ne Number of Eigenvalues used in low-rank approximations
nT ,nU ,nX Number of elements in T ,U , and X
N,Φ Probability density function (PDF), and cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution
p(C| f ), ∇p(C| f ) Likelihood and its Jacobian ∂ p(C| f )∂ fi
t, t(d),T Trade-off t, its d-th element, and set of all trade-offs, respectively
U Set of all users
W =−∇∇ log p(C| f ) Negative Hessian of the log likelihood
X Set of all instances
y ∈ {−1,+1} Single choice: y = +1 (ﬁrst alternative), or y = −1 (second alter-
native)
Z Model evidence, also known as marginal likelihood
Table 3.1. Summary of Mathematical Notation.
GTM against the Mixed Logit model, a well-established standard in Marketing and Econo-
metrics.
3.3 Gaussian Process Trade-off Model (GTM)
Let U = {u1, . . . ,unU } denote a set of users and X =
{
x1, . . . ,xnX | xi ∈ RdX
}
a set of in-
stances, the objects or actions between which users choose. Each instance is described by
dX real-valued attributes. Thus, a set of choices is denoted as:
C =
{
(u,x1,x2,y) | u ∈U,xi ∈ X ,y ∈ {+1,−1}}
Here, (u,x1,x2,+1) means that user u prefers the ﬁrst alternative (instance x1) to the second
alternative (instance x2), whereas (u,x1,x2,−1) means the opposite.1 In contrast to models
1Table 3.1 summarizes the mathematical notation used throughout the paper.
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that additionally include users’ demographic information, we aim to infer individuals with
similar preferences directly from their choices. This alleviates the need for the common but
problematic assumption that individual characteristics (such as demographics) correlate with
preferences.
The goal of preference learning is to learn an order relation u over instances for each
user so as to predict previously unobserved choices, including those of previously unob-
served users. Rather than operating directly on order relations u, preference models often
estimate latent functions from which the order relations can easily be inferred. For example,
the standard discrete choice models by Thurstone (1927) and Bradley and Terry (1952) esti-
mate functions f˜u : X →R that capture the utility f˜u(x) that user u derives from each instance
x. When presented with a previously unobserved choice between instances x1 and x2, these
models will predict that x1 u x2 if and only if f˜u(x1)≥ f˜u(x2).
Two important disadvantages of models based on instance utilities are their absolute in-
terpretation of utility independently of context, and the stringent rationality assumptions that
follow from this treatment. When making decisions, individuals have been shown to focus
on trade-offs resulting from their choices rather than on absolute outcomes, and thus per-
ceive alternatives within the context in which they are presented (Tversky and Simonson,
1993). The assumption of utility models that individuals simply recall absolute, predeter-
mined instance utilities f˜u(x), and the strict transitivity ofu implied by this assumption, are
frequently violated in practice. In our model, we aim to capture trade-offs t = τ(x1,x2) ∈ T
between alternatives and we estimate probability distributions over users’ trade-off evalua-
tions fu(t).
As an example, suppose that electricity tariffs (i.e., rates or plans) are characterized
by their cost per kilowatt-hour and by whether the electricity is generated from renewable
sources. Given user u is presented with a choice between two such tariffs:
x1 =
[
32
¢
kWh
, 1 (renewable)
]
and x2 =
[
28
¢
kWh
, 0 (non-renewable)
]
our goal is to predict whether the user will prefer the ﬁrst (y = +1 and x1 u x2) or the
second tariff (y = −1 and x2 u x1). The trade-off the user faces is (x1− x2) =
(
4 ¢kWh ,1
)
,
i.e., by choosing tariff x1, the user pays an additional 4 ¢kWh in exchange for a supply of
renewable energy.2 In this formulation of the trade-off, our goal is to classify whether the
2If suggested by domain knowledge, one can alternatively formulate the trade-off using percentage increases,
t =
( 32−28
28
¢
kWh ,1
)
, or any other relevant transformation. Such alternative transformations may increase the in-
terpretability of the model’s outputs, but they have a negligible effect on the predictive accuracy of our ﬂexible,
non-parametric model, as shown in our empirical evaluations. We conjecture that it is also possible to learn the τ
mapping from the data using, e.g., warped Gaussian processes (Snelson et al., 2004).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1. Probabilistic Graphical Model of GTM. Panel (a): Users make
choices based on their evaluations fu(t) of the associated trade-offs. Users’
evaluations are linear combinations of nc behavioral characteristics f c which
they possess to different degrees γcu . Shaded circles represent observed data,
white circles represent latent quantities of interest. The two plates in the
ﬁgure denote replication of the enclosed elements for each characteristic c or
user u, respectively. Panel (b): Graphical table of contents for this article.
user will perceive the trade-off as favorable ( fu(t) positive) and choose the ﬁrst tariff, or
perceive the trade-off as unfavorable ( fu(t) negative) and choose the second tariff instead.
From a decision-theoretic perspective, our approach is inspired by the trade-off contrast
principle (Tversky and Simonson, 1993), and by case-based decision theory (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1995), which posits that a user’s trade-off evaluation will resemble evaluations
of similar trade-offs made by the user in the past. From a machine learning perspective, our
approach is related to collaborative classiﬁcation, because we aim to classify trade-offs as
favorable or unfavorable based on users’ latent evaluations fu(t).
Because human preferences are latent and inconsistent, and because observed choices
may be biased and distorted by noise (Evgeniou et al., 2005), we cast the problem in proba-
bilistic terms, which accommodates all of these properties. Panel (a) in Figure 3.1 outlines
the generative process underlying our Gaussian process Trade-off Model (GTM). Reading
panel (a) from right to left: users make observable choices C between presented alternatives
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based on their latent evaluation of trade-offs t, denoted as fu(t). Evaluations are modeled as
linear combinations of nc behavioral characteristics f c which individuals possess to different
degrees, denoted by γcu ∈ [0,1]:
fu(t) =
nc
∑
c=1
γcu · f c(t) with ∑
c
γcu = 1 (3.1)
Γ denotes the nU × nc matrix of all γcu . For now, we assume that Γ is known, and focus on
the problem of efﬁciently obtaining probabilistic estimates of the f c.
The evaluations f c are latent, uncertain quantities, and we aim to infer their distributions.
A common modeling choice is to assume that the f c are members of a parametric class, such
as the class of linear functions f c(t) = wcTφ(t), and then infer the distribution of the param-
eters wc. However, this choice has two important limitations. First, in the absence of prior
knowledge about the shape of the distribution of the f c, restricting the distribution to a par-
ticular parametric class entails the risk of excluding promising candidates. In futuristic smart
grid applications, for example, little is known about the eventual choice behavior of users.
Data-driven models have an advantage over parametric models in this setting, because they
impose fewer up-front restrictions. Second, a ﬁxed number of parameters wmakes the model
prone to underﬁtting or overﬁtting if the complexity of relationships present in the data
does not match the number of parameters. These model complexity challenges then have
to be overcome using additional tweaks, such as regularization or cross-validation (Bishop,
2006).
Gaussian processes (GPs; Rasmussen and Williams, 2006) are a non-parametric, data-
driven alternative to traditional parametric models, and they overcome these limitations by
design.3 GPs are stochastic processes that model function distributions directly (i.e., without
the need for explicit parameters w) in Bayesian statistics, and they provide automatic, data-
driven control of model complexity while remaining computationally tractable. Our aim is
to estimate function distributions of the form p( f c|C,T,Γ) that quantify the probability that
a particular set of trade-off evaluations f c generated the observed choicesC, given trade-offs
T and user characteristics Γ.4 Starting from some prior distribution p( f c), this distribution
3Note, that the term non-parametric is a misnomer as non-parametric models may in fact employ parameters,
such as the length-scale hyperparameters we introduce below. The distinguishing feature of such models is that the
number of parameters automatically increases with the training data.
4To simplify the notation, we henceforth omit conditioning on T and Γ.
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can be updated to incorporate observed choicesC by using Bayes’ theorem as follows:
p( f c|C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior
=
Likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
p(C| f c)×
Prior︷ ︸︸ ︷
p( f c)∫
p(C| f c)× p( f c) d f c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Likelihood
=
p(C| f c)× p( f c)
Z
(3.2)
An initial prior distribution over trade-off evaluations p( f c)may be either uninformative and
consider all possible f c somewhat probable, or it may be informative and reﬂect a strong a
priori belief about the f c. An effective approach for deriving informative priors is through
incremental updates: a posterior p( f c|C) derived from observations up to a certain time can
form a prior that is subsequently updated with newly arriving choices. Incremental updates
are also beneﬁcial because they greatly simplify the computation, and because they enhance
the online, real-time performance of GTM. The likelihood p(C| f c) in Equation (3.2) relates
the latent f c to the choice observations C.5 The denominator Z is a scalar called marginal
likelihood which ensures that p( f c|C) is a valid probability distribution.
While the Bayesian update in Equation (3.2) is commonly used, it is essential to under-
stand how it proceeds on distributions over functions (i.e., on Gaussian processes f ). We
therefore give a two-dimensional demonstration of this update in Figure 3.2. Note, that di-
mensionality here refers to the number of unique trade-offs t at which f is evaluated. The
updating process begins with Panel (a), which illustrates the prior belief that those functions
f are most probable for which the joint evaluation ( ft1 , ft2) is close to (0,0) and positively
correlated.6 The correlated prior reﬂects a belief that ft1 and ft2 should be similar, e.g.,
because t1 and t2 are similar. We could make the prior less informative and thereby less
inﬂuential on the estimates by increasing its variance. The likelihood in Panel (b) illustrates
the probability that a function with joint evaluation ( ft1 , ft2) gave rise to the observations
C = {(u, t1,y1 =−1),(u, t2,y2 =+1)}. The likelihood is highest where ft1 is negative (the
user evaluates trade-off t1 as unfavorable) and where ft2 is simultaneously positive. These
evaluations agree with the observed rejection of trade-off t1 and the acceptance of trade-off
t2. Panel (c) illustrates the posterior belief p( ft1 , ft2 |C) about the latent trade-off evalua-
tions f , and it reﬂects the update of the prior from panel (a) based on the observed choices.
Importantly, the posterior shown in panel (c) offers two valuable estimates: it allows us to
predict future (unobserved) choices, and it allows us to quantify the uncertainty inherent in
our current estimate.
5Technically, the likelihood model establishes the relationship between the fu and C. However, because Γ is
ﬁxed for now, the fu are deterministic combinations of the f c.
6Henceforth, we use the shorthand ft to denote f (t).
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f(t1)
f(t 2
)
−0.5 0 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
(a) Prior p( f (t1), f (t2))
f(t1)
f(t 2
)
−0.5 0 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
(b) Likelihood p(C| f (t1), f (t2))
f(t1)
f(t 2
)
−0.5 0 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
(c) Posterior p( f (t1), f (t2)|C)
Figure 3.2. Example of a Bayesian Gaussian Process Update. Update of a
two-dimensional Gaussian process evaluated at t1 and t2 with observations
C = {(u, t1,y1 =−1),(u, t2,y2 =+1)}. Darker colors indicate higher prob-
abilities. The prior is a bivariate Gaussian centered on (t1, t2) = (0,0). The
likelihood assigns high joint probabilities to functions f that evaluate to small
values at t1 and high values at t2, i.e., that are compatible with the observed
choices. The posterior reﬂects an update of the prior based on the observed
choices.
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Figure 3.3. Illustration of the Probit Likelihood Model. Probit likelihood
model applied to a range of one-dimensional trade-offs t. The evaluation
function f (t) is ﬁxed in the example. The bold line shows the Probit like-
lihood that assigns higher probabilities p(y = +1| ft) from the interval [0,1]
(dotted lines, right axis) to trade-offs with more positive evaluations.
Towards probabilistic inference in GTM, we must specify its three fundamental com-
ponents: the likelihood model p(C| f c), the Gaussian process prior p( f c), and a scalable
method to efﬁciently compute the posterior p( f c|C) via Equation (3.2). In the remainder of
this section, we will address the ﬁrst two components. We develop an approach for efﬁcient
inference in Section 3.4.
The likelihood model relates the latent trade-off evaluations f c to the observed choices
C. For a single observed choice y given a trade-off t, the likelihood speciﬁes the probability
p(y| f ct ) that f ct was the true evaluation function that gave rise to y. The f c capture users’
characteristic evaluations of trade-offs, and higher values of f c imply a higher probability
that the user chooses the ﬁrst alternative (i.e., a higher probability of the event y=+1). Con-
sequently, the likelihood model must be a sigmoidal function, mapping evaluations f ct from
a real value to the interval [0,1] of valid probabilities p(y| f ct ). The two most prominent can-
didates used for such mappings are the Probit and Logit functions (Train, 2003). Given that
both functions can be computed efﬁciently and that no signiﬁcant differences exist between
them in terms of predictive accuracy (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006), we follow earlier
work (Chu and Ghahramani, 2005, Houlsby et al., 2012) and use the Probit likelihood:
p(y| f ct ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Φ
fu,t︷ ︸︸ ︷(
∑
c
γcu f
c
t
)
if y=+1
1−Φ( fu,t) =Φ(− fu,t) if y=−1
(3.3)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.7
7In some models, the Probit likelihood also includes a noise variance term, p(y|·) =Φ
(
fu,t
σ2n
)
. However, because
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The shape of our likelihood model is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Assuming that multiple
choices i are independent of each other, the joint likelihood of all choices is given by:
p(C| f c) =∏
i
Φ(yi · fui,ti)
We are now ready to formulate our GP prior p( f c). GPs are sets of random variables,
any ﬁnite subset of which has a joint multivariate Gaussian distribution (Rasmussen and
Williams, 2006, MacKay, 1998). In our model, the random variables correspond to the
values of the f c at ﬁnite sets of trade-offs T . When conditioning on ﬁnite sets of trade-offs,
inferences about function distributions are reduced to updating multivariate Gaussians based
on the observed choices. In Figure 3.2, we illustrated this update for |T | = 2. In general, a
GP-distributed process f can be written as: f (t)∼ GP(m(t),k(t, t ′)) where m(t) = E[ f (t)]
denotes the mean function, and k(t, t ′) = Cov[ ft , ft ′ ] denotes the covariance function that
speciﬁes how strongly evaluations of f at t and t ′ are correlated. In what follows, we set
m(t) = 0, reﬂecting indifference in the absence of other information. We employ squared
exponential covariances of the form:
k(t, t ′) =
dT
∏
d=1
exp
⎛⎜⎝−
(
t(d)− t ′(d)
)2
2 · l2d
⎞⎟⎠ (3.4)
Under the squared exponential covariance function, evaluations ft , ft ′ of trade-offs t, t ′ be-
come less correlated as the distance between them increases. This gives preference to smooth
functions f , which reﬂects the intuition that people make similar choices when confronted
with similar trade-offs. The product structure of Equation (3.4) corresponds to the assump-
tion that each dimension of a trade-off contributes independently to the covariance, a prop-
erty that will be crucial for efﬁcient posterior inference. {ld | d = 1, . . . ,dT} =: θ denotes
the length-scale hyperparameters of the squared exponential covariance function. These
length-scales characterize, in each dimension, the magnitude at which a trade-off becomes
material to the users. Because the length-scales depend on the measurement of trade-offs in
each dimension (e.g., dollars vs. cents), we will learn them from the data in Section 3.4.4.
Evaluating k at all pairs of observed trade-offs (t1, t2) yields the covariance (kernel) ma-
trix K necessary for posterior inference. That the cost of many important operations on K
grows cubically in the number of unique trade-offs presents naı¨ve inference methods with
scalability challenges. However, in Section 3.4 we show that the structure of our preference
learning task can be exploited to reduce this cost substantially.
our trade-off evaluation interpretation of the fu,t is invariant under scaling, we set σ2n = 1 without loss of generality.
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Having speciﬁed both the likelihood model and the GP prior in Equation (3.2), we can
now obtain a posterior distribution p( f c | C), reﬂecting our updated belief about the latent
f c. This belief can be used to predict users’ choices regarding unobserved trade-offs t∗.
Speciﬁcally, the probability of a user u choosing the ﬁrst alternative when presented with
trade-off t∗ is given by:
p(y∗ =+1 | t∗,C) =
∫
Φ( fu,t∗) p( fu,t∗ |C) d fu,t∗ (3.5)
=Φ
(
y ·E[ fu,t∗ ]√
1+Var[ fu,t∗ ]
)
(3.6)
where Equation (3.6) holds if p( fu,t∗) is Gaussian (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). An im-
portant advantage of our Bayesian model relative to traditional discrete choice models is that
predictions are derived from inﬁnitely many evaluation functions fu,t∗ , all of which impact
the ﬁnal prediction proportional to their posterior probability p( fu,t∗ |C). In contrast, a tra-
ditional discrete choice model bases its predictions only on a single “true” utility function
from a parametric class. This single utility function is obtained, e.g., through Maximum
Likelihood, a procedure which tends to overﬁt the data (see also Panel (b) in Figure 3.2). As
we will see, the Bayesian approach results in substantial accuracy improvements.
3.4 Fast Bayesian Inference in GTM
Computational efﬁciency and scalability are a critical prerequisites for the adoption of pref-
erence models in practical applications, where the number of trade-offs and users can be
large. In GTM, efﬁciently computing the posterior p( f c|C) requires addressing two key
challenges. First, the cost of many important operations on the covariance matrix K grows
cubically in the number of unique trade-offs, thereby rendering them infeasible in many in-
teresting applications. Second, under the Probit likelihood, the posterior is neither Gaussian
nor analytically tractable, and it is thus necessary to approximate it. In this section, we de-
velop a novel inference method for GTM that brings about conceptual simplicity and that
meets the critical scalability requirements for preference learning in real-world applications.
Our development proceeds as follows: In Section 3.4.1, we show how particular as-
sumptions regarding the trade-offs T lead to structured Gaussian process models, where
K has Kronecker structure, and where many operations can be performed efﬁciently as
long as the dimensionality dT is low. In Section 3.4.2, we combine structured GPs and
other computational shortcuts with an approximate inference scheme known as Laplace’s
method (MacKay, 1996) to efﬁciently obtain the approximate posterior distribution p( f c|C)≈
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q( f c|C) of characteristic trade-off evaluations. In Section 3.4.3, we show how the user char-
acteristics Γ can be learned from the data, and in Section 3.4.4, we provide heuristics for
learning the hyperparameters θ .
3.4.1 Structured Gaussian Processes
To address the cubic computational cost of several important operations on K, we propose an
approach which exploits common characteristics of consumer choice settings. In particular,
consumer and econometric research has established that information overload causes con-
sumers to focus on relatively small subsets of attributes and values when choosing amongst
alternatives, e.g., (Caussade et al., 2005, Hensher, 2006). We show that when alternatives can
be represented by a small number of attributes and values, it is possible to obtain matrices
K which are large, but on which important operations can be performed efﬁciently. Sub-
sequently, we consider settings in which (1) the number of users, instances, and observed
choices is large and naı¨ve methods are therefore computationally infeasible; (2) trade-offs
can be represented by a small number of attributes; and (3) each attribute has a small number
of values, or can be discretized.
In the setting we consider, trade-offs can be arranged on a dT -dimensional grid. To-
gether with the product structure of the covariance function in Equation (3.4) this yields
Kronecker covariance matrices as follows. Suppose that T ⊂ Rd , and let Td denote the
set of unique values that occur on the d-th attribute in T . In our electricity tariffs ex-
ample, trade-offs can be characterized by (1) price differences per kWh, and (2) differ-
ences in renewable sources, so that we might have the following unique trade-off values:
T1 = {−0.10,−0.09, . . . ,0.09,0.10} and T2 = {−1,0,1}. Not all possible combinations of
trade-offs are usually observed (|T |< |T1| · |T2|= 63), and the covariance matrix K˜ = [k(t, t ′)]t,t ′∈T
is therefore much smaller than 63×63. The key notion in structured GPs is to replace K˜ with
a larger matrix of the form:
K = K1⊗·· ·⊗Kd
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.8 The entries Kd hold the covariance contributions
of the d-th dimension and they are generally much smaller than K˜ (in our example, K1 ∈
R
21×21 and K2 ∈ R3×3). The Kronecker matrix K, on the other hand, holds the covariances
8For two arbitrarily sized matrices A,B, the Kronecker product is deﬁned as:
A⊗B :=
⎡⎢⎣a11B · · · a1nB... . . . ...
am1B · · · amnB
⎤⎥⎦
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between all trade-offs in the cartesian product×d Td , and it is thus much larger (in our
example, K ∈ R63×63).
The signiﬁcant computational savings that the Kronecker structure of K allows us to
achieve follow from the fact that, instead of explicitly generating and manipulating K˜, we
can now operate on the smaller Kd . In this setting, several important matrix operations
involving K can be performed efﬁciently. Most importantly:
• Matrix-vector products of the form Kb can be computed at a cost that is linear in the
size of b, instead of the quadratic cost entailed by standard matrix-vector products.
Similar beneﬁts are obtained for products of the form (K ◦K)b where ◦ denotes the
Hadamard (element-wise) matrix product.
• Eigendecompositions of the form K =QTΛQ can be computed from the Eigendecom-
positions of the Kd :
Q=
D⊗
d=1
Qd Λ=
D⊗
d=1
Λd
at cubic cost in the size of the largest Kd . In particular, this allows us to determine the
Eigenvectors to the ne largest Eigenvalues of K efﬁciently.
Kronecker products have additional computational advantages, and we refer the reader
to (van Loan, 2000, Gilboa et al., 2013) for further references. In addition, note that all
operations can be implemented by considering only the set of unique observed or predicted
trade-offs. This reduces the actively considered region from the large space covered by K to
a manageable superset of T .9
3.4.2 Learning Trade-off Evaluations
Let us now address the problem that the posterior p( f c|C) is analytically intractable un-
der the Probit likelihood. Discrete choice models often employ sampling-based methods to
approximate the posterior (Allenby and Rossi, 1998, Train, 2003). However, sampling is
slow, especially for high-dimensional models based on GPs. Alternatives include Laplace’s
method, Expectation Propagation, and Variational Bayesian methods, all of which seek to
approximate p( f c|C) with a similar distribution q( f c|C) that can be computed and repre-
sented efﬁciently (Bishop, 2006).
9Unobserved trade-offs can be modeled through inﬁnite noise variances in Equation 3.3. The corresponding
likelihood terms then evaluate to indifference (p = 0.5), and their derivatives to zero. These zero values lead to
even sparser matricesW and L in Algorithms 1 and 2 below, and they can easily be exploited using standard sparse
matrix operations.
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Figure 3.4. Laplace Approximation q( f c|C) of the True Posterior p( f c|C).
The solid line shows the approximation q( f c|C) of the true posterior p( f c|C)
for a one-dimensional marginal distribution. The approximation is centered
on the mode fˆ c of the true posterior and its variance is matched to a second-
order Taylor expansion of the true posterior at that point.
In this paper, we use Laplace’s method because it is computationally fast and conceptu-
ally simple – two of our key design objectives. Laplace’s method aims to approximate the
true posterior p with a single Gaussian q, centered on the true posterior mode fˆ c, and with a
variance matching a second-order Taylor expansion of p at that point (see Figure 3.4). Ap-
proximating the posterior with a single multivariate Gaussian allows us to conveniently re-
use it as prior in subsequent Bayesian updates which is important for online and active learn-
ing from user interactions (Saar-Tsechansky and Provost, 2004). A limitation of Laplace’s
method is that the approximation becomes poor if the true posterior is strongly multi-modal
or skewed. However, prior work has found no signiﬁcant impact of this limitation in the
preference learning context, e.g., (Chu and Ghahramani, 2005).
Our development of Laplace inference in GTM proceeds in two steps. First, we describe
an efﬁcient procedure for ﬁnding the posterior mode fˆ (Algorithm 1). We then describe how
the posterior variance and predictions for new trade-offs t∗ can be computed (Algorithm 2).
Additional mathematical details are provided in Appendix B.1.
The mode fˆ of the posterior is the maximizer of the log posterior log p( f c|C)∝ log p(C| f c)+
log p( f c) (see Equation (3.2)) which can be found by setting the ﬁrst derivative of log p( f c|C)
to zero and solving for f c. Because the Probit likelihood is log concave, there exists a unique
maximum fˆ , which we obtain iteratively by using the Newton-Raphson method (Press et al.,
2007) with the update step:
f new = (K−1+W )−1 (W f +∇ log p(C| f ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
(3.7)
= K(b−L(I+LTKL)−1LTKb) (3.8)
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until f converges. The matrix W in Equation (3.7) denotes the negative Hessian of the
log likelihood, W = −∇∇ log p(C| f c), a sparse matrix consisting of nc × nc diagonal sub-
matrices of size nT ×nT .10 The sparsity ofW allows us to compute its Cholesky decomposi-
tionW = LLT , which we use instead ofW in Equation (3.8). This alternative representation
eliminates the numerically unstable K−1 and the unwieldy inverse of the ﬁrst factor in Equa-
tion (3.7). All matrices in Equation (3.8) are of size (ncnT )× (ncnT ) and therefore usually
large. However, L has at most nT nc(nc−1)2 non-zero elements (less if not all possible trade-offs
from T are observed), and we never have to generate K explicitly (see Section 3.4.1).
Algorithm 1 Laplace mode ﬁnding
1: function LAPLACEMODE(covariance matrix K, choicesC, user characteristics Γ)
2: f = 0
3: repeat
4: W ←−∇∇ log p(C| f )
5: L← CHOLESKY(W )
6: b←W f +∇ log p(C| f )
7: a← b−L(I+LTKL)−1LTKb  using conjugate gradients
8: f ← Ka
9: until f converges
10: return posterior mode fˆ
11: end function
Using Equation (3.8), we can efﬁciently compute the posterior mode by following the
steps outlined in Algorithm 1. The operations in lines 6 through 8 are all matrix-vector oper-
ations which generate vectors as intermediate results. Importantly, because of K’s Kronecker
structure, and because L consists only of diagonal sub-matrices, multiplications with K and
L have linear time and space complexity. Rather than calculating the inverse in line 7 explic-
itly, we use conjugate gradients (Press et al., 2007) to solve the system (I+LTKL)x= LTKb
by repeatedly multiplying the parenthesized term with candidates for x, as in (Cunningham
et al., 2008). This operation is fast because the required multiplications can be carried out in
linear time.
We next compute the varianceVq( f ) of the approximate posterior q, which can be written
as (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006):
Vq( f ) = diag(K)−diag(KL(I+LTKL)−1LTK) (3.9)
The computations in Equation (3.9) involve full matrix operations, and are therefore more
10W is computed using Equation (B.1) in Appendix B.1.1. There, we also give other computational details
regarding our Probit likelihood.
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expensive than the matrix-vector operations used for mode-ﬁnding. However, we can limit
the computations to points of interest t∗ only, which reduces the number of rows in K being
considered. To further reduce the size of the involved matrices, we approximate K via a
low-rank decomposition with exact diagonal given by:
K ≈ QSQT +Λ, where Λ= diag(K)−diag(QSQT ) (3.10)
The decomposition can be efﬁciently computed when K has Kronecker structure (see Sec-
tion 3.4.1). The matrix S in Equation (3.10) is a diagonal matrix with the ne largest Eigen-
values of K on its main diagonal. Q contains the corresponding Eigenvectors, and it has the
same number of rows as K but only ne columns. Λ is a diagonal matrix of the same size as
K, making the low-rank approximation of K exact on the diagonal (Quin˜onero-Candela and
Rasmussen, 2005, Vanhatalo et al., 2010). The number of Eigenvalues ne in the approxima-
tion is a user-deﬁned input and it can be used to balance computing time against accuracy of
the approximated posterior variance. As we will show below, even choices of small numbers
of Eigenvalues ne often yield posterior variances close to those obtained with the full matrix
K. Under this low-rank approximation, Equation (3.9) can be re-written as:
Vq( f )≈ diag(K)−diag(KL(I+LT (QSQT +Λ)L)−1LTK)
= diag(K)−diag(KΠK)+diag(KΠQ(S−1+QTΠQ︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
)−1QTΠK) (3.11)
where P is a small matrix of size ne×ne, and whereΠ= L(I+LTΛL)−1LT can be computed
efﬁciently, because L is sparse and Λ is diagonal. Π itself is also sparse, consisting of
nc × nc diagonal blocks like W . Because K has Kronecker structure, the ﬁrst two terms in
Equation (3.11) can be computed efﬁciently and without resorting to approximations. We
address the computation of the third term next.
In Algorithm 2, we ﬁrst calculate the Cholesky factorC of P (line 5), which we then use
in solving11 the system ΠQC−1. The product V in line 6 is equivalent to ne matrix-vector
products with a Kronecker matrix and is computationally inexpensive when ne is sufﬁciently
small. In line 7, we exploit the symmetry of the third term in Equation (3.11), and the fact
that only its diagonal is needed, to reduce calculations to an efﬁcient element-wise product
of the smaller V . Finally, in line 9, we use the posterior variances to calculate the predictive
probabilities p∗ at the trade-off points T∗ using Equation (3.5).
Figure 3.5 illustrates the output of Algorithms 1 and 2 for the choices of a single user,
11FORWARDSOLVE denotes the operation that solves the linear system Ax= b for x. BACKWARDSOLVE similarly
solves xA= b.
89_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
3.4. Fast Bayesian Inference in GTM 77
(a) Posterior Mode (b) Posterior Variance
(c) Prediction
Figure 3.5. Outputs of Algorithms 1 and 2 for a Single User from a Pop-
ular Preference Benchmark Dataset. Observed choices are represented by
black pluses (favorable trade-offs) and white circles (unfavorable trade-offs);
red colors represent higher values; bold lines represent the boundaries where
E[ fu] = 0 (Panels (a), (b)), or p(y = +1| f ) = 0.5 (Panel (c)). The diamond-
like shape of the plot results from mapping the four-dimensional trade-off
space to two dimensions using its ﬁrst two principal components.
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Algorithm 2 Laplace prediction
1: function LAPLACEPREDICT(covariance matrix K, choices C, user characteristics Γ,
posterior mode fˆ , trade-offs T∗, # Eigenvalues ne, Cholesky factor L)
2:
3: QSQT +Λ← LOWRANKAPPROXIMATION(K, ne)  Equation (3.10)
4: Π← L · FORWARDSOLVE(I+LTΛL, LT )
5: C ← CHOLESKY(S−1+QTΠQ)
6: V = K∗ · BACKWARDSOLVE(ΠQ,C)
7: v∗ ← diag(K∗)− (K ◦K) ·diag(Π)
∣∣∗+∑ j[V ◦V ]i, j  Equation (3.11)
8:
9: p∗ ←Φ
(
fˆ∗√
1+v∗
)
 Equation (3.5)
10: return posterior variances v∗, predictive probabilities p∗ = p(y=+1| f ,T∗)
11: end function
using data from a popular preference benchmark dataset (Kamishima and Akaho, 2009).
Panel (a) shows the posterior mode fˆu = E[ fu], which is expectedly high in regions of the
trade-off space perceived as favorable, and low otherwise. The bold line indicates the zero
boundary fˆu = 0, and it is sufﬁcient as a predictor of future choices when predictive certainty
estimates are not required. Importantly, it can be computed using only Algorithm 1 and is
therefore very fast. However, the distinguishing feature of our probabilistic approach is the
variance estimates shown in Panel (b). Here, the algorithm correctly identiﬁes a region at
the center of the panel where the decision boundary already follows a closely determined
course to match earlier observations (blue coloring, low variance). If additional observations
were to be acquired for the purpose of improving predictions, they should be located in the
upper or lower regions of the decision boundary instead, where less evidence is presently
available (red coloring, high variance). Panel (c) shows the combination of both outputs into
predictive probabilities p(y =+1| f ). While the decision boundary at p(y =+1| f ) = 0.5 is
the same as the one in Panel (a), this panel additionally incorporates predictive variances by
shrinking the predictive probabilities towards indifference (p= 0.5) in high-variance regions
(see Equation (3.5)). Consequently, the corridor in which GTM is indifferent (yellow/green
coloring, intermediate probabilities) is narrower in areas with extensive evidence from the
data, and wider towards the edges of the panel.
3.4.3 Learning User Characteristics
So far we have assumed that the user characteristics Γ= [γcu ]u,c are known. We now relax this
assumption by learning user characteristics from the data. Recall from Section 3.3 that γcu
denotes the fraction of user u’s behavior explained by characteristic c, that is, fu,t =∑c γcu · f ct
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with ∑c γcu = 1. In a full Bayesian treatment, we would consider Γ another latent quantity of
interest, and infer its posterior distribution. Previous work has addressed similar challenges
by either imposing a multinomial or a Dirichlet process prior on Γ (Houlsby et al., 2012,
Abbasnejad et al., 2013). However, these approaches are conceptually complex and com-
putationally expensive and therefore conﬂict with our key design objectives towards wide
adoption in practice. Instead, we employ a simple and fast iterative scheme that calculates
point estimates of Γ.
Algorithm 3 Learning user characteristics
1: function LEARNUSERCHARS(covariance matrix K, choicesC, # characteristics nc)
2: Γ← random user characteristics
3: repeat
4: E
[
fˆ c
]← LAPLACEMODE(K,C,Γ)
5: for c= 1 : nc do
6: Γ∗,c ←∏iΦ(yi ·E
[
fˆ cti
]
)  approx. to Eq. (3.5): p(C| f c) =Φ
(
yi·E[ fu,ti ]√
1+Var[ fu,ti ]
)
7: end for
8: NORMALIZEROWS(Γ)
9: until Γ converges
10: return user characteristics Γ
11: end function
Our Algorithm 3 is an EM-type algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977) that alternates between
optimizing fˆ c given user characteristics Γ (line 4), and inferring new user characteristics Γ
given fˆ c (line 6). For each user, the resulting user characteristics are re-scaled so that they
add to one in line 8. The process is repeated until Γ converges.
The Γ update in line 6 computes an approximation to the likelihood that characteristic
c alone generated the observed choices. Each iteration of the surrounding loop calculates
one column of the Γ matrix, corresponding to one characteristic. The intuition behind this
update is that users should have higher γcu values for those functions f c that have generated
their choices with a higher probability. The update is a reduced version of Equation (3.5).
In particular, the reduced version does not include the denominator because it is expensive
to compute while merely shrinking high-variance estimates to the point of uncertainty (see
Section 3.4.2). Finally, while the number of user characteristics nc has to be set manually, we
ﬁnd that, consistent with prior work, our method is insensitive to the choice of this parameter
when it is not excessively small, e.g., (Houlsby et al., 2012).
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3.4.4 Learning Hyperparameters
We ﬁnally consider learning the hyperparameters θ = {ld}. As in the case of Γ, a full
Bayesian treatment of these parameters is prohibitively expensive. Prior work has often
resorted to either gradient-based optimization of the marginal likelihood Z, e.g., (Chu and
Ghahramani, 2005), or to heuristics, e.g., (Stachniss et al., 2009) to learn them from the
data. In the experiments that follow, we employ a heuristic and set the length-scales to the
median distance between trade-offs t . This approach has been found in prior work to be a
computationally fast heuristic that yields consistently good empirical results (Houlsby et al.,
2012).
3.5 Empirical Evaluation
To assess GTM’s predictive and performance characteristics, we compared it to three other
recent GP models, and to the well-established Mixed Logit model. Our evaluation employs
two real-world datasets from the literature, as well as a novel stated preference dataset col-
lected speciﬁcally for this work. Our GTM implementation is based on a standard GP tool-
box (Vanhatalo et al., 2013), and we make both implementation and data publicly available
at https://bitbucket.org/gtmanon/gtmanon.
3.5.1 Datasets and Benchmark Methods
We ranGTM and its benchmarks on three preference datasets collected from human decision-
makers. Recall, that a key motivation for this work is the need for computationally fast and
scalable preference modeling techniques for use in contemporary applications with millions
of users and many alternatives to choose from. A prime application of signiﬁcant global
importance is the modeling of electricity tariff choices of smart grid consumers. In future
smart grids, tariffs may be revised frequently to reﬂect changes in the cost and availability
of renewable energy, and therefore tariff choice is anticipated to become a near-continuous
process in which both retailers and customers will rely on automated, data-driven decision
support. The ability to predict and act on tariff choices quickly and with adequate accuracy is
therefore an important challenge. To evaluate our approach in this setting, we employed real
data on electricity tariffs offered in the Texas retail electricity markets, which is one of the
most advanced retail markets in the United States, and which provides daily information on
available tariffs (see http://www.powertochoose.org). Using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk crowdsourcing platform, we acquired data on American participants’ choices between
pairs of tariffs, randomly drawn from a set of 261 tariffs offered in Austin, Texas in February
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Dataset Instances Users Trade-OffsStated Preferences Orig. Dim. Sel. Dim. Grid Size
Tariffs 261 61 610 9 5 12288
Cars 10 53 2362 5 4 216
Elections 8 264 7392 20 8 30375
Table 3.2. Characteristics of the Datasets Used in this Study. Instances,
Users, and Trade-Offs refer to the number of elements in X , U , and T , re-
spectively. Orig. Dim. and Sel. Dim. refer to the number of trade-off
dimensions (the size of each t) before and after feature selection. And Grid
Size refers to the number |T | of points on GTM’s grid.
2013. Appendix B.2 provides complete details on the data collection process for the Tariffs
dataset, including an example tariff choice (Table B.1). The Tariffs dataset contains many
instances (tariffs) but relatively few observed choices per user (see Table 3.2). The choices of
different users likely correspond to different instances and are hence sparsely distributed and
difﬁcult to learn from. This is an important property of the Tariffs dataset which is common
in many real world applications, but which is not reﬂected in prior benchmark datasets.
We complemented our evaluations with two prior benchmark datasets. Speciﬁcally, we
used the Cars dataset collected by Abbasnejad et al. (2013), which contains stated prefer-
ences for automobile purchases, and on the Elections dataset prepared by Houlsby et al.
(2012), which captures revealed voters’ preferences over eight political parties in 650 con-
stituencies in the United Kingdom. A summary of the key characteristics of these datasets
is presented in Table 3.2. The number of instances in all datasets is such that even compu-
tationally intensive methods can be trained in a reasonable time. However, we will closely
examine the scalability properties of each method below, because they are key to the feasi-
bility of the approaches and their subsequent adoption in practice.
We applied greedy forward feature selection to reduce the dimensionality of the datasets
to a subset of predictive features without a signiﬁcant loss in information content. The qual-
ity criterion guiding the feature selection was the predictive accuracy achieved by our most
accurate benchmark method (Birlutiu et al., 2012). The resulting accuracies after feature
selection were essentially the same as those reported on the complete feature set in Houlsby
et al. (2012). Importantly, that the information content was maintained by the feature se-
lection procedure reafﬁrms prior ﬁndings which GTM exploits, namely that only a subset of
relevant dimensions effectively informs human choices. Using the most accurate benchmark
as quality criterion also ensured that the procedure was not biased in favor of GTM. Finally,
GTM was applied to versions of the datasets in which the continuous attributes were dis-
cretized to between 5 and 25 levels, with the objective of minimizing information loss while
94_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
82 Chapter 3. A Preference Model for Autonomous Decision-Making
keeping the resulting grid size manageable.12 We employed the Natural Breaks algorithm
of Jenks and Caspall (1971) to identify bins for discretization. Natural Breaks is a univariate
variation of the k-means algorithm which selects bin boundaries such that within-bin vari-
ances are minimized while between-bin variances are maximized. All benchmark methods
ran on the original, non-discretized datasets.
We compared GTM to four benchmarks: a computationally fast and conceptually sim-
ple method, GP classiﬁcation, whose computational performance GTM aims to match; two
methods with state-of-the-art predictive accuracies but higher computational and conceptual
demands, Hierarchical GP (Birlutiu et al., 2012) and Collaborative GP (Houlsby et al.,
2012); and the popular parametric Mixed Logit model. These benchmarks reﬂect different
trade-offs between computational efﬁciency and scalability, accuracy, and conceptual sim-
plicity.
Speciﬁcally, the Hierarchical GP model (Birlutiu et al., 2012) is based on a semi-
parametric Bayesian formulation that builds on the framework proposed in Bradley and Terry
(1952). The authors estimate the distribution of parametersw of the user-speciﬁc utility func-
tions fu(x) = wTu φ(x). These parameters are drawn from a hierarchical Gaussian prior that
couples similar users (hence our choice of name for the approach). An EM-type algorithm
is used for learning, which iteratively reﬁnes the parameters of the hierarchical prior. The
Hierarchical GP model is conceptually simple and known to offer state-of-the-art accuracy.
However, inference in it is computationally expensive.
The Collaborative GP method of Houlsby et al. (2012) also builds on Bradley and Terry
(1952). LikeGTM, it estimates latent characteristics hc(xi,x j) that quantify the utility derived
from the trade-off between xi and x j, and that users possess to different degrees. A key
distinction is that Collaborative GP operates on pairs of alternative instances (xi,x j) instead
of the associated trade-offs t = τ(xi,x j), and it estimates instance utilities rather than trade-
off evaluations. This makes inference in the model more demanding, and the authors employ
a combination of Expectation Propagation and Variational Bayes to address this challenge.
Their design choice yields comparable accuracies to the Hierarchical GP method at lower
computational cost, but it makes inference in the model conceptually much more demanding.
In the limit of a single latent characteristic, Collaborative GP reduces to regular GP clas-
siﬁcation with a speciﬁc preference kernel (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006, Houlsby et al.,
2012). Inference in this model is fast and conceptually simple, and as such it constitutes the
strongest computational benchmark for GTM. While it is desirable to achieve GP classiﬁca-
tion’s computational performance, its computational advantage comes at the cost of limited
ﬂexibility to adapt to complex data and at a signiﬁcant loss in predictive accuracy relative to
12On our hardware, we restricted overall grid sizes to 104−105 points.
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Collaborative GP. Hence, it would be desirable to match GP classiﬁcation’s computational
scalability while maintaining high predictive accuracy.
The ﬁnal benchmark is the well-established parametric Mixed Logit model which es-
timates f iu = wux
i
u + ε iu where ε iu is extreme-value distributed, and the wu are drawn from
a hierarchical prior. Like the other benchmarks, Mixed Logit accommodates random vari-
ations in taste among users. This makes inference more difﬁcult than in the regular Logit
model, a challenge which is addressed using a computationally expensive sampling proce-
dure. Moreover, in comparison to the non-parametric models, Mixed Logit is signiﬁcantly
less ﬂexible to adapt to the data. In our experiments we used the implementation of Train
(2003).
In summary, in our empirical evaluations we examine GTM’s ability to match the scal-
ability of GP classiﬁcation. Simultaneously, the state-of-the-art predictive accuracies ex-
hibited by the Hierarchical GP and Collaborative GP methods will allow us to assess the
reduction in predictive accuracy that GTM’s computational beneﬁts entail.
3.5.2 Model Scalability and Predictive Accuracy
We evaluated GTM and its benchmarks on 20 random splits of the data into training and test
sets.13 In all GTM runs, the number of characteristics was set to nc = 10, and we used the
Eigenvectors corresponding to the ne = 100 largest Eigenvalues in the sparse approximation.
Figure 3.6 shows the model training time required by GTM and its benchmarks on in-
creasing training set sizes for each dataset. The learning curves show average running times
over 20 random experiments, and the error bars reﬂect 90% conﬁdence intervals. In all plots,
training times correspond to running Algorithms 1 through 3. Our algorithm development
aims to offer a new benchmark for preference learning in real-world applications with large
numbers of users and choices. Fast and consistent training times are critical in these applica-
tions, because new observations must quickly be reﬂected in the preference model, and in the
decision-making processes that build on it. Training times must therefore scale gracefully
with the number of training choices.
As shown in Figure 3.6, GTM achieves two important goals. First, it trains signiﬁcantly
faster than the Hierarchical GP, Collaborative GP, or Mixed Logit models. Second, GTM’s
training times barely increase with the size of the training set. GTM’s training efﬁciency
matches that of the relatively simple GP classiﬁcation model. However, as we will see
below, the simplicity offered by GP classiﬁcation limits its ﬂexibility to adapt to complexities
in the data, which undermines its predictive accuracy under some conditions and results in
13i.e., repeated-sampling cross-validation with varying training sizes. The horizontal axis in the following ﬁgures
indicates the different training/test data splits.
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inconsistent performance.
GTM’s fast training times and superior scalability as a function of the number of training
observations follow directly from our design which employs Kronecker-structured covari-
ance matrices. Importantly, once a given grid size is set for inference, new observations only
entail modest additional training time through additional likelihood terms. In contrast, in
other methods, additional observations increase the size of covariance matrices which un-
dermines their scalability. The added (typically cubic) costs of matrix operations are the
primary factor for their poor scalability in the number of observations.
WhileGTM offers computational efﬁciency and scalability comparable to that of the sim-
ple GP classiﬁcation approach, we now explore whether this efﬁciency entails the same in-
consistent predictive accuracy exhibited by GP classiﬁcation. Figure 3.7 presents the predic-
tive accuracies (captured by the proportion of correctly predicted test choices) corresponding
to the training times in Figure 3.6. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that GTM’s superior speed and scal-
ability do not result in lower accuracy on the Tariffs dataset. Actually, GTM instead exhibits
higher predictive accuracy than all other methods. It is useful to recall here that, similar to
many real-world choice situations, the Tariffs dataset contains many instances but relatively
few observations (see Table 3.2). We conjecture that estimating the f c, our focus in the de-
velopment of GTM, is more critical in such cases than determining user characteristics Γ.
Furthermore, GTM yields predictive accuracies that are comparable to the most accurate and
computational intensive methods on the other datasets, and that are consistently good across
domains. By comparison, GP classiﬁcation’s high training speed and scalability come at the
cost of inconsistent predictive accuracies. GP classiﬁcation yields particularly poor predic-
tions on the Elections dataset, and it is unable to beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from additional training
data.
The Hierarchical and Collaborative GP methods deliver almost perfect predictions on
the Cars and Elections datasets, yet, as shown in Figure 3.6, at the cost of slow training
times and poor scalability in the number of observations. Key to this discussion is that all
non-parametric methods, including GTM, can exploit additional training observations to au-
tomatically adapt the model to the inherent complexity in the data. Having additional training
data allows these methods to capture more predictive structure in the data, as reﬂected by the
inclining accuracy curves (see, in particular, Figure 3.7(b)). In sharp contrast, the paramet-
ric Mixed Logit fails to beneﬁt from additional data because its ﬁxed number of parameters
underﬁts larger training sets. A related effect can be observed in GP classiﬁcation’s perfor-
mance on the Elections dataset. On this revealed preference dataset, the sophisticated GP
methods beneﬁt substantially from additional training data early on in the learning curve as
reﬂected by the rate of performance improvement. As shown, once a representative train-
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ing sample is available, these methods are able to exploit more observations to capture the
heterogeneity in the data. GP classiﬁcation beneﬁts somewhat from additional training data,
but to a lesser degree. While its single latent characteristic yields a signiﬁcant speed-up in
computation, it also undermines its ﬂexibility to capture all the heterogeneity inherent in the
Elections data. In contrast, GTM shares the capacity of other non-parametric methods to
adapt to the complexity in the data and to improve its predictive performance with more ob-
servations. However, by design, and unlike other non-parametric methods, GTM also scales
gracefully as more data becomes available.
In summary, GTM strikes a new balance which combines the scalability of GP classiﬁca-
tion with a conceptually simple approach, and at the same time retains the modeling ﬂexibil-
ity and expressiveness of more complicated and expensive non-parametric GP approaches.
GTM is highly scalable with respect to the number of users and observations in consumer
choice setting. It also offers both good and consistent predictive performance which is par-
ticularly pronounced in sparse domains commonly encountered in preference settings with
a large number of users and instances. GTM’s predictive accuracy closely follows that of its
most accurate benchmarks, and it is signiﬁcantly more accurate than Mixed Logit. Overall,
its scalability along with good and consistent predictive performance establish GTM as a
new benchmark that is a likely method of choice in large-scale applications involving many
users and observations, such as smart grid and healthcare choice modeling.
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Figure 3.6. Training Time. Training times for GTM and its benchmarks in
seconds. The horizontal axis indicates the fraction of data used for training
the model, all remaining data is used for testing. Error bars show 90% conﬁ-
dence intervals based on 20 repetitions with different random splits between
training and test data. The Hierarchical GP implementation available to us
failed to predict on the Tariffs dataset due to numerical errors.
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Figure 3.7. Predictive Accuracy. Accuracy of predictions on held-out test
data corresponding to the training time measurements in Figure 3.6. The
horizontal axis indicates the fraction of data used for training the model, all
remaining data is used for testing. The vertical axis indicates the fraction of
correctly predicted choices on held-out test data.
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3.5.3 Dimensionality Characteristics
Our design choices for GTM aim to produce state-of-the-art scalability in the number of ob-
servations to accommodate real-world applications with millions of observed choices. Our
solution relies on prior ﬁndings that human choices are determined by a small number of
dimensions. Based on these ﬁndings, GTM has been designed to provide superior scalability
for learning and inference when trade-offs are characterized by a small number of dimen-
sions. Our experiments also demonstrate that dimensionality reduction incurs only a modest
loss in predictive accuracy compared to prior results. The trade-off inherent in GTM’s ability
to offer state-of-the art scalability in the number of observations and consistently good pre-
dictive performance, is typical of structured GP methods: GTM is fast and highly scalable
with respect to the number of observations for low-dimensional settings, but it is unsuitable
for use in higher dimensions as this yields exponential growth in its grid size.
To demonstrate the implications of this trade-off, we studied the performance of GTM
and the two fastest benchmarks, GP classiﬁcation and Collaborative GP, on synthetic choice
datasets for which we can directly control the number of users (nU ) and dimensions (dX ).
Speciﬁcally, for each user, we randomly constructed a utility plane in a dX -dimensional
instance space from which we read utilities for nX = 15 randomly drawn instances. These
instance utilities were distorted with Gaussian noise, and then used to compute each user’s
choices between all 15·142 = 105 instance pairs. Eighty percent of these choices were used
to train the model while the remaining 20% were held out for model evaluation. Note, that
our synthetic generation procedure closely follows the key assumption made by the two
benchmark methods, namely that users make choices based on their predetermined, latent
utility functions. Our synthetic generation procedure should therefore work in the favor of
these methods.
Figure 3.8 shows the resulting training times for several dimensionalities (panels) and
levels of discretization (threeGTM lines per plot). GTM’s computational costs are dominated
by the ﬁxed cost associated with a given grid size. In particular, because GTM’s grid grows
exponentially in the number of dimensions, this ﬁxed cost outgrows the variable cost of other
methods as the data’s dimensionality increases (see Panel (c) for 9 dimensions and 7 levels).
At the same time, as shown in Figure 3.8, GTM’s training curves are relatively ﬂat, which
means that it scales better for large numbers of users and choices in the consumer choice
settings for which it is designed.
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3.5.4 Sparse Approximation Quality
Another parameter affecting the overall computational cost of GTM is the number of Eigen-
vectors ne used in the sparse approximation in Algorithm 2. In our experiments, we used
ne = 100 throughout, and we now illustrate that GTM’s output is relatively unaffected by
this choice as long as ne is not excessively low. Note, that ne has no bearing on predictive
accuracy as the sparse approximation is only used in the posterior variance computation. The
posterior mode, and therefore also the iterative procedure for learning user characteristics Γ
(Algorithm 3), are unaffected by ne.
Figure 3.9 depicts the posterior variance for the ﬁrst user from a popular preference
benchmark dataset, and for varying numbers of Eigenvectors. Note, that the general shape of
the posterior variance is similar in all three panels, which indicates that our sparse Laplace
approach delivers reasonable results starting from small ne values. Differences between
panels are primarily limited to the step from ne = 10 (Panel (a)) to ne = 100 (Panel (b)). In
Panel (b), the low-variance area at the center of the panel is noticeably larger than in Panel
(a). Surrounding areas similarly shift to lower variances. The subsequent step to ne = 1000
(Panel (c)) entails almost no further change in posterior variance.
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Figure 3.8. Scalability in the Number of Dimensions. Training times for
GTM at various levels of discretization, and its two fastest benchmarks, GP
Classiﬁcation and Collaborative GP. Experiments are based of synthetic data
of various dimensionality. Half of the dimensions were assumed to be bi-
nary, the other half continuous. Continuous dimensions were discretized to
the indicated number of levels for GTM only. Error bars show 90% conﬁ-
dence intervals based on ten repetitions with different random splits between
training and test data.
103_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
3.5. Empirical Evaluation 91
 
 
Certain
Indifferent
Uncertain
(a) 10 Eigenvectors (b) 100 Eigenvectors
(c) 1000 Eigenvectors
Figure 3.9. Posterior Variance for Different Numbers of Eigenvectors (ne) in
the Low-Rank Approximation. Panels show increasingly ﬁner posterior vari-
ance estimates for a single user from a popular preference benchmark dataset.
Between panels (a) and (b), the low-variance area in the center expands, and
the adjacent regions shift towards lower variance, reﬂecting the better esti-
mate. The addition of more Eigenvalues in Panel (c) has no noticeable effect,
however.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The GTM preference model we develop here is a new benchmark that strikes a novel balance
between computational scalability and predictive performance, and it is designed to facilitate
the use of preference models for autonomous decision-making in consumer choice settings.
GTM provides state-of-the-art speed and scalability which allows it to accommodate data
on millions of users and observations. These properties are particularly critical in important
emerging applications, including smart electric grids and complex B2B marketplaces where
preference models must be learned in real-time, based on a large number of users and obser-
vations. GTM provides principled probabilistic uncertainty estimates that are fundamental
for automated, data-driven decisions. Finally, its conceptual simplicity makes GTM eas-
ier to understand and validate for practitioners than existing state-of-the-art, non-parametric
choice models.
These advantages are possible by exploiting common characteristics of consumer choice
settings. Speciﬁcally, GTM is designed for settings in which the number of users, instances,
and observed choices is very large and thus excellent scalability is critical. In addition, given
users approximate when evaluating alternatives to avoid information overload (Caussade
et al., 2005), GTM exploits settings in which trade-offs can be captured by a small number
of attributes with a few levels for each attribute. In our empirical evaluations we ﬁnd that
exploiting these properties allows GTM to offer order-of-magnitude performance improve-
ments, making it possible to deploy preference modeling in a wide variety of contemporary
consumer choice domains. Our empirical evaluations also show that the computational bene-
ﬁts entail only a modest reduction in predictive accuracy. GTM is signiﬁcantly more accurate
than the traditional Mixed Logit model, and its predictive performance compares favorably
with conceptually and computationally more demanding non-parametric GP approaches that
scale poorly and are infeasible in applications with millions of users.
We also show that for settings where both the dimensionality and the number of ob-
servations is high, standard GP classiﬁcation provides similarly fast predictions as GTM in
lower-dimensional settings. However, this capability comes at the cost of inconsistent pre-
dictive accuracies because GP classiﬁcation is limited in capturing complex patterns. Over-
all, GTM’s state-of-the-art scalability and its consistently good predictive performance has
not been possible with existing approaches, and it thus constitutes a new benchmark for
preference modeling with a large number of users, instances, and observed choices.
The focus of the research we present here has been on modeling fast learning of proba-
bilistic trade-off evaluations f c that characterize segments of the user population. We solved
the related problem of learning what combination of these evaluations describes each user
through a simple, yet effective iterative scheme. We ﬁnd that existing alternatives to this
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Figure 3.10. Summary of Empirical Results. Darker colors indicate higher
predictive accuracy. GTM provides high predictive accuracy and higher scal-
ability than existing methods for consumer choice settings with few dimen-
sions and attribute levels. In higher-dimensional settings, the Hierarchical
and Collaborative GP models are more efﬁcient, but their scalability with re-
spect to the number of users and choices is limited. GP classiﬁcation scales
to high dimensions and large numbers of observations, but its predictive ac-
curacy is inconsistent across datasets due to its limited expressive power.
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simple iterative scheme entail signiﬁcantly higher computational and conceptual costs, mak-
ing them impractical for the settings we consider. It would be valuable for future work to
explore alternatives that learn the number of characteristics nc from the data at a reasonable
cost.
We also focused on learning from pairwise choices of the form “User u prefers alternative
a to alternative b,” which are objective and cognitively less demanding for the user, but also
more difﬁcult to learn from than ratings. However, unlike some existing approaches, the
natural separation between model and observations inherent in Bayesian modeling allows us
to adapt GTM to learn from a variety of other data types in addition to pairwise choices. In
particular, Jensen and Nielsen (2014) provide likelihood models for ordinal ratings that are
compatible with the framework underlying GTM, and that would allow GTM to learn from
heterogeneous observations containing pairwise choices and ratings simultaneously. This
ﬂexibility of our framework further enhances its applied properties.
In machine learning terms, GTM corresponds to a collaborative classiﬁcation approach
for preference learning, a common interpretation of pairwise choice settings. Importantly,
the contributions presented here towards efﬁcient, scalable, and conceptually simple infer-
ence also generalize to other important classiﬁcation problems such as those arising in credit
scoring, quality assurance, and other impactful business challenges. As such, GTM con-
tributes to the foundations of next-generation information systems in a broad range of do-
mains, where its reliable and consistent computational and predictive performance make it
suitable for autonomous decision-making on users’ behalf.
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Competitive Benchmarking of
Electricity Brokers
4.1 Introduction
In a signiﬁcant change to its strategic research policy, the European Commission announced
in 2010 that it would shift large parts of its research resources to addressing societal chal-
lenges in Europe and beyond (European Commission, 2011). Instead of working on projects
that are neatly delineated by disciplinary borders, researchers are increasingly encouraged to
work on solutions to overarching societal challenges such as health and demographic change,
climate action and resource efﬁciency, and clean and efﬁcient energy. This policy shift is not
just a formal departure from an earlier emphasis on individual research areas or a peculiar
European phenomenon. It is a symptom of the deeper need for comprehensive solutions to
the complex challenges of our time, and it is a testament to the fact that we need more than
a loose collection of clever technological advances to address these challenges.
Consider the challenge of supplying clean and efﬁcient energy at societal scale. In the
United States, more than 40% of all energy is supplied through the electric grid, a threefold
increase over the 10% supplied in electric form in 1940 (US Energy Information Admin-
istration, 2013a,b). Electriﬁcation and its counterpart digitization have spurred substantial
innovation and economic growth, as witnessed by projected global information technology
(IT) investments of around four trillion dollars annually over the next ﬁve years (Gartner
Group, 2013). But the boon of electriﬁcation also has its downsides.
Most American electricity is generated in large, central power plants from fossil (68%)
or nuclear (20%) fuels that have been heavily criticized for their environmental impact (US
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Energy Information Administration, 2013a). The average US power plant converts only one
third of its primary fuel into usable electricity, while 6% of generated electricity is lost to
the aging power lines that connect generators with consumers (US Department of Energy,
2003). Required investments for maintaining and updating these lines have been held back
by budget cuts and lengthy approval processes, and the consequences of these delays are
starting to show as disruptions like the 2003 Northeastern blackout are leaving millions of
households and businesses without power (Fox-Penner, 2005).
These challenges are even greater beyond the highly developed economies. The second
most populous country in the world, India generates close to 80% of its electricity from fossil
fuels, more than a ﬁfth of which is lost to its unreliable network infrastructure (Worldbank,
2013). In 2012, the Indian electricity network became the scene of the worst blackout in
power system history when a cascading fault left more than 600 million people without elec-
tricity and triggered breakdowns in water and health services (Romero, 2012). At 5.2% of
American per capita generation, India’s power system may be small in relative terms (World-
bank, 2013), but its inﬂuence on the country’s economic development is signiﬁcant and its
problems will continue to exacerbate as Indian standards of living advance.
Generation from renewable or decentralized sources could alleviate these problems, but
they are difﬁcult to integrate when consumers have little information about their electricity
usage and few incentives to invest in smart appliances that adapt to the changing availabil-
ity of wind and sun. A less predictable supply of clean electricity must be counteracted
by more intelligently managed demand, but the right combination of technology, informa-
tion, and policies to control the intricate interplay between individual behaviors and physical
constraints remains elusive. The only universally accepted fact to date is that, to tackle
a challenge of this scale and scope, an interdisciplinary effort is required that bundles the
ingenuity of some of the sharpest minds in academia, industry, and policy.
Societal challenges like sustainable energy provisioning are “wicked problems” (Rittel
and Webber, 1973), that arise from complex socio-technical systems where numerous social,
technical, economic, and political factors interact. The overall behavior of such systems
cannot be explained by considering each of its parts in isolation which makes it difﬁcult
to design targeted interventions that correct perceived misbehaviors of the system (Kling,
2007). Worse yet, even where promising interventions are known, the prohibitive cost of
potential social negatives makes it impossible to thoroughly evaluate candidate interventions
realistically and at scale. To continue our example, even though the sustainable energy
challenge is, to all appearances, an information and coordination problem, legislators are
understandably wary of funding large-scale IT deployments without reliable guidance on
their long-run effects.
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Providing such guidance should be familiar ground for the Information Systems (IS)
discipline with its rich tradition of studying and resolving socio-technical challenges for
which “solutions cannot be deduced from scientiﬁc principles alone” (Hevner and Chatterjee,
2010). Events like electrical blackouts or recent ﬁnancial market ﬂash crashes have left the
public wondering whether “we may be becoming critically dependent on [large-scale IT
systems] that we simply do not understand” (Cliff and Northrop, 2012). But even though
the IS discipline seems well-positioned to engage in these debates, its impact on resolving
societal challenges has remained limited (Straub and Ang, 2011, Lucas Jr et al., 2013).
Although there are various reasons for this, we consider two reasons to be particularly im-
portant.
Research Method Scalability: IS research has historically favored the individual, group,
organization, and market levels of inquiry over the societal level (Sidorova et al.,
2006). We suspect that the limited scalability of the single-investigator model (Ibid.)
of IS research plays a signiﬁcant role in this.
Insights and Solutions: Decision-makers in politics and industry are increasingly looking
for solutions in addition to mere insights (Aken, 2004). Researchers must expand
their vision to “inventing new systems that address information needs not covered by
current systems. [They] must not only be observers and historians of technology, [but]
make technological contributions” (Nunamaker and Briggs, 2012).
One of the many IS innovations needed in the sustainable energy context are systems that
broker spontaneous, self-sufﬁcient coalitions of appliances, solar-panels, and electric vehi-
cles to better utilize local infrastructure without inconveniencing users.1 But delivering this
and other innovations despite the complexity that governs the underlying system requires
research methods that scale with the challenge, and that deliver solutions in addition to in-
sights. We aim to make three contributions to this end:
First, we characterize the difﬁculties that wicked problems of societal scale pose to IS
researchers. We contend that several obstacles limit the ability of current research methods
to tackle problems of essential complexity that are large in scale and scope, that are cur-
rently unrealized, that progress at a rapid pace, and for which the social costs of erroneous
interventions are prohibitive.
Second, we proposeCompetitive Benchmarking, a novel IS research method that builds
on the competitive research approach pioneered by the Trading Agents community (Green-
wald and Stone, 2001, Wellman, 2011, Ketter and Symeonidis, 2012), and that speciﬁcally
1This is a special case of a more general idea known as Microgrids or Virtual Power Plants (Pudjianto et al.,
2008).
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addresses these obstacles. Our method emphasizes the importance of rich problem rep-
resentations that are jointly developed among stakeholders and researchers, and it leads
to actionable research results complete with comprehensive supporting data. Competitive
Benchmarking supports both behavioral IS research (insights) and design science research
(solutions).
Third, we evaluate the efﬁcacy of Competitive Benchmarking using a case study on
the Power Trading Agent Competition for research on sustainable energy systems (Power
TAC, Ketter et al. 2013a). Power TAC challenges researchers to design Brokers, a novel type
of information system that can play a pivotal role in modern coordination mechanisms for
sustainable energy systems speciﬁcally, and other smart market environments more gener-
ally (Bichler et al., 2010).
To date, Power TAC has brought together more than a dozen research groups from vari-
ous academic disciplines, and stakeholders from utilities to customer lobby groups to com-
petitively design, evaluate, and improve Brokers. We conclude this article with preliminary
empirical evidence of the beneﬁts of CB as a research methods, and evidence of the beneﬁts
that competitively designed Brokers have to offer towards resolving the “grand challenge”
of providing affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy for the twenty-ﬁrst century (Mas-
soud Amin and Wollenberg, 2005).
4.2 Information Systems Research for Societal Challenges
We set the scene for Competitive Benchmarking by ﬁrst considering the difﬁculties that so-
cietal challenges pose to IS researchers. Two fundamental types of scientiﬁc inquiry can
be distinguished in the IS discipline, both of which are important in resolving societal chal-
lenges: behavioral research and design science research (March and Smith, 1995, Walls
et al., 1992). The research framework of Hevner et al. (2004) depicted in Figure 4.1 illus-
trates the interaction between the two.
An IS research effort might start with the realization that IT can improve the effectiveness
or efﬁciency of a particular socio-technical system, such as an organization’s use of IT, or that
of a whole society . If the goal of the research effort is to describe or explain phenomena
occurring within the system, researchers develop and justify new descriptive or explanatory
theories, whereas if the goal is to improve the system, they build and evaluate artifacts and
corresponding prescriptive design theories  – . The outcomes of these efforts are both
applied to the original system, and added to the scientiﬁc knowledge base for future use.
Note that both types of scientiﬁc inquiry are interrelated. Descriptive and explanatory
theories provide the understanding needed for designing effective artifacts, whereas artifacts
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Figure 4.1. IS research encompasses behavioral and design science research.
While the former seeks truth in the form of justiﬁed theories, the latter
seeks to create utility through designed artifacts. The depicted framework
is adapted from Hevner et al. (2004). Circled numbers are referenced from
the main text.
embedded in context are the subject of new theories. In the remainder of this article, we
will illustrate many of our arguments using design science examples, which, in our opinion,
holds the greatest need and the greatest opportunity for advancing the impact of IS on so-
cietal challenges. But our arguments hold true for behavioral research as well, and we will
highlight several such instances below.
This general research framework applies to societal challenges as well as to challenges
of smaller scale. However, a number of issues arise in each step of the framework when
applying it at the societal level. We discuss these issues below (see Table 4.1 for a summary).
Deﬁning Problems and Needs 
Societal challenges exceed the capacity of individual research groups to interact with all
stakeholders to build and maintain an understanding of an unfolding challenge (Arias et al.,
2000). For example, a research group attempting to design IT-based interventions to cli-
mate change would have to interact with meteorologists, geologists, politicians, chemists,
economists, sociologists, and many other stakeholders to develop an understanding of cli-
mate change and its expected societal impact. But even if time and resources were unlimited,
societal challenges like climate change would defy the comprehensive formalization of the
challenge itself and the objectives for possible interventions. This is a direct consequence
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Characteristic Methodological Challenges
Cost of Social Negatives: Failures
of real-world interventions, even at
small scale, entail prohibitive costs
• Reduce social negatives through high external validity evaluations
• Produce rigorous prescriptive design theories, not singular designs
Unrealized Challenges: Many chal-
lenges are only anticipated, solutions
must be preemptive
• Produce solutions in addition to descriptive and explanatory insights
• Demonstrate viability of candidate interventions for expensive real-
world evaluation
Rapid Pace: Real world progresses
quickly and unpredictably • Avoid wasteful duplication in developing a joint understanding of the
challenge
• Maintain an up-to-date understanding of the challenge
• Find the right balance between rigor and relevance
• Benchmark alternative interventions swiftly
• Disseminate results in a timely manner
Scale and Scope: Societal chal-
lenges have vastly broader scales and
scopes (societal, global) than most
traditional IS research (individual,
group, organization, market)
• Interact with all stakeholders
• Understand the problem and ﬁnd solutions, effectively coordinate
many smaller research groups
• Evaluate candidate interventions swiftly, rigorously, and with high
external validity
Essential Complexity: Increasing
use of IS, (smart) markets, and other
social forms of organization creates
essential complexity
• Explore broad solution space
• Produce comparable artifacts based on a shared paradigm
• Comprehensively formalize the problem and solution quality criteria,
quickly converge on a paradigm
• Evaluate strategic interactions of evolving candidate artifacts, re-
late locally optimized artifact performance to overall system perfor-
mance, deal with asymmetrically dominated options
Table 4.1. Summary of key characteristics that societal challenges pose to IS
researchers.
of the essential complexity governing the systems that these challenges emerge from (von
Hayek, 1989). In the climate change example, an intervention might aim to protect biodiver-
sity, mitigate the short-run impact on the global food supply, or maintain economic growth.
Each of these objectives gives rise to a different set of interventions and to a different delin-
eation of the challenge. In other words, the deﬁnition of the challenge, the vocabulary used
to describe it, and the questions that researchers ask about it all become a crucial part of the
challenge itself (Rittel and Webber, 1973).
Two conventional responses to these issues have been to either work on a small sub-
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set of the challenge, or to establish large, centrally composed and hierarchically organized
research consortia (Hey et al., 2009). But by focussing on small subproblems, researchers
ignore essential facets of the challenge, create candidate interventions that are incomparable
to interventions for adjacent subproblems, and ignore important system-level consequences.
And centrally composed and hierarchically organized research consortia forgo the opportu-
nity of leveraging the diversity of various research groups for understanding the problem
from a wide range of angles. Large consortia also tend to move more slowly than the rapidly
evolving challenges they aim to address (Moss et al., 2010). Unsurprisingly therefore, prac-
titioners ﬁnd “science [to be] lagging behind the commercial world in the ability to infer
meaning from data and take action based on that meaning” (Hey et al., 2009).
We argue that methodological advances are needed to support interdisciplinary com-
munities of stakeholders and researchers in jointly developing (1) problem deﬁnitions and
models of societal challenges, (2) shared vocabularies, and (3) lists of important research
questions. Loosely following Kuhn (1996), we refer to this triplet as a scientiﬁc paradigm.
Any method ﬁt for this purpose must effectively distribute the limited capacity of individual
research groups by facilitating a separation of concerns between them. It must avoid the
wasteful duplication inherent in deﬁning small, disparate sub-challenges, and it must be able
to respond quickly to evolutions in the current understanding of the challenge. Richer, more
malleable problem representations beyond printed articles are needed that can be created and
updated with ease. The paradigm itself must become a device through which researchers and
stakeholders jointly coordinate their efforts, and new incentives are needed for researchers
to invest in its development.
Using the Knowledge Base and Building Artifacts  	
The scale and complexity of societal problems comes paired with a vast number of possible
interventions. In our climate change example, these interventions might include organi-
zational redesigns, legislation, economic incentives, deployment of technology, or a com-
bination thereof. Research on societal challenges must consider a broad range of diverse
candidate interventions based on experiences of researchers from various disciplines to un-
derstand the nature of good interventions in the absence of a unique quality criterion (Pries-
Heje and Baskerville, 2008, Collins et al., 2009). In the case of technological interventions,
studying a broad range of candidate artifacts is particularly important, because the effects
of strategic interactions between artifacts can easily dominate the performance of artifacts
studied in isolation (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007).
Quickly generating diverse candidate interventions presents current scientiﬁc methods
with difﬁculties. We already discussed shared paradigms as a critical precondition to compa-
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rability. In contrast, the current norm are disparate candidate interventions based on different
problem deﬁnitions that hamper a quick cycle of comparison and improvement.
We argue that methodological advances are needed to foster interdisciplinary communi-
ties of researchers working from a shared paradigm. This will require new forms of coor-
dination between a multitude of smaller research groups, and a mindset that favors a peer-
reviewed and community-owned paradigm over after-the-fact comparisons of results based
on disparate problem deﬁnitions.
Evaluating IS Artifacts 

Interventions in complex systems must be evaluated at the system level where strategic
interaction effects can be observed. This is particularly difﬁcult for societies, where the
increasing use of markets and other social forms of organization has vastly increased the
number and diversity of interactions (Bichler et al., 2010). Consider the case of the global
ﬁnancial markets with their continuously evolving setup. These markets
involve or acquire signiﬁcant degrees of variability in components and hetero-
geneity of constituent systems ... For this reason traditional engineering tech-
niques, which are predicated on very different assumptions, cannot necessarily
be trusted to deliver acceptable solutions. ... [N]ew approaches are required:
new engineering tools and techniques, new management perspectives and prac-
tice (Cliff and Northrop, 2012).
Analytical methods may provide important insights in stylized settings, but they are neces-
sarily limited when it comes to evaluating complex system interventions. Real world evalua-
tions such as ﬁeld experiments, on the other hand, are problematic because of the prohibitive
cost of well-intended interventions gone awry, that is, the cost of social negatives. Pilot
evaluations could alleviate these consequences, but they are expensive and their realism is
bounded by a homogenous, small-scale setup where one consortium controls the entire pi-
lot. Finally, many important societal challenges like climate change, aging societies, and
depleted carbon-based energy sources have not fully materialized yet, rendering real world
evaluations simply impossible.
IS researchers have extensive experience with system level evaluations that often include
strategizing actors and artifacts, e.g., (Bapna et al., 2004, Wang and Benbasat, 2005). But
because of the vast number of interactions, decentrally evolving artifacts, and the evolv-
ing web of interactions between them, interventions in societal challenges are particularly
difﬁcult to evaluate. Research must anticipate and preempt societal challenges instead of
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studying them in retrospect, but it is unclear is how researchers can cater to unrealized futur-
istic needs while meeting standards of academic rigor today.
We argue that methodological advances are needed in system-level evaluations of de-
centrally evolving artifacts and their strategic interactions for currently unrealized problems
of societal scale. Evaluation facilities must provide detailed, comparable data on artifact
performance and evolution, and balance swift evaluation against the risk of incurring social
negatives. We should emphasize that we do not attempt to prescribe a single best tradeoff
between rigor and relevance. Instead, we see this tradeoff as a conscious choice, jointly
made by researchers and stakeholders during the deﬁnition of their paradigm.
Communicating with the Environment and the Knowledge Base  
Producing research results on societal challenges that are both impactful and rigorous is dif-
ﬁcult for at least three reasons. First, stakeholders expect researchers to proactively provide
solutions in addition to mere insights. Policy makers, for instance, seek concrete guidance
on the technologies, rules, and institutions of future energy infrastructures (Kassakian and
Schmalensee, 2011). Second, due to the scale and complexity of societal challenges it it dif-
ﬁcult to communicate the problem and possible interventions, and to convince stakeholders
of the viability of interventions for further evaluation in the real world. And ﬁnally, the es-
tablished scientiﬁc publication cycle cannot keep up with the pace of societal challenges,
which reduces the timeliness of research results and their potential impact.2
We argue that methodological advances are needed that encourage researchers to produce
tangible representations of their results in addition to textual descriptions. These represen-
tations must be based on a credible, peer-reviewed paradigm, invite further experimentation
by researchers or practitioners, be readily comparable to alternatives, and come with detailed
performance records in the form of curated experimental data. By working from a shared
paradigm, and by making data and designed artifacts ﬁrst-class citizens of the scientiﬁc pro-
cess, frictions in building on other researchers’ results must be reduced, and the credibility
and concreteness of results must be increased.
Towards IS Research for Societal Challenges
To summarize, while nothing limits the application of existing research frameworks to soci-
etal challenges per se, we ﬁnd several obstacles when applying them at the societal level. In
this section, we have identiﬁed and described these obstacles, and have put forward several
required advances.
2Our focus in this article is on IS reaserch, but we conjecture that this is also true for other disciplines.
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4.3 Competitive Benchmarking
We next propose Competitive Benchmarking (CB), a novel IS research method that aims
to remove these obstacles. At the heart of CB is a new separation of concerns around
rich representations of scientiﬁc paradigms and research results. CB enables scalable inter-
disciplinary research communities in which coordination and peer review are shifted to the
earliest possible time. The return on this up-front investment comes in the form of compara-
ble, actionable research results, and timely dissemination.
Figure 4.2. Competitive Benchmarking (CB) consists of three related
core elements: the PROCESS, the PLATFORM, and a continuous process of
ALIGNMENT. The boundaries between these core elements enable the new
separation of concerns within CB.
Figure 4.2 illustrates CB’s three core elements:
1. CB ALIGNMENT3 refers to a continuous synchronization process between a scientiﬁc
paradigm and a societal challenge, and it provides for the timely dissemination of
late-breaking results.
2. The CB PLATFORM is the medium in which researchers and stakeholders represent
an evolving scientiﬁc paradigm, and it provides the infrastructure for the PROCESS.
3. The CB PROCESS is where independent researchers iteratively build novel theories
3We use small capitals to distinguish ALIGNMENT, PROCESS, and PLATFORM as deﬁned in Competitive Bench-
marking from their usual interpretations.
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and design artifacts, while benchmarking and improving their work in direct sight of
each other.
We now elaborate on these core elements and describe where CB departs from conventional
IS research. In the following sections, we instantiate CB to the sustainable energy challenge,
give empirical evidence for its efﬁcacy, and discuss connections to related work.
4.3.1 Competitive Benchmarking ALIGNMENT
No single research group is likely to understand the full extent of a societal challenge, and
we therefore propose a shared scientiﬁc paradigm, established through a community-based
process. This paradigm must be updated continuously as technologies, regulations, or ob-
jectives change (synchronization function). And research results must be disseminated in a
targeted and timely fashion in order to have impact (dissemination function). In CB, these
two functions are realized through a continuous ALIGNMENT process, depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. Alignment is a continuous, community-based synchronization
process between a scientiﬁc paradigm and a societal challenge.
Let us ﬁrst consider synchronization. Establishing and maintaining an accurate model
of a societal challenge is an important precondition for research that generates useful theories
and artifacts, and that offers reliable policy guidance (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007). Neither the
idea of continuous analysis nor the methods CB researchers use to this end differ from con-
ventional research and we will therefore not discuss them further (see, e.g., Gray, 2004; Ma-
jchrzak and Markus, 2013). ALIGNMENT’s distinguishing feature is that it encourages the
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establishment of one shared, peer-reviewed paradigm early on, to increase the speed, effec-
tiveness, and credibility of the research efforts that follow.
The basic idea is to replace the single-investigator model and its numerous smaller, in-
compatible problem deﬁnitions with a social learning process that is better suited for gath-
ering dispersed, often tacit stakeholder knowledge. The resulting paradigm is continuously
updated and represented in a software-based CB PLATFORM, a choice of medium that we
discuss in detail below. In practice, community-based paradigm development requires ini-
tial investments from a core community of dedicated researchers. Once a critical mass of
groundwork has been laid, its beneﬁts become evident and a virtuous cycle of peer-review,
incremental reﬁnement, and increase in paradigm value sets in. As researchers from diverse
backgrounds begin adopting and contributing to the paradigm, they increase the community’s
capacity for understanding the challenge, improve the coverage and detail of the paradigm,
challenge prior assumptions, and provide additional validation in the process.
Besides building the paradigm, maintaining its connection to the societal challenge under
study is equally important. In our own CB efforts, we institutionalize this idea through
industry and policy advisory boards that meet regularly to provide guidance on the most
important aspects of the challenge. The upshot is an intellectual capital base with high
managerial and societal relevance, that each researcher has an interest to invest in, and that
beneﬁts the entire community by providing one high-quality research infrastructure.
We hasten to add that the goal of ALIGNMENT is not to establish one universally accepted
world-view, nor to socialize the scientiﬁc process. As we shall see below, CB encourages
a type of intense, competitive innovation in which individual achievements are promoted
rather than attenuated. But for such competitive innovation to be effective, researchers must
start from compatible assumptions and distribute their limited time judiciously. ALIGNMENT
provides upfront coordination and open dispute resolution before major research efforts are
undertaken. It avoids duplicate work during the problem deﬁnition phase, it promotes re-
search results that are comparable after the fact, and it leads to a greater conﬁdence that the
community’s efforts ﬂow into the highest-value research questions.
The results of these efforts must be communicated in a targeted and timely fashion to
have impact and to accelerate progress (Garvin, 1993). CB supports the timely communica-
tion of results through the dissemination function of ALIGNMENT. Clearly, the community
of stakeholders and researchers involved in CB is a natural starting point for dissemination,
with a vested interest in results guided by their own ideas. But the dissemination function
adds at least two other novel and important beneﬁts.
First, by combining a peer-reviewed paradigm with a swift but rigorous PROCESS, CB
offers an alternative to the protracted ex-post review of assumptions and results that is the
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current scientiﬁc norm. Because a signiﬁcant share of review is performed up-front at the
paradigm level by numerous independent researchers and stakeholders, ALIGNMENT is “a
way of effecting ... validation. The interaction between the modeler and the client in mutu-
ally understanding the model and the process establishes the model’s signiﬁcance; that is, its
warranty” (Kleindorfer et al., 1998). Individual researchers then develop new theories and
artifacts based on the pre-validated paradigm, which are ultimately evaluated by an indepen-
dent party during the public CB PROCESS. There, theories and artifacts have to perform
well under demanding conditions that are partly determined by the evaluators, and partly by
other researchers’ designs. Fine-grained protocols of these evaluations are made publicly
available to support their credibility. Overall, this procedure greatly reduces the need for
ex-post scrutiny and time to disseminate.
Second, because ALIGNMENT is problem-centric and continuously seeks to identify the
next most important insights and solutions, it reduces the risk of addressing outdated prob-
lems. It thereby generalizes the idea of applicability checks (Rosemann and Vessey, 2008)
to a continuous process that guides a research community.
The prohibitive cost of potential social negatives will make decision-makers in industry
and policy understandably sceptical of trusting just any result. A diligently executed process
of ALIGNMENT leads to an improved rapport with these stakeholders and adds credibility to
research results obtained through CB. Combined with timely, tangible results in the form of
data and executable artifacts, this creates attractive opportunities for high-impact dissemina-
tion.
4.3.2 Competitive Benchmarking PLATFORM
The PLATFORM is the central point of coordination for CB participants. It is the malleable,
executable representation of the shared paradigm created and updated during ALIGN-
MENT, and it provides a scientiﬁc toolset to the PROCESS (see Figure 4.4).
Given the central role of the paradigm within CB, the medium used to represent it is
important. The current medium (natural language) has three signiﬁcant shortcomings: it
has no safeguards against imprecisions and inconsistencies, it is difﬁcult to update as the
challenge evolves, and it must be translated into other media to become actionable. Formal
representations address the ﬁrst concern, but they are limited in terms of problem sizes they
can address.
CB instead promotes the use of software-based PLATFORMs to represent the paradigm,
which leverage the great strides that software engineering has made in understanding and
representing complexity. These started with the realization that modeling complex socio-
technical systems should be an iterative, social learning process. Related progress in com-
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Figure 4.4. The PLATFORM is a community-developed, executable repre-
sentation of the paradigm. It is the central point of coordination between
researchers and stakeholders, and it provides a toolset for empricial science.
puter language theory has bred a generation of highly expressive, problem-centric languages
that put stakeholder needs before machine considerations (Meyer, 1998). And advances in
program design and architecture have made software extensible and adaptive to changing
environments. The upshot is a proven, scalable, and social approach to capturing complex-
ity (Baetjer, 1997).
The advantages of software-based paradigm representations come at a greater cost of ini-
tially describing the problem, which must therefore be spread over several research groups.
We should also note that certain technical qualities of software-based representations may
require advanced software engineering skills, a point we revisit in the discussion. Among
these qualities are a clear design that makes it easy for other researchers to use and extend
the paradigm, good readability and thoroughly documented assumptions, a modular ar-
chitecture that enables specialist contributions in clearly delineated areas, and a licensing
model that encourages free redistribution and extension.
The second PLATFORM function is that of a toolset for empirical science. Because
the PLATFORM encodes a shared understanding of a societal challenge, research results and
tools derived from it will be comparable and technically compatible. For the purpose of the-
ory validation, PLATFORM data can be related to data obtained from studies under different
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environmental conditions, or reproduced under identical environmental circumstances (Tes-
fatsion, 2006, Pyka and Fagiolo, 2007). Designed artifacts can readily be benchmarked
against artifacts from other research groups. And ecosystems of scientiﬁc tools can be built
around the PLATFORM to aid researchers in routine tasks such as data screening, reporting,
and distributed experiment management.
We should emphasize that the presence of an executable representation of the paradigm
also means that fully executable interventions like dynamic decision rules, economic mecha-
nisms, or IS artifacts can be evaluated using the PLATFORM as a testbed. These interventions
are tangible and interesting to study for practitioners and researchers alike.
4.3.3 Competitive Benchmarking PROCESS
The iterative PROCESS is where researchers iteratively build novel theories and design arti-
facts, while continually improving their work in direct sight of each other. It also encom-
passes the competitive, benchmarking-based elements from which CB derives its name.
Figure 4.5. The PROCESS consists of four phases in which researchers sub-
sequently (1) design new theories and artifacts, (2) pit them against other
researchers’ work, (3) analyze the quality of their ideas, and (4) improve iter-
atively. The PROCESS leverages the aligned PLATFORM, and it produces the-
ories and executable artifacts with comprehensive supporting data for quick
dissemination.
122_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
110 Chapter 4. Competitive Benchmarking of Electricity Brokers
Any effective research method is a structured approach to exploring and learning about
phenomena (descriptive and explanatory research) and solution spaces (design science re-
search). Researchers create new theories and designs, evaluate their realism and usefulness,
learn from experience, and iterate to improve their work (see Figure 4.1). This structured
form of learning and improvement is related to benchmarking in that it requires skills in
“systematic problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning from ... own
experience and past history, learning from the experiences and best practices of others, and
transferring knowledge quickly and efﬁciently.” Its best practitioners “[rely] on the scientiﬁc
method, rather than guesswork, for diagnosing problems” and “[insist] on data, rather than
assumptions, as background for decision making” (Garvin, 1993).
Figure 4.5 illustrates how CB incorporates the notion of benchmarking in its PROCESS.
Suppose a community of researchers and stakeholders is interested in understanding the
effects that different transaction tax regimes have on the trading behavior of commercial
banks and in stability implications for global ﬁnancial markets. Starting from these goals,
they engage in ALIGNMENT and model the behaviors of private and institutional investors, a
market infrastructure, central banks, etc. until they agree on having captured the most salient
features of the challenge. The result of this work is an aligned PLATFORM on which the
PROCESS proceeds iteratively, in cycles consisting of four phases:
Design: Several research groups design trading strategies against the PLATFORM, which
can be based on both ad-hoc designs or on sound kernel theories, as long as they re-
main within the agreed-upon paradigm (see Section 4.2).4 Strategies can even involve
human traders, which opens interesting avenues for work on behavioral theories (Babb
et al., 1966, Collins et al., 2009, 2010). Researchers repeatedly evaluate their strategies
against the PLATFORM in research setup to detect and remove weaknesses.
Compete: Participants then pit their artifacts against each other in a formal tournament
where strategic interactions and system-level properties can be observed. An indepen-
dent party determines the tournament schedule, including the pairing of artifacts and
environmental conditions (e.g., various tax levels or trading intensities). CB is inher-
ently meritocratic and good performance in a strong ﬁeld of competitors is reward and
incentive for further improvement.
Analyze: The tournament outcome is a ranking of strategies, together with ﬁne-grained data
on artifact and system-level behavior made publicly available. The PLATFORM and its
accompanying scientiﬁc tools promote credible analyses that can be produced quickly
4Note, that this does not preclude artifacts from exploiting loopholes within the PLATFORM. One of the beneﬁts
of CB is the discovery of unintended loopholes through a wide array of creative artifacts.
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and distributed along with the underlying data.
Publish: The insights gleaned from these analyses are disseminated to researchers and
stakeholders. Analyses can, for example, pinpoint drivers of artifact performance that
research groups can use to direct their future efforts, e.g., (Jordan et al., 2007, Ketter
et al., 2013c). Researchers also make executable versions of their tournament artifacts
available for study, which is an attractive additional channel for distributing tangible,
actionable results.
This example is mostly concerned with artifact design, and system-level artifact evaluations
are indeed among CB’s key beneﬁts, but the PROCESS equally supports other types of sci-
entiﬁc inquiry that close the IS research cycle described by Hevner et al. (2004). Most
importantly, a PLATFORM together with a ﬁxed set of high-performing artifacts can be used
as a conventional Agent-based Virtual World (ABVW) to perform controlled experiments in
pursuit of descriptive or explanatory theories (Ketter et al., 2008, Chaturvedi et al., 2011).
These theories can then be used by artifact designers to improve their designs. Table 4.2
provides an overview of the supported research types.
CB’s PROCESS contains four novelties that aim to improve the capacity of IS research
for tackling societal challenges. Most importantly, it adds naturalistic dynamics to artifact
validations. In our example, researchers cannot hope to experiment with real tax regimes and
must therefore resort to working against a model of the challenge. However, one particularly
important facet of real-world evaluation can be brought into the laboratory: the competitive
co-evolution of artifacts. Like ﬁrms and individuals in the real world, CB participants con-
stantly seek to improve their designs by adapting to the behavior of the environment and of
others in a type of Emergent Knowledge Process (EKP, Markus et al. 2002). The ensuing
dynamics provide a unique tradeoff between artiﬁcial and naturalistic elements for high-risk
evaluations in complex economic environments, see Figure 4.6.5
Second, the aligned PLATFORM is validated by other researchers and stakeholders,
and evaluation conditions are determined by an independent party. That artifacts and theories
must perform well under many different circumstances in a realistic environment increases
external validity and researchers’ conﬁdence in the absence of unanticipated social nega-
tives.
Third, community-based ALIGNMENT and PLATFORM development spreads the effort
of understanding and modeling a challenge across many researchers to increase scientiﬁc
5An alternative view on this is based on the “increasing recognition of the mutable nature of these artifacts.
That is, they are artifacts that are in an almost constant state of change” (Gregor and Jones, 2007). Designs, in the
context of CB, are by deﬁnition “evolutionary trajectories,” not static blueprints, and an important beneﬁt of CB is
the ability to generate such trajectories realistically, and to study their development over time.
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Research Type Research Setup Examples
Artifact Design
1. Use PLATFORM for distributed artifact de-
sign
2. Benchmark and improve artifacts iteratively
• Trading strategies
• Dynamic pricing
• Brokers
Controlled
Experiments 1. Hold set of high-performing artifacts con-
stant
2. Execute artifacts against PLATFORM while
varying environmental parameters
3. Measure resulting system-level properties
• Social welfare studies
• Distribution studies
• Concentration and
competitiveness mea-
sures
Falsiﬁcation
Studies 1. Vary set of high-performing artifacts
2. Execute artifacts against the PLATFORM
3. Assess stability of mechanism or theory
• Market mechanisms
• Circuit breakers
Mixed Initiative
Studies 1. Vary set of high-performing artifacts
2. Task human participants
3. Execute artifacts against PLATFORM
4. Assess human or artifact performance
• Decision support sys-
tems
• User interfaces
Table 4.2. CB supports descriptive and explanatory research (insights) as
well as design science research (solutions). The continuous evolution of ar-
tifacts in the PROCESS yields diverse, high-performing artifacts that can be
studied towards descriptive or explanatory theories.
cycle speed later. The initial investment amortizes as researchers gain the ability to rapidly
test artifacts and theories without the frictions of ﬁrst ﬁnding compatible benchmarks. The
publicly evaluated artifacts and theories can then be swiftly disseminated. The evaluation
data also can be used to derive rigorous design theories, which is an important step in
reconciling the need for scientiﬁc rigor with leveraging the creativity of pragmatic designs.
It may not even be known why a particular artifact works at the time of evaluation, but the
availability of evaluation data allows the community to discover theoretical principles behind
its working later on.6
And ﬁnally, the comprehensive data generated in the PROCESS provides clear visibility
of the progress that designers make in improving their artifacts, which also gives a measure
of the beneﬁts of CB as a research method (Venable and Baskerville, 2012). When progress
6A similar separation of concerns led Johannes Kepler to discover the laws of planetary motion from recordings
in the notebooks of Tycho Brahe (Hey et al., 2009). We speculate that the lack of comparability between artifacts
causes this separation of concerns to be virtually absent from design research today.
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Figure 4.6. The CB PROCESS brings competitive coevolution of artifacts,
one particularly important facet of naturalistic evaluation, into the laboratory.
The depicted classiﬁcation is adapted from Venable et al. (2012). The dotted
line indicates the partly artiﬁcial, partly naturalistic character of evaluation in
CB.
tapers off, the community may also decide to call its advisory board for new challenges.
4.3.4 Interaction effects of ALIGNMENT, PLATFORM, and PROCESS
We should emphasize that CB does not attempt to replace the existing process of scientiﬁc
knowledge discovery. It rather aims to remove several common obstacles, and it adds a
structured approach to benchmarking which, in our opinion, is insufﬁciently represented in
current IS research practices. One of the resulting beneﬁts for IS research on societal chal-
lenges is a clear separation of concerns between various stakeholder and researcher groups
around the PLATFORM, which ultimately leads to better scalability, and which we summarize
in Table 4.3.
The improvement in scalability stems partly from reducing the waste and redundancy
inherent in incomparable research results, and partly from redistributing efforts between in-
dividuals and the community. In particular, the early coordination during ALIGNMENT en-
ables the reuse of domain knowledge obtained from stakeholders, and of the scientiﬁc toolset
provided by the PLATFORM. Figure 4.7 illustrates how individual effort is supplemented by
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Separation of con-
cerns between ...
Enables ...
Stakeholders and Re-
searchers • Researchers to effectively learn about the challenge
• Stakeholders to learn about new research insights and solutions in a timely fashion
Researchers from
different disciplines or
with different expertise
• Scalable, expert model-building and concurrent work on one joint problem deﬁni-
tion. For example, a battery expert might build realistic models of e-vehicle charging
behavior to be used by an economist in the design of market mechanisms.
• Competitive design. For example, a machine learning (ML) expert and an operations
research (OR) expert might design alternative solutions to a given problem. The
shared use of a PLATFORM ensures that their artifacts remain technically compatible
and comparable.
Theory/Artifact De-
signers and Data
Scientists
• Independent data analysis and validation. PROCESSes generate publicly available
data for analysis. An economist could, e.g., analyze the welfare effects of deploying
the ML- and OR-based artifacts described above.
Academic Re-
searchers and Prag-
matic Designers
• Leveraging the creativity of pragmatic designers (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). CB
imposes very few constraints on the theoretic underpinnings of designed artifacts.
Practitioners can contribute high performing ad-hoc artifacts that are then further
analyzed by academic researchers.
• Effective industry cooperations. Industrial designers can contribute artifacts that are
rigorously evaluated according to the standards of design theories.
Table 4.3. CB’s three core elements facilitate an effective collaboration be-
tween various groups of contributors. This leads to better scalability in the
challenge size, and in the number of independent contributors.
community effort in deﬁning the problem and in evaluating and communicating results. The
upshot is more time spent on the value-generating core activities of theory development and
artifact building for each individual researcher.
The next section evaluates the efﬁcacy of CB in a case study on design for sustainable en-
ergy systems that we have been conducting together with a global community of researchers
over the past four years.
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Figure 4.7. Competitive Benchmarking leads to redistributing efforts be-
tween individual researchers and the community. Early joint problem deﬁ-
nition and peer review lead to conceptually compatible theories and artifacts
that can be re-used for evaluation and benchmarking purposes. Clear separa-
tions of concerns enable, e.g., the development of system-level analyses by
independent third-party data scientists.
4.4 The Power TAC Case: Competitive Benchmarking for
Sustainable Energy Systems
From relatively modest beginnings 130 years ago, electricity has quickly revolutionized the
way we consume energy and transport information. But next to substantial economic ben-
eﬁts, the electric revolution has also brought about environmental and reliability concerns.
The drivers behind these negatives are numerous and complex, but one important underlying
theme is the mismatch between increasing demands for volume, sustainability, and afford-
ability on one hand, and hierarchical control structures that are essentially unchanged from
electricity’s early days on the other.
Modernizing these control structures is an extremely challenging proposition. The Smart
Grid of the future will have to (a) efﬁciently allocate electricity among hundreds of millions
of users with unique preferences, (b) integrate production from renewable and decentral-
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ized power sources like electric vehicle ﬂeets, (c) respect complicated constraints imposed
by power ﬂow physics, privacy concerns, and several layers of regulation, and (d) uphold
real-time control under uncertainty, all the while ensuring a smooth transition from the op-
erational grid of today. IS scholars can make substantial contributions to this grand societal
challenge by “integrating new information and communications technologies, combining
them with active support from electricity consumers, and leveraging the optimizing power
of markets” (Coll-Mayor et al., 2007).
The scale and complexity of the challenge, and the interrelated advances required in
theory and artifact design prompted a global community of researchers to address it through
the Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC, Ketter et al. 2013b, 2013c, see also
www.powertac.org), a Competitive Benchmarking effort that we describe next, together
with empirical evidence for its efﬁcacy.
4.4.1 Power TAC ALIGNMENT
At the beginning of the Power TAC project stood an initial ALIGNMENT during which a core
group of researchers performed stakeholder interviews and surveyed the literatures on power
systems and smart grids. Key stakeholders were identiﬁed in utility companies, network in-
frastructure providers, communication electronics manufacturers, electricity cooperatives,
and electricity customer lobby groups. These stakeholders were interviewed repeatedly, and
many joined an advisory board which now institutionalizes Power TAC’s ongoing ALIGN-
MENT. The board meets twice yearly to provide researchers with industry insights, to ensure
that important challenges are being tackled, and to disseminate the latest research results.
After several ALIGNMENT iterations, Power TAC began to attract outside researchers in-
terested in leveraging the publicly available PLATFORM for their own work. Several groups
contributed specialized knowledge that improved its realism in areas where no other commu-
nity member possessed the requisite expertise or resources, e.g., customer modeling (Reddy
and Veloso, 2012) and balancing (de Weerdt et al., 2011). In exchange, the contributors
could study their models in a rich, realistic environment that they could not have created
otherwise, including a dedicated community that validated and critiqued their models. Other
groups created experimental tools for and third-party analyses of Power TAC (Babic and
Podobnik, 2013, Kahlen et al., 2012), compared the PLATFORM against real-world behav-
iors (Nanoha, 2013), and designed and evaluated artifacts, e.g., (Peters et al., 2013c, Kuate
et al., 2013). Importantly, many of these new participants had the technical expertise but
no prior domain knowledge or interest in contributing to the sustainable energy challenge.
It was the availability of a community-supported, executable model of a real-world chal-
lenge and a predeﬁned list of important research questions that triggered them to apply their
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diverse technical skills to sustainable energy. Conversely, researchers and external stake-
holders with energy domain knowledge beneﬁted from the innovative contributions of these
technical experts.
Our case study illustrates how ALIGNMENT provides scalability to communities of re-
searchers coordinating through a shared paradigm. Establishing and maintaining this paradigm
regularly requires incisive modeling decisions from the community. But through ongoing
ALIGNMENT, these decisions can be made early, thereby keeping subsequent research re-
sults technically and conceptually comparable. For example, Power TAC currently:
• models the electric distribution system but not the transmission system, because
while controlling the latter is well understood, much scientiﬁc guidance is needed
on making the former “smarter” (EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute, 2011).7
• models the economic aspects of the smart grid but not the physical power ﬂows,
because of an urgent need for insights on how a combination of IT and economic
forces can incentivize sustainable electricity consumption (Watson et al., 2010).
• models retail electricity tariffs, but not bilateral price negotiations with commercial
customers, because end users “can provide remarkable local intelligence ... [but] any
technology is doomed to fail if the involved users do not like or understand it” (Palen-
sky and Dietrich, 2011).
These ALIGNMENT results are continuously translated into the executable and peer-reviewed
Power TAC PLATFORM.
4.4.2 The Power TAC PLATFORM
The PLATFORM models a competitive retail power market in a medium-sized city, in which
consumers and small-scale producers may choose from among a set of alternative electricity
providers, represented by competing Brokers. Brokers are autonomous software agents,
built by individual research groups. The remainder of the paradigm (see Section 4.2) is
modeled by the PLATFORM (see Figure 4.8).
Brokers offer electricity tariffs (also known as plans or rates) to household and business
customers through a retail market. Some customers are equipped with solar panels and
wind turbines, which produce and consume power, and many own demand-side management
capabilities such as remotely controllable heat pumps or water heaters. All customers are
7The distribution system is responsible for providing regional electricity to commercial and residential end-
customers. The transmission system is where large-scale generators like wind farms and coal power plants feed in
high-voltage electricity for long range transmission.
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Figure 4.8. Main elements of the Power TAC scenario. Brokers are au-
tonomous software agents built by individual research groups. The remainder
of the scenario is modeled by the PLATFORM
equipped with smart meters from which consumption and production is reported every hour.
Customers are sensitive to price changes, weather conditions, and calendar factors such as
day of week and hour of day, and they have a range of preferences over tariff terms. For
example, some are willing to subscribe to variable-rate tariffs if they have the opportunity
to save by adjusting their power usage, while others are willing to pay higher prices for the
simplicity of ﬁxed-rate or time-of-use tariffs. Many of these models are contributions from
the user community, e.g., (Gottwalt et al., 2011, Reddy and Veloso, 2012). Brokers buy
and sell energy either from retail customers, or in the day-ahead wholesale market, where
utility-scale power suppliers sell their output. These suppliers represent different price points
and lead-time requirements, e.g., fossil and nuclear power plants, gas turbines, and wind
parks.
The Distribution Utility (DU) models a regulated monopoly that owns and operates the
physical facilities (feeder lines, transformers, etc.) and is responsible for real-time balancing
of supply and demand within the distribution network.8 It does this primarily by operating in
the balancing market, the real-time facet of the wholesale market, and by exercising demand
and supply controls provided by Brokers. The associated costs are allocated to imbalanced
8In the real world, balancing responsibility is typically handled at the transmission level; the simulation imple-
ments a generalization of proposals to move some balancing responsibility to the distribution level (Strbac, 2008).
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Brokers. Given a portfolio of customers, Brokers compete in the wholesale market to mini-
mize the cost of power they deliver to their consuming customers, and to maximize the value
of power delivered to them by their producing customers.
The Power TAC PLATFORM as described here has quickly evolved into the most com-
prehensive economic simulation for smart distribution networks worldwide. Its source code
is licensed under a research and business-friendly Apache license and can be downloaded
for free from https://github.com/powertac. Use and modiﬁcation of the PLATFORM
are not predicated on participating in the PROCESS, but several important CB beneﬁts can
only be reaped by actively engaging with the Power TAC community in this way.
4.4.3 The Power TAC PROCESS
Cornerstones of the CB PROCESS are annual championships, and pilots that provide addi-
tional informal benchmarking opportunities. To date, pilots have been held at IJCAI 2011
in Barcelona, at AAMAS 2012 in Valencia, and at IEEE SG-TEP 2012 in Nuremberg. The
ﬁrst two ofﬁcial Power TAC championships were held at AAAI 2013 in Bellevue, WA, and
at AAMAS 2014 in Paris, France.9
All tournaments consisted of qualifying rounds in which Brokers were screened for tech-
nical ﬂaws, followed by ﬁnal rounds in which varying combinations of three, ﬁve, and eight
Brokers competed. Table 4.4 shows all ﬁnalists of the 2012 Nuremberg pilot and the ﬁrst two
Power TAC championship. These Brokers were designed by researchers with expertise in
Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Electrical Engineering, Information Systems, Machine Learning, and
other areas, and their heterogeneous design approaches have contributed to a rich repository
of design ideas, executable artifacts, and artifact performance data that we analyzed.
Figure 4.9 gives a high-level view of Brokers’ performances at different levels of compe-
tition in the 2012-2014 tournaments.10 The ﬁgure supports several preliminary conclusions:
Heterogeneity Matters: Heterogeneity in designs led to signiﬁcant performance differences.
The best Broker designs outperformed competitors by more than an order of magni-
tude. Attracting heterogeneous designs, benchmarking them against each other, and
understanding the theoretical basis of their functioning is therefore critically impor-
tant.
Breakthrough Innovation: The two best Broker designs in 2013 had only submitted an
9AAAI = Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Artiﬁcial Intelligence; AAMAS = International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; IJCAI = International Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence; SG-TEP = IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Technology, Economics, and Policies.
10For simplicity, we refer to the 2012 Nuremberg pilot and the 2013/2014 Power TAC championship as the
2012-2014 tournaments henceforth.
132_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
120 Chapter 4. Competitive Benchmarking of Electricity Brokers
Broker Institute Country
AgentUDE University Duisburg-Essen Germany
AstonTAC Aston University Birmingham UK
coldbroker INAOE, Natl. Institute for Astrophysics, Optics, and Electronics Mexico
CrocodileAgent University of Zagreb Croatia
cwiBroker CWI, Natl. Research Institute for Mathematics and Computer Science Netherlands
Incumbent Incumbent Monopoly, provided by Power TAC -
LARGE Erasmus University Rotterdam Netherlands
Maxon Westfa¨lische Hochschule Germany
Mertacor Aristotle University Thessaloniki Greece
MinerTA University of Texas at El Paso USA
MLLBroker University of Freiburg Germany
SotonPower University of Southhampton UK
TacTex University of Texas at Austin USA
Table 4.4. Participants in the 2012-2014 Power TAC ﬁnals. The list excludes
several other participating groups who did not qualify for the ﬁnal rounds.
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Figure 4.9. Average proﬁt share of brokers in the 2012-2014 tournaments.
Larger circles indicate a higher percentage of proﬁts captured on average.
Darker circles indicate a higher certainty, that is, a lower standard devia-
tion of average proﬁt shares. CrocodileAgent participated in the 2012 pilot,
but all of its games were affected by a technical ﬂaw and are therefore ex-
cluded from the analysis. The Incumbent broker is provided by the Power
TAC PLATFORM and models the incumbent monopoly.
early-stage prototype in 2012 (TacTex) or no entry at all (cwiBroker). The 2014 win-
ner AgentUDE similarly was a new entrant. Nevertheless, these designed surpassed
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relatively more established designs from previous years, which illustrates the powerful
effect of competitive innovation.
Game Context Matters: Performance depended on the level of competitiveness and other
environmental conditions. AstonTAC’s design, for example, lost ground to several
competitors in three-broker games in 2013, but continued to perform well in highly
competitive eight-broker games. Repeatable games under different environmental
conditions therefore play an important role in fully understanding system dynamics
and reducing the risk of incurring social negatives.
Note, that it is only through Power TAC’s shared scientiﬁc paradigm, the common PLAT-
FORM, and the public nature of the PROCESS that we can freely access, understand, and
compare such a broad variety of creative designs towards an understanding of the Broker
artifacts’ role in the sustainable energy challenge.
4.4.4 Case Study Evaluation
Figure 4.10. Two complementary viewpoints on the qualities of CB: PRO-
CESS Quality is deﬁned as improvements in several key electricity market
characteristics over subsequent iterations of the PROCESS. Market Quality is
deﬁned to improvements in thesye characteristics through the introduction of
competitive brokers.
Towards this deeper understanding, we now analyze Power TAC’s CB PROCESS from
two complementary viewpoints (see Figure 4.10):
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PROCESS Quality: Our key objective in this case study is to understand the efﬁcacy of
CB as a research method. To this end, we quantify the progress made by broker
designers in the 2012-2014 timeframe by evaluating its impact on a set of key market
characteristics deﬁned below. Because the development of these market characteristics
over time is driven by the progress of the PROCESS, we refer to this view as PROCESS
Quality.
Market Quality: As a secondary objective, the case study provides an evaluation of the
potential of competitively designed brokers for addressing the sustainable electric-
ity challenge. The Power TAC PLATFORM allows us to contrast the performance of
competitive and monopolistic retail electricity markets by re-running all competitive
games without brokers. Because the change between the competitive and monopolis-
tic scenario lies in the introduction of competitive markets, we refer to this view as
Market Quality.
Our results are based on data from the three most recent Power TAC tournaments and are
therefore preliminary. In the spirit of CB, the complete data set together with scripts used for
the statistical analyses is publicly available at https://bitbucket.org/journalanon/
pla/src, so that readers can reproduce and extend these result as more data becomes avail-
able.
PROCESS Quality
We compared the results of 48 ﬁnal games played during the 2012 tournament to an equal
number of ﬁnal games played in 2013. The latter were selected from a total of 59 games,
and paired with the 2012 games such that pairs were maximally similar.11 Using the same
procedure, we paired the 59 games played in 2013 with 59 out of 67 games played in the
2014 championship. Together, these games represent about 30 years of simulated artifact
behavior at hourly resolution.
Table 4.5 shows the key performance indicators (KPIs) that we used in our comparison. They
can be categorized as follows:
Retail Market Behavior: Broker behaviors and overall distribution system performance
critically depend on Brokers’ interactions with retail customers. We tracked realized
11The 2012 tournament used a public beta version of Power TAC and for our analyses we excluded games that
were affected by a technical ﬂaw in this beta version. As an example for the similarity pairing procedure, a three-
broker game between AstonTAC, Mertacor, and TacTex played in 2012 would be paired either with a game between
the same brokers in 2013, or otherwise with a similar alternative.
135_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
4.4. The Power TAC Case: Competitive Benchmarking for Sustainable Energy Systems 123
prices, price variability, overall energy traded, and retail market competitiveness as
indicated by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI).12
Sourcing Behavior: Brokers cover retail consumption through production commitments
procured in the wholesale market, or through small-scale production from retail cus-
tomers. We tracked the percentage of retail consumption covered and the development
of corresponding proﬁt margins for each of these sources.
Balancing Behavior: In case of residual imbalances, the balancing market acts as the en-
ergy source and sink of last resort. We tracked the development of balancing energy
required by Brokers as a percentage of their overall energy trading business.
12The HHI is deﬁned as HHI =∑Nn=1 s2n where N denotes the total number of ﬁrms in a market, and sn the market
share of ﬁrm n in percent. Possible index values range from 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000 (monopoly).
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The targeted change in each of these KPIs depends on perspective, and the directions
given in Table 4.5 reﬂect Power TAC’s objective of contributing to the resolution of the sus-
tainable energy challenge. As the PROCESS progresses, we hope to see highly competitive
retail markets with low  and stable  electricity prices for consumers. Overall electricity
consumption should remain constant or decline, electricity should increasingly come from
renewable sources , and brokers should rely less on balancing power as their forecasting
abilities improve . Conversely, small-scale producers should beneﬁt from high  and sta-
ble  prices for their willingness to produce locally from renewable sources.
The results of the ﬁrst PROCESS iterations have met many of these objectives. Most
importantly, Broker designs have matured, as suggested by the reduced need for balancing
power, and retail markets have become signiﬁcantly more competitive.13 These ﬁndings
are further conﬁrmed in Figure 4.11 which illustrates Brokers’ retail market strategies for
the sale (left) and purchase (right) of energy. The left panels show a remarkable reduction
in overall price levels  for consumers relative to the incumbent monopoly, as well as a
reduction in price differences between Brokers. The right panels additionally shows that
Brokers now routinely include small-scale production in their sourcing strategies, which
suggests that participants have been probing into more advanced design options for the most
recent iteration.
But our analysis also highlights several behaviors that have developed in unintended
ways. Using the data produced in the PROCESS, we can identify these developments and
suggest remedies. First, lower retail consumption prices have naturally lead to higher elec-
tricity consumption . While some of this additional consumption comes from renewable
sources, we see the need for incentives that encourage consumer energy efﬁcient behav-
ior even when prices decline. Brokers could, for example, be rewarded for selling smarter
through distribution charges coupled to a steadier, more efﬁcient utilization of the distribu-
tion infrastructure. Second, the desired increase in price levels for small-scale producers has
not materialized . Clearly, additional buy-side competition in that market should lead to
higher prices, but Brokers have simultaneously improved their pricing strategies. The up-
shot is a slightly reduced price level for small-scale producers in later years. And ﬁnally,
while Brokers now buy less energy in the balancing market, we observe a new tendency to
sell oversupply on short notice . While this need not be a problem per se, it suggests that
we need ways of absorbing such excess energy, such as cold storage facilities that double as
thermal energy storage.
13The trend towards more competitiveness has partly been reversed in 2014 with AgentUDE, cwiBroker, and
TacTex increasingly dominating the ﬁeld, see also Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.11. Brokers’ strategic retail market positioning. Each panel shows
the relationship between volume captured and average price paid. Left: Mar-
ket for energy consumption (Brokers’ sales). Right: Market for small-scale
production (Brokers’ purchases). Lighter labels indicate higher variations in
market shares between games.
Market Quality
We re-ran the 59 games of the 2013 ﬁnals under identical environmental circumstances but
with only the incumbent monopoly, and without competitive Brokers. That is, we conducted
59 alternative simulations that only differed in the absence of a competitive retail market
and competitively designed brokers. This procedure yielded 59 pairs of games for which
we analyzed several important societal indicators. Most of the indicators from Table 4.6
were already introduced in the PROCESS Quality analysis. The key difference here is that
we study their development between alternate realities that differ only in the presence of the
Broker artifacts, not between multiple iterations of the PROCESS.
The targeted directions of change are again viewed from a societal perspective. In par-
ticular, we aim for competitive markets  with low  and stable 	 consumer prices after
the introduction of Brokers. Because the incumbent monopoly already offers stable (albeit
high) prices, retail price variability can at best be expected not to increase by much. Bal-
ancing ratios should decline 
 as Brokers improve their forecasting abilities in an effort to
avoid high balancing costs. One additional indicator of importance is the Load Factor, the
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Metric 3 Brokers 5 Brokers 8 Brokers All Games Target
Retail Price Sale -0.42* -0.44* -0.45* -0.43*   
Purchase -0.01* -0.02* -0.04* -0.02*   
Retail Price Variability Sale 0.02* 0.017* 0.018* 0.018*   	
Purchase 0.002* 0.005* 0.002* 0.004*  
Retail Volume Change Sale 1.4* 1.41* 1.4* 1.4*   
Purchase 1.02* 1.02* 1.02* 1.02*   
HHI Sale -3050* -4953* -6802* -4433*   
Purchase -216 -1132* -27* -746*  
Balancing Ratio Sale 0.02* 0.07* -0.01 0.05*   

Purchase 0.02* 0.07* -0.01 0.05*   

Load Factor 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01   
Table 4.6. Quality indicators for Power TAC’s competitive retail electric-
ity market as mean difference between competitive 2013 tournament games
and corresponding monopolistic games, interpreted from the Broker’s per-
spective. Stars indicate signiﬁcance at the 95% level, circled numbers are
referenced from the main text, checkmarks indicate targets that have been
met.
ratio between the average and the maximum load on the distribution infrastructure. High
load factors  are desirable in that they indicate a steadier, more efﬁcient use of the expen-
sive infrastructure which in turn leads to lower environmental impact (e.g., fewer power line
corridors) and reduced consumer prices.
Table 4.6 shows an ambivalent impact of introducing competitive retail Brokers com-
pared to the monopolistic situation. As before, we observe large and signiﬁcant increases
in competitiveness  and decreases in retail prices . We also note a slight increase in the
volume of energy sourced from small-scale renewables . But these social positives come
with several negatives that require careful consideration. Through competition, retail mar-
kets become signiﬁcantly more turbulent as reﬂected in higher retail price variability 	, the
need for additional balancing power 
, and slightly lower load factors . Parts of the favor-
able competitive retail prices are, in other words, socialized by Brokers that put higher stress
on consumers and the physical infrastructure in an effort to offer the lowest possible prices
while remaining competitive.
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4.4.5 Interim Balance
These preliminary results are ambivalent, but expected and desirable from a CB perspec-
tive. They are expected in that designers have made meaningful, high-return design choices
to obtain control over their complex environment. After only two iterations, Brokers au-
tonomously set competitive prices, forecast demand with acceptable accuracy, and make ex-
plicit use of most strategic options such as sourcing from small-scale production. As the ﬁeld
of competitors grows more sophisticated, designers will also need to consider more subtle
effects arising from complex interactions like those in the balancing market. CB’s iterative
nature continually raises the bar for designers. In the future, we expect to see more nuanced
strategies that incorporate ideas with successively lower return on design investment.
The results are desirable in that they raise the right questions. The analyses we presented
above are objective in the sense that we provide no value judgement on the relative impor-
tance of individual targets. It is unclear whether all targets can be achieved simultaneously
and it is the subject of politics to prioritize between them. Should society care about higher
stress on distribution infrastructures? Should the bulk of the welfare effects from price re-
ductions go to consumers, or should parts of these beneﬁts be used to incentivize more
efﬁcient energy use and investments in renewables? And should consumers be subjected
to more pronounced price swings, or are additional policies necessary to dampen these ef-
fects? Competitive Benchmarking as instantiated in Power TAC invites these questions, and
provides the means to study the effect of alternate answers on businesses and consumers.
4.5 Discussion
Throughout this article we have portrayed Competitive Benchmarking as an effective combi-
nation of existing tools and techniques, integrated into a coherent method for IS research on
societal challenges. In this section, we discuss connections with several inﬂuential streams
of work, and we describe a set of best practices for implementing CB based on our own
experiences with Power TAC.
4.5.1 Related Work
Benchmarking has long been recognized as an important tool for improving products and
organizational performance (Hindle, 2008). Walter Chrysler regularly bought and disassem-
bled new Oldsmobiles to better understand his competition (Shetty, 1993), and Ford engi-
neers allegedly anatomized some ﬁfty German and Japanese cars before embarking on the
construction of the popular Ford Taurus (Mittelstaedt, 1992). But the key event that popular-
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ized benchmarking as a distinct concept among management practitioners and scholars was
Xerox Corp.’s benchmarking-driven turnaround in the late seventies (Garvin, 1993). Today,
a wide range of activities are recognized as benchmarking, ranging from informal com-
parisons within corporate boundaries to highly structured analyses of competitive postures
across industries.
Competitive Benchmarking as we deﬁne it here is rooted in the competitive research
approach pioneered by the Trading Agents community (Greenwald and Stone, 2001, Well-
man, 2011, Ketter and Symeonidis, 2012) which aims to deploy techniques from Artiﬁ-
cial Intelligence and other computational disciplines to trading applications. Trading Agent
Competitions (TAC) challenge researchers to devise software agents for complex, uncertain
environments like supply chains (Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005) and advertisement auc-
tions (Jordan and Wellman, 2010), and to benchmark and improve them iteratively. This
practice has been found to foster creativity, improve learning, and facilitate innovation based
on deep introspection (Garvin, 1993, Shetty, 1993, Drew, 1997).
The key difference between CB and TAC is our emphasis on real-world ALIGNMENT.
Theories developed though CB must be representative of real-world dynamics to the de-
gree that they can be used for policy guidance. And artifacts designed through CB must
meet the usefulness criterion of IS design science. That is, they must address an impor-
tant and relevant business problem, and their utility, quality, and efﬁcacy must be clearly
demonstrated (Hevner et al., 2004). While previous TACs have been inspired by business
settings, their focus has been on stylized decision problems among autonomous software
agents, and system-level consequences of interventions played no signiﬁcant role in them.
CB also improves over TAC by providing human-system interaction facilities that can be
used in training human decision-makers and in decision support studies. Such facilities are
valuable in complex environments like ﬁnancial markets, where training based on historical
data streams “cannot readily model market impact [and offers] essentially nothing toward
understanding the current or future overall system-level dynamics ... [it] can tell you what
happened, but not what might happen next, nor what might have happened instead” (Cliff
and Northrop, 2012).
A competitive element is also present in Research Competitions like those organized
by Netﬂix (Bell and Koren, 2007) and Kaggle (http://www.kaggle.com). Research com-
petitions encourage participants to develop solutions for data mining, forecasting, and op-
timization problems ranging from chess predictions to disease spread analyses. Like CB,
they attract diverse communities of experts from various technical backgrounds, and the rich
repositories of resulting artifacts can be used to explore broad solution spaces and derive
rigorous design theories.
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But while research competitions leverage iteration and benchmarking, they forgo the
beneﬁts of collaborative analysis, learning, and improvement that are central to CB. Fur-
thermore, they are based on static datasets instead of dynamic PLATFORMs, because they
aim to address complicated instead of complex problems. Participants are limited to de-
ploying promising techniques to prefabricated datasets provided by a self-interested sponsor,
whereas identiﬁcation and modeling issues remain out of their scope. Research competitions
are therefore limited in their ability to produce insights and solutions for societal challenges
for which the problem deﬁnition itself constitutes a signiﬁcant hurdle (Wagstaff, 2012).
By contrast, work on Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE, Tesfatsion, 2006)
and Agent-based Virtual Worlds (ABVW, Chaturvedi et al. 2011) foregrounds these mod-
eling aspects in an effort to derive possible futures of high-complexity environments, and
the paths to these futures, based on realistic assumptions. Creating agent-based models that
faithfully capture interesting aspects of real-world phenomena is difﬁcult, because the repre-
sented phenomena are often vague, unstructured, and perennially changing. ABVW research
therefore promotes the use of simulation platforms on which user-contributed content can be
executed, so that users become citizen developers who contribute to the richness and valida-
tion of the models.
CB PLATFORMs are Virtual Worlds by deﬁnition, and design guidelines like the involve-
ment of citizen developers are important in their construction.14 But in contrast to work on
ABVW, wemake use of PLATFORMs as one of several components in an overarching method
for IS research on societal challenges to alleviate the problem that:
[a]nalytical methods give elegant closed-form solutions to narrow, but well-
deﬁned, problems; empirical methods allow researchers to test theories at dif-
ferent levels of analyses; and computational methods allow researchers to build
high ﬁdelity simulations. However, none of these methods are particularly ef-
fective for studying large-scale problems (Chaturvedi et al., 2011, p.682).
Beyond Virtual Worlds, CB therefore adds the novel notion that software-based PLATFORMs
can be used as the medium for capturing a community-created scientiﬁc paradigm, and as
the infrastructure for a new type of competitive research process. The iterative, competitive
nature of the PROCESS is essential in the context of societal challenges, because it brings
the competitive co-evolution of artifacts into the laboratory, as well as the environmental
complexity captured by regular ABVWs.
Bringing elements of real-world evaluations into the laboratory is also prominent in the
use of Serious Games for artifact evaluation (Lang et al., 2009) where participants engage in
14More speciﬁcally, CB platforms are so-called Mirror Worlds, one of the two subtypes of ABVW (Chaturvedi
et al., 2011).
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games that incorporate the artifact under study, e.g., a particular market mechanism. Similar
to a CB PROCESS, these participants can evaluate the artifact more realistically than an iso-
lated research group, since their diverse, creative behaviors will better pinpoint unintended
design ﬂaws. But Serious Games focus on human evaluations of a single artifact, whereas
CB studies the competitive co-evolution of artifacts in complex environments. Moreover,
unlike CB, Serious Games provide no tools for handling the scale and complexity inherent
in research on societal challenges.
Finally, we should point out that Power TAC ﬁlls several recently proposed IS research
agendas on energy and sustainability with life (Bichler et al., 2010, Melville, 2010, Watson
et al., 2010). We provide more detail on this connection, and on Power TAC’s coverage of
the three research agendas in the appendix.
4.5.2 Best Practices
Power TAC is the ﬁrst comprehensive implementation of the ideas presented in this article,
and initiating and organizing this CB effort together with a global community of dedicated
researchers has been truly insightful. In this section, we present a set of best practices that
we have collected so far, and that can inform future CB researchers.
CB’s reliance on software-based representations is perhaps the most visible departure
from established IS research methods. These representations have a fruitful tradition in the
software engineering ﬁeld, and agent-based models in particular have long been accepted
into the scientiﬁc mainstream (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). But a scientiﬁc paradigm must
be readily understandable and modiﬁable before it is accepted by a community. Purely code-
based representations become problematic as the diversity of the community grows and we
must therefore emphasize the important distinction between software (which includes log-
ical representations like decision trees and process charts) on the one hand, and program
code on the other. For a PLATFORM to successfully represent a scientiﬁc paradigm requires
high-quality software, not just high-quality program code. We contest that PLATFORMs that
consist only of the latter are bound to fail in addressing interdisciplinary challenges of soci-
etal scale, and we recommend a clear distinction between logical models of the paradigm,
and their translation into machine-executable statements. While the former are of critical
importance to CB, the latter can be created by well-trained engineers that do not necessarily
have to be involved in the core research effort.
The intention behind our recommendation is not to downplay the difﬁculty or impor-
tance of actually building a PLATFORM. In CB, like in software projects more generally,
it is easy to underestimate the effort and skill needed for the implementation of an idea. A
PLATFORM must provide a sound foundation on which the PROCESS can proceed, which
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in turn requires technical qualities like scalability, security, and extensibility. Moreover, the
distributed nature of ALIGNMENT requires an understanding of concepts like version and
conﬁguration management that are well-understood by professional software engineers but
not often by amateur programmers. In Power TAC, many of the initial software engineering
tasks were done by experienced programmers that are part of our research community. But
since these initial days, we have gradually hired several full-time software engineers who
are now responsible for maintaining the technical foundation of Power TAC’s PLATFORM.
Separating the logical problem deﬁnition from its translation into code is another important
separation of concerns and we recommend this also because it frees up additional research
capacity.
Moving to the conceptual level, one critique we sometimes encounter is that formal rep-
resentations like those built on by CB require a full understanding of the dynamics of each
part of the system, some of which may be unknown for societal challenges that have yet to
unfold. For example, it is largely unclear how electricity consumers would react to real-time
prices, simply because such pricing schemes are technically unfeasible or forbidden in most
states. While we consider the critique legitimate, we feel that forcing modelers to make all
assumptions explicit is a beneﬁt of agent-based modeling and, by extension, CB. Perhaps a
more ﬁtting critique is that CB requires the right choice of abstraction. We might counter
that artiﬁcial systems such as markets or other social forms of organization exhibit
properties that make them particularly susceptible to simulation via simpliﬁed
models. ... [T]he possibility of building a mathematical theory of a system or of
simulating that system does not depend on having an adequate micro theory of
the natural laws that govern the system components. Such a micro theory might
indeed be simply irrelevant (Simon, 1996, p.19).
But the combination of naturalistic and simulation-based elements in CB indisputably in-
herits strengths and weaknesses from each that researchers must carefully consider before
embarking on a CB effort (e.g., North and Macal 2007). In particular, skillful modeling
remains as critical in CB as it is in any other simulation effort. One common modeling pit-
fall is the temptation to boil the ocean, that is, the attempt to capture every possible detail.
ALIGNMENT and PROCESS are purposely iterative and allow researchers to start small and
gradually increase the level of sophistication. We encourage CB researchers to make use of
these facilities and to resist the temptation of big design up-front.
Our previous recommendation comes with one caveat: PLATFORMs must provide a cer-
tain level of realism before they attract a research community. This should not keep CB
initiators from iteratively building their understanding of a societal challenge and the corre-
sponding PLATFORM. But they must brace themselves for an initial investment of time and
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resources for which current academic incentive systems offer little reward. In the case of
Power TAC, it took approximately two years for the PLATFORM to become attractive and
stable enough for other researchers to build upon it. We advise future CB researchers to
carefully plan this period, and to ensure that resources are available for its duration.
Finally, we should remark that some challenges stand to gain more from CB research
than others. In our opinion, these are the challenges that are large in scale and scope, char-
acterized by essential complexity and prohibitive costs of potential social negatives, and that
require interrelated advances in theory development and design. Many important CB prin-
ciples certainly carry over to, for example, common design problems like those currently
tackled in research competitions. But CB’s characteristic up-front investments in ALIGN-
MENT and PLATFORM development offer the highest beneﬁts in situations where the swift,
community-based development of a shared paradigm, the strategic co-evolution of artifacts,
and system-level evaluations matter.
4.6 Conclusions
Many important challenges of our time transcend individuals, organizations, and markets,
which have been the traditional focus areas of IS research. Grand challenges like sustainable
energy, climate change, and ﬁnancial market stability can only be fully understood at the
societal or global level, and they require interrelated advances in theory development and
design that are best provided by interdisciplinary research communities (European Com-
mission, 2011). IS innovations have fueled these challenges through their enabling role in
globalization, and they should play a similarly important part in their resolution.
Any intervention in complex social systems requires careful consideration of system-
level consequences including potential social negatives (Rittel and Webber, 1973) which is
particularly difﬁcult in the case of societal challenges. We argue that the single-investigator
research model of IS research is limited in its ability to scale to the societal level, and to
deliver proactive solutions in addition to reactive insights. Competitive Benchmarking ef-
fectively addresses these limitations through a coherent combination of ideas from Bench-
marking, Trading Agents research, Agent-Based Computational Economics, Agent-Based
Virtual Worlds, and several other ﬁelds. CB scales to large, interdisciplinary communities
of researchers, and it encompasses both behavioral research (insights) and design science
(solutions).
At the heart of CB is the notion of a community-created problem deﬁnition that we
call a scientiﬁc paradigm, i.e, a triplet consisting of (1) problem deﬁnitions and models of
societal challenges, (2) shared vocabularies, and (3) lists of important research questions
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(see Section 4.2). This paradigm is captured using malleable, executable software-based
representations. It is important that these representations are malleable, because they are
maintained and validated by a distributed research community through ALIGNMENT. And it
is important that they are executable, because they serve as the foundation for a competitive
research PROCESS in which artifacts and theories are created, benchmarked, and iteratively
improved. This PROCESS starts from one set of peer-reviewed assumptions which breeds
artifacts and theories that are readily comparable after the fact, and it reduces the need for
protracted ex-post scrutiny and increases scientiﬁc cycle speed.
The key to scalability within CB lies partly in reducing waste from multiple, incompa-
rable paradigms and results, and partly in better focusing individual efforts on theory and
artifact creation. CB does not aim to socialize the scientiﬁc process, but it distributes the
community’s joint efforts to a greater effect, and it promotes intense scientiﬁc competition
in areas where individual achievements matter.
Power TAC is one concrete instance of CB that aims to address the sustainable energy
challenge and we have been conducting it together with a global community of researchers
for over four years. To date, this community has created a diverse set of candidate de-
signs for a novel class of IS artifacts that we call Brokers, and that can contribute to sus-
tainability objectives like better integration of renewable energy sources. By turning wor-
thy causes into viable business models, Brokers provide “an opportunity to create shared
value – that is, a meaningful beneﬁt for society that is also valuable to the business” (Porter
and Kramer, 2006). Brokers form the foundation for a series of radically new IS-driven,
customer-centric business models based on personalized services, and they afford customer
participation where it is currently unfeasible. Power TAC has also spawned work on the
economic beneﬁts that competitively designed Brokers can offer towards solving the “grand
challenge” of providing affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy (Massoud Amin and
Wollenberg, 2005). Just how grand this challenge is may still be the subject of heated de-
bates. But signiﬁcant upsides can be achieved in the form of sustainable energy systems with
reduced environmental footprints and improved economic productivity that critically depend
on IS innovations.
Like the sustainable energy challenge itself, Power TAC continually evolves through
ALIGNMENT. Potential new research questions that are currently under consideration in-
clude the costs and beneﬁts of large-scale storage and locational marginal pricing (Stoft,
2002), the role of customer-side automation and security considerations, and demand-based
distribution charges that incentivize more efﬁcient usage of the existing distribution infras-
tructures.
An interesting methodological question is how rigorous design theories can be derived
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from the comprehensive data recorded by Power TAC. Although a lively debate has been held
on what constitutes a proper design theory, e.g., (Walls et al., 1992, Gregor and Jones, 2007,
Venable et al., 2012), it is less clear how such a theory is best constructed starting from raw
observational data. We suspect this is because artifact performance data like those generated
by Power TAC’s PROCESS were previously simply unavailable. Within the Trading Agents
community similar questions have been answered using descriptive analyses (Ketter et al.,
2013c), formal statistical or information-theoretical methods (Andrews et al., 2009), and
empirical game theory (Jordan et al., 2007), and we are currently evaluating their beneﬁts
for the derivation of principled IS design theories.
Interestingly, CB as a research method is itself a designed artifact, and the Power TAC
process quality analysis we presented in this article is one example of how CB’s compre-
hensive data record reaches beyond analyses of theories and designed artifacts, into the as-
sessment of the method itself. This has important ramiﬁcations as this new level of visibility
allows the Power TAC community to purposely control the degree of novelty and challenge
admitted into the PROCESS, and it provides a sound measurement of the rates of insight and
innovation delivered (Venable and Baskerville, 2012). Based on our results to date, Power
TAC is making good progress on both counts, and we propose that IS research on other
societal challenges stands to gain from the beneﬁts of Competitive Benchmarking as well.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The preceding work aimed to advance the development of IS design theories for brokers. In
Section 5.1 we summarize our main ﬁndings, and their implications for theory and practice.
In Section 5.2, we discuss areas for future research.
5.1 Summary of Main Findings and Implications
We presented our contributions in three separate studies that covered different facets of the
broker design challenge (see Figure 5.1).
Chapter 2 – Broker Design
In our ﬁrst study, we developed a top-level design theory for brokers that learn from ex-
perience, and that behave effectively in their ever-changing retail electricity environments.
Our work builds on the theory of Reinforcement Learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which
we combined with regularization and feature selection techniques. We found that different
combinations of these design elements perform well under different environmental circum-
stances, and we provided guidance on when to use which combination.
Speciﬁcally, we found that simple manual and regularized approaches performed well in
static environments, but their performance deteriorated quickly as environmental conditions
changed. The regularized approach generalized slightly better and required signiﬁcantly less
domain knowledge in the design process. Both approaches are computationally efﬁcient and
can be applied without a model of a target environment. When an environmental model is
available, feature selection techniques can be leveraged to obtain signiﬁcantly better perfor-
mance in the target environment and beyond. The application of feature selection techniques
137
150_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
138 Chapter 5. Conclusions
Figure 5.1. Areas of contribution for the three studies that comprise the
dissertation, repeated here from Figure 1.1 for convenience
led to strategies that generalized better than, e.g., the regularized approach. Generalization
is desirable because of potential shifts in a smart market environment, but also to effectively
accommodate potential mismatches between the environmental model used for feature se-
lection and the actual target environment. Feature selection requires signiﬁcant computation
before executing the strategy, but has little impact on the derived strategies’ runtime require-
ments. In our experiments, we found that greedy feature selection generally delivers high-
quality results at low computational costs, and we therefore recommend it over other feature
selection techniques (e.g., using genetic algorithms) for our application. We summarize the
resulting theory for design and action in Table 5.1.
The theoretical contribution of this study lies in advancing the state-of-the-art in the
area of retail electricity broker design. Furthermore, we aimed to provide guidance on this
nascent topic area to future broker designers. Other RL-based design work has indeed refer-
enced our study since it was originally published, e.g., (Babic and Podobnik, 2014, Reddy,
2013, Urieli and Stone, 2014, Valogianni et al., 2014a). Its managerial and societal im-
portance lie in providing evidence for the viability of a decentralized distribution system
control scheme built on smart markets and economic incentives. Furthermore, intelligent
intermediation is one possible business model for utility companies in future Smart Grids.
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Theory component Instantiation
Means of representation Mathematical formulae, computer programs, words
Primary constructs Broker, tariffs and subscriptions, small-scale consumers and
producers, retail market, wholesale market
Scope Brokers in retail electricity markets
Causal explanations Provided by the Reinforcement Learning framework (Sutton
and Barto, 1998)
Testable propositions
• Proﬁtable autonomous electricity brokers for Smart
Electricity Markets can be constructed using the Re-
inforcement Learning framework.
• Regularization and feature selection techniques lead
to improved control performance and better general-
izability when the characteristics of the consumer and
producer population are volatile.
• Greedy feature selection generally delivers high-
quality results at lower computational costs than other
considered feature selection techniques.
Table 5.1. Components of our broker design theory. A theory for design and
action is a prescriptive theory that informs the choices of artifact designers.
As such, its principal components are constructs and relationships between
those constructs that are prescriptive in nature, backed by causal explanations,
and empirically testable.
We contend that the insights gleaned from this work also generalize to domains other
than electricity. For example, other work has recently explored the potential of concurrent
RL for controlling general customer interactions through web and e-mail channels (Silver
et al., 2013). Domains such as trafﬁc congestion pricing, where real-time visibility and
controllability are now becoming feasible, or complex B2B marketplaces (Lu et al., 2013)
also stand to beneﬁt from these advances.
Chapter 3 – Preference Learning
The idiosyncratic preferences of their customers are a particular challenge for brokers. Bro-
kers must be capable of reasoning about customer responses to changes in tariff terms to
incentivize behavioral change. We therefore studied in greater detail the problem of learning
from past customer choices to improve future decisions in our second study.
In the study, we presented GTM, a Bayesian nonparametric preference model that lever-
ages characteristics of consumer choice settings (many consumers and observed choices;
choices described by a small number of attributes; and consumers with limited cognitive
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resources for evaluating trade-offs) to efﬁciently learn from noisy observations. To assess
GTM’s predictive and performance characteristics, we compared it against two recent non-
parametric GP models, one semi-parametric GP model, and the well-established Mixed
Logit model. We found that GTM’s predictions are of comparable quality to those made
by state-of-the-art nonparametric choice models. However, GTM scales much better in con-
sumer choice situations than its benchmarks. We summarize the resulting theory for design
and action in Table 5.2.
Theory component Instantiation
Means of representation Mathematical formulae, computer programs, words
Primary constructs Users, alternatives, choices
Scope Discrete choice problems
Causal explanations Provided by the Gaussian process framework (Rasmussen and
Williams, 2006)
Testable propositions
• The Gaussian process trade-off model (GTM) predicts
future choices with an accuracy that is at par with
existing state-of-the-art models, but at a signiﬁcantly
lower computational cost.
Table 5.2. Components of our design theory for discrete choice prediction.
The theoretical contribution of this study lies in combining elements of sparse and
structured Gaussian process models with Laplace inference, and in showing the effectiveness
of this combination for consumer preference learning tasks. Its managerial importance
lies in the development of a practical, conceptually simple method for predicting consumer
choices that nevertheless provides a principled Bayesian treatment of predictive uncertainty.
Uncertainty estimates are an important ingredient for decision-making tasks such as that
faced by electricity brokers.
We intentionally separated this second study from the broker design work of Chapter 2,
because it is a general purpose preference learning method that transcends the broker prob-
lem. In our empirical evaluation, we also assessed the performance of our method on other
preference learning tasks (political elections, automobile purchases), and it unsurprisingly
performs well as long as the choice task matches the characteristics outlined above. More-
over, the technical foundations developed in this work fully generalize to approximate poste-
rior inference using Laplace’s method in other machine learning tasks such as classiﬁcation.
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Chapter 4 – Competitive Benchmarking
In our ﬁnal study, we proposed and evaluated Competitive Benchmarking (CB), a novel
research method for accelerating progress on IS design tasks where the underlying real-
world phenomena evolve rapidly, and where the social cost of failure is high. The ﬁrst
instance of Competitive Benchmarking is Power TAC, a research effort through which a
global community of researchers now addresses the broker design challenge. Their work
has resulted in a rich repository of ﬁne-grained data that are interesting to practitioners and
policy makers alike. Analyzing the 2012 through 2014 Power TAC data, we ﬁnd preliminary
evidence of the beneﬁts of CB as a research method (process quality), and of the system-level
effects of introducing brokers into retail electricity markets (market quality).
With respect to process quality, we ﬁnd that the heterogeneous broker designs attracted
by Power TAC indeed led to large and signiﬁcant performance differences. The best broker
designs outperformed competitors by more than an order of magnitude. Several outstanding
designs were new Power TAC entrants who surpassed relatively more established designs,
which illustrates the powerful effect of competitive innovation. After only two CB itera-
tions, brokers now autonomously set competitive prices, forecast demand with acceptable
accuracy, and make explicit use of most strategic options such as sourcing from small-scale
production.
Our market quality analyses showed an ambivalent impact of introducing competitive
retail brokers. We observed large and signiﬁcant increases in competitiveness, decreases in
retail price, and a slight increase in the volume of energy sourced from small-scale renew-
ables. But these social positives came with several negatives that require careful considera-
tion. Through competition, retail markets become signiﬁcantly more turbulent as reﬂected
in higher retail price variability, the need for additional balancing power, and slightly lower
load factors. Parts of the favorable competitive retail prices are, in other words, socialized
by brokers that put higher stress on consumers and the physical infrastructure in an effort to
offer the lowest possible prices while remaining competitive. These analyses are objective
in the sense that we provide no value judgement on the relative importance of individual tar-
gets. It is unclear whether all targets can be achieved simultaneously, and it is the subject of
politics to prioritize between them. Competitive Benchmarking as instantiated in Power TAC
invites these discussions, and it provides the means to study the effect of alternate outcomes
on businesses and consumers.
The theoretical contribution of this study lies in formalizing a novel research method
that can help interdisciplinary research communities tackle complex challenges of societal
scale. The key to swift innovation and scalability within CB lies partly in reducing waste,
and partly in better focusing individual efforts on theory and artifact creation. CB distributes
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a community’s joint efforts to greater effect, and it promotes intense scientiﬁc competition
in areas where individual achievements matter. Its primary societal and managerial ben-
eﬁts lie in its ability to address challenges that evolve rapidly, and that require solutions in
addition to mere insights, a combination that otherwise presents IS researchers with difﬁ-
culties (Hey et al., 2009). The CB process yields tangible research results, and it facilitates
a new separation of concerns where practitioners can contribute design ideas that are then
rigorously evaluated to according scientiﬁc standards.
In the study, we carefully separated the formalization of the CB research method from
its instantiation to the sustainable electricity challenge (Power TAC). We expect that CB
immediately generalizes to other societal challenges of essential complexity that are large in
scale and scope, that are currently unrealized, that progress at a rapid pace, and for which
the social costs of erroneous interventions are prohibitive.
5.2 Limitations and Future Research
The development of design theories is an ongoing process. Much like our studies aimed to
improve over previous work, we hope and expect that future work will improve over ours.
Improvements in our reference theories (Reinforcement Learning, Gaussian processes, etc.)
are one possible source of progress. But even within their current state-of-the-art, several
areas for future research remain, and we now discuss them in turn.
First, all of our studies are based on environmental models that can be extended to cover
other important real-world phenomena. For example, the customer interactions we modeled
in Chapter 2 were limited to ﬁxed tariff offerings, and a model of customer choice driven
by real-world data, but idealized nonetheless. Future work could explore the performance of
our broker design in increasingly sophisticated retail electricity markets with advanced tariff
structures, storage devices, and customers who adopt electronic agents of their own. The
preference learning study in Chapter 3 made use of stated preferences from human decision-
makers, and it would be interesting to assess our model’s performance on actual real-time
tariff choices. Chapter 4 employed what is perhaps the most sophisticated Smart Grid eco-
nomics model to date, fueled by the contributions of the global Power TAC community. But
even within Power TAC’s sophisticated environmental model, many possibilities for exten-
sions (e.g., physical network characteristics) remain.
Second, while the analyses in Chapter 4 give a good ﬁrst impression of the beneﬁts of
CB, and of the societal ramiﬁcations of competitive electricity brokerage, they are based on
preliminary data. More Power TAC iterations will generate more data, and provide more
conclusive evidence. CB’s iterative nature continually raises the bar for designers. In the
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future, we expect to see more nuanced strategies that incorporate ideas with successively
lower return on design investment.
Third, more work is required at the seams between the three studies. For example, while
we presented comprehensive empirical evaluations of our preference model in Chapter 3,
these evaluations were conducted on static tariff choice datasets. More work remains to
integrate our GTM preference model with the dynamic decision-making scenario of Chap-
ter 2. The work of Chapter 2, in turn, predates the ﬁrst Power TAC tournament held in July
2013, and it would be interesting to assess our broker’s performance in the broad ﬁeld of
sophisticated benchmark strategies that Power TAC now offers.
Finally, the models in Chapters 2 and 3 should make the leap into Smart Grid pilot
projects. For example, Power TAC is now being used as part of the Cassandra platform
(www.cassandra-fp7.eu) for strategic decision-making. First versions of this platform
have been deployed in pilot projects in Coventry (UK), Milan (Italy), and Lulea (Sweden).
Customers in participating pilot buildings receive real-time feedback on their electricity con-
sumption, see the impact of their own decisions on the overall power system, and coordi-
nate through social networks to reduce their impact as a community. The performance of
autonomous electricity brokers, including the automatic learning of customer preferences,
should similarly be evaluated under such real-world conditions.
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Summary
The shift towards sustainable power systems is one of the grand challenges of the twenty-
ﬁrst century. Decentralized production from renewable sources, electric mobility, and related
advances are at odds with traditional power systems where central large-scale generation of
electricity follows inelastic consumer demand. Smart Markets and intelligent Information
Systems (IS) could alleviate these issues by providing new forms of coordination that lever-
age real-time consumption information and prices to incentivize consumer behaviors that
remain within the grid’s operational bounds. But the best design for these systems, and the
societal implications of different design choices are largely unclear. This dissertation makes
three contributions to the debate:
First, we propose and evaluate a design theory for Brokers, a novel class of IS-based
intermediaries in retail electricity markets that provide participants with additional informa-
tion and ﬁne-grained economic incentives. Endowing Brokers with all possibly successful
behaviors at design time is futile, because these behaviors are impossible to enumerate, and
quickly become obsolete in Brokers’ ever-changing retail electricity environments. Instead,
our designs employ Reinforcement Learning (RL) to learn effective behaviors by observing
their environment, taking actions, monitoring the long-run consequences that these actions
entail, and updating their behavior accordingly. We propose and evaluate several RL-based
designs, and we identify the most effective design conditional on prevailing market con-
ditions. Our simulation-based evaluations are based on data from the Ontario wholesale
market, a complete micro-level model of appliance usage in private households, and several
benchmark designs for Brokers proposed in the literature. We ﬁnd that our designs outper-
form these earlier works by a signiﬁcant margin.
Second, we study in greater detail the Broker’s core problem of learning from past cus-
tomer choices as a basis for future decisions. To incentivize favorable behaviors, Brokers
must be capable of reasoning about customer responses to changes in tariff terms, even if
the prior experiences they can draw from are limited. Furthermore, observed choices are
usually subject to behavioral inconsistencies, such as inertia. A Broker preference model
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must respect these inconsistencies, because the uncertainty arising from them is a crucial
ingredient for autonomous decision-making: Brokers should only make high-value deci-
sions autonomously if past evidence suggests that they will be correct with high probability,
and prompt their users for additional information otherwise. To address these requirements,
we propose a non-parametric Bayesian preference model based on Gaussian processes that
learns from limited data, and that quantiﬁes the certainty of its predictions as input to the Bro-
ker’s autonomous decision-making task. Probabilistic inference in non-parametric Bayesian
models is often computationally expensive, but by using advances in sparse and structured
Gaussian processes, we are able to reduce the costs of inference substantially. We evaluate
our model on several real-world choice datasets, including an electricity tariff choice dataset
that we collected speciﬁcally for this study on a crowdsourcing platform. We ﬁnd that our
model is competitive with state-of-the-art approaches in terms of predictive accuracy, that it
is signiﬁcantly faster, and that it scales better to large customer populations.
Finally, we propose and study Competitive Benchmarking (CB), a novel research method
for effective IS artifact design in complex environments like power systems, where the social
cost of failure is prohibitive. Traditional design science studies are well-suited for initially
identifying and studying individual designs, but their homogeneous setup limits their abil-
ity to quickly detect promising alternatives and possible social negatives. CB challenges
researchers to devise alternative designs that are regularly pitted against each other in com-
petitions to foster a swift cycle of innovation. The ﬁrst instantiation of CB is the Power
Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC), in which more than a dozen research groups from
four different continents now jointly devise, benchmark, and improve Broker designs. Us-
ing ﬁne-grained records of this community’s results, we quantify performance differences
between alternative Broker designs, and between subsequent iterations of the same designs
to give preliminary empirical evidence of CB’s efﬁcacy as a research method.
The results reported in this dissertation provide guidance on IS design choices for sus-
tainable electricity systems, and they contribute to the foundations for new Smart Grid busi-
ness models.
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Samenvatting
De verschuiving naar duurzame energiesystemen is een van de grote uitdagingen van de
eenentwintigste eeuw. Decentrale productie uit duurzame bronnen, elektrische mobiliteit
en hieruit volgende nieuwe ontwikkelingen staan op gespannen voet met traditionele en-
ergiesystemen waar de centrale productie de inelastische vraag van consumenten volgt.
Smart Markets en intelligente informatiesystemen (IS) zouden deze problemen kunnen ver-
lichten door te voorzien in nieuwe vormen van coo¨rdinatie die, door gebruik te maken van
real-time consumptiegegevens en prijssignalen, consumenten belonen voor gedrag waarmee
consumenten binnen de operationele grenzen van het system blijven. Echter, het beste design
van zulke systemen en de maatschappelijke gevolgen van het gebruik ervan zijn onduidelijk.
Dit proefschrift levert een bijdrage aan deze discussie in de vorm van drie studies.
De eerste studie is gericht op de introductie en evaluatie van een designtheorie voor Bro-
kers bestaand uit een nieuwe klasse van IS-gebaseerde intermediairs voor de retailmarkt van
elektriciteit, die klanten van aanvullende informatie en economische prikkels voorzien. Het
feit dat de retailmarkt voor elektriciteit sterk dynamisch is maakt het onmogelijk om Brokers
vooraf van alle mogelijke succesvolle gedragingen te voorzien. Daarom maken onze designs
gebruik van Reinforcement Learning (RL) waarmee effectieve gedragingen geleerd kunnen
worden door waarneming van de omgeving, het nemen van beslissingen, het observeren van
de gevolgen en het (op basis hiervan) bijstellen van het gedrag. We introduceren en evalueren
meerdere RL-gebaseerde designs waarna het meest effectieve design wordt geı¨dentiﬁceerd
afhankelijk van de heersende marktcondities. Onze simulatie-gebaseerde evaluatie maakt
gebruik van gegevens uit de groothandel in elektriciteit in Ontario, van een gedetailleerd
model van het gebruik van elektrische apparaten in huishoudens en van verschillende bench-
mark designs uit de wetenschappelijke literatuur. Uit onze studie blijkt dat de resulterende
nieuwe designs aanzienlijk betere prestaties opleveren dan bestaande designs.
In de tweede studie focussen we op het centrale probleem van de Broker: het nemen
van beslissingen op basis van klantpreferenties uit het verleden. Om prikkels te kunnen aan-
bieden waarmee gewenst gedrag bij klanten gestimuleerd wordt, moeten Brokers in staat
147
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zijn de reacties van klanten op veranderende economische voorwaarden (zoals prijsveran-
deringen) te kunnen beredeneren. Echter, gegevens hierover uit het verleden zijn vaak
beperkt en bevatten bovendien gedragsmatige inconsistenties zoals inertie. Een Broker pref-
erentiemodel moet met inconsistenties rekening houden omdat de onzekerheid die hieruit
voortvloeit een belangrijke factor is in het nemen van autonome beslissingen. Brokers zullen
hoogwaardige beslissingen enkel autonoom moeten nemen als er voldoende indicatie voor
hun juistheid bestaat, en de gebruiker om aanvullende informatie moeten vragen als dit niet
zo is. Om aan deze eisen te voldoen stellen we een non-parametrisch Bayesiaans model
gebaseerd op Gauss processen (GP) voor dat uit beperkte gegevens kan leren en dat onzek-
erheden als basis voor autonome besluitvormingen berekent. Het berekenen van waarschijn-
lijkheden in zulke modellen is vaak kostbaar in termen van rekenkracht. We maken daarom
gebruik van nieuwe Sparse GP and Structured GP technieken om deze kosten aanzienlijk te
verlagen. We evalueren ons model op meerdere realistische datasets, onder andere een set
met keuzes van elektriciteitstarieven die via een crowdsourcing platform special voor deze
studie werd verzameld. De voorspellingen van ons model zijn vergelijkbaar met die van an-
dere state-of-the-art modellen in termen van precisie, maar ons model is substantieel sneller
en schaalt beter voor populaties met grote aantallen klanten.
In de derde en laatste studie stellen we Competitive Benchmarking (CB) voor als nieuwe
methode voor onderzoek naar effectieve IS designs in complexe omgevingen zoals energiesys-
temen waar de maatschappelijke kosten van mislukking groot zijn. Traditionele design sci-
ence studies zijn geschikt voor het identiﬁceren en bestuderen van enkele designs. Echter,
hun homogene natuur beperkt hun vermogen snel alternatieven te vinden en negatieve maatschap-
pelijke gevolgen duidelijk te maken. CB daagt onderzoekers uit alternatieve designs te on-
twerpen en die in regelmatige wedstrijden tegen elkaar te laten wedijveren wat tot snellere
innovatie leidt. De eerste CB instantie is de Power Trading Agent Competition (Power TAC),
waarin ruim een dozijn onderzoeksgroepen uit vier continenten Broker designs ontwerpen,
vergelijken en verbeteren. Door gebruik te maken van gedetailleerde verslagen van hun
werk meten we prestatieverschillen tussen designs, en tussen opeenvolgende CB iteraties.
Dit heeft geleid tot een voorlopig bewijs van de effectiviteit van CB als onderzoeksmethode.
De resultaten uit dit proefschrift dragen bij aan betere designs voor duurzame elek-
triciteitssystemen en aan de fundering van nieuwe Smart Grid bedrijfsmodellen.
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Appendix A
A Reinforcement Learning
Approach to Autonomous
Decision-Making in Smart
Electricity Markets
A.1 SEMS Example Run
We referred to the tendency of feature selection to overﬁt SELF instances to their target
environment in Section 2.5.2. In Figure A.1 we give a concrete example of this behavior.
The Figure depicts the development of tariff rates (panel (b)) and cash account balances
(panel (c)) for various strategies in one example run of SEMS against a stylized step-function
wholesale market (panel (a)). After the jump in wholesale prices at timeslot 25, the TableRL
strategy ﬁrst fails to adjust its rate upwards; and while SELF ﬁrst increases its rate based
on its target margin over the prevailing wholesale price, it quickly reverts to its initially
successful strategy of offering the lowest margin in the market (recall from Section 2.4.1 that
SELF learns target margins, not target rates). In the process, it undersells the unproﬁtable
TableRL strategy and falls behind Fixed in terms of cash balance.
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Figure A.1. Simulation using an overﬁtted strategy against a stylized step-
function wholesale market
A.2 Robustness and Self-Play
In the experiments above we have considered SELF instances in competition against the
benchmark strategies available in the literature to date. As another test of robustness we let
two instances of SELF compete against each other, as well as against the benchmarks used
earlier to explore whether our broker’s strategy remains stable under self-play. The results
of this evaluation are presented in Figure A.2.
As shown, both SELF brokers perform mostly better than their benchmark strategies
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Figure A.2. Performance of two SELF instances in self-play
under self-play, and overall exhibit consistent performance in comparison to the situation
when only a single SELF broker is present. The two brokers’ performances are similar as
well: When customers exhibit low switching rate (q), the SELF brokers performances are
statistically indistinguishable; when q is high their performances are barely distinguishable,
but with no clear advantage of one or the other instance. Rather, the SELF brokers’ respective
proﬁt shares are lower than in previous settings, as they simply share the proﬁt available in
the market among themselves. Overall, we interpret the consistent, good performance shown
by SELF in this more challenging setting as further evidence for the robustness of our broker.
A.3 Miscellaneous Experimental Results
In Section 2.5.3 we explored the role that bootstrapping and noise injection can play in
counteracting overﬁtting tendencies in the feature and parameter selection process. The
detailed conﬁgurations of the SELF conﬁguration obtained under bootstrapping and noise
injection are given in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively.
An interesting property of bootstrapping and noise injection is that they work in a com-
plementary fashion. Figure A.3 shows the performance of a SELF instance obtained through
greedy feature selection using both add-on techniques. The results indicate that the strategy
beneﬁted in terms of both, performance in the target environment and generalizability.
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Feature Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Parameter Value
Bias αmax 0.37
ActionIndex α ′ 1.41
ActionOneInK εmax 0.34
BetterConsumptionRates ε ′ 1.09
CashGradient
CustomerGradient γ 0.76
MarketBreadth
MarketShare
MarkupLeader
NumberCustomers
RateChangeIndicator
TargetMargin
WholesalePrice
WorseConsumptionRates
Table A.1. SELF instance obtained through greedy feature selection with
bootstrapping
Feature Plain RBF RBF(T) Bin Parameter Value
Bias αmax 0.37
ActionIndex α ′ 1.41
ActionOneInK εmax 0.34
BetterConsumptionRates ε ′ 1.09
CashGradient
CustomerGradient γ 0.76
MarketBreadth
MarketShare
MarkupLeader
NumberCustomers
RateChangeIndicator
TargetMargin
WholesalePrice
WorseConsumptionRates
Table A.2. SELF instance obtained through greedy feature selection with
added noise
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Figure A.3. Performance of a SELF instance obtained through greedy feature
selection with noise injection and bootstrapping. Note, that all three random
strategies are superimposed at the zero-line.
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Appendix B
A Scalable Preference Model for
Autonomous Decision-Making
Involving Consumer Choices
B.1 Derivations used in Fast Inference
B.1.1 Probit Likelihood
The Laplace mode ﬁnding procedure (Algorithm 1) requires computation of the log likeli-
hood log p(C| f c), and of its ﬁrst two derivatives with respect to the values f ct of the char-
acteristic evaluations f c at all trade-offs t (i.e., the Jacobian ∇ log p(·), and the Hessian
∇∇ log p(·)). The Probit likelihood of a single observation is given by Equation (3.3) as:
log p(y| f ct ) = logΦ(y · fu,t)
= logΦ
(
y ·
[
nc
∑
c=1
γcu · f ct
])
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distri-
bution. The argument to Φ is sometimes scaled by a precision factor σ−2. But because
our interpretation of the f c is invariant under scaling, we can set σ−2 = 1 without loss of
175
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generality. The Jacobian and the Hessian of the log likelihood are given by:
∇ log p(C| f c) = ∂ log p(y| f
c
t )
∂ f c1ti
=
yiγc1u N( fti)
Φ(y fti)
(B.1)
∇∇ log p(C| f c) = ∂
2 log p(y| f ct )
∂ f c1ti ∂ f
c2
ti
=
−y ftiγc1u γc2u N( fti)
Φ(y fti)
− γ
c1
u γc2u N2( fti)
Φ2(y fti)
(B.2)
where the derivatives are with respect to the evaluations of characteristics c1 and c2 for trade-
off ti, and u denotes the user making choice y.
B.1.2 Laplace Mode Finding
In Laplace mode ﬁnding, we approximate the posterior p( f |C) using a single Gaussian
q( f |C) = N( f | fˆ ,A−1)
centered on the true mode fˆ = argmax f p( f |C), and with a precision of A=−∇∇ log p(C| f )
∣∣
f= fˆ
obtained through a second-order Taylor expansion (Rasmussen and Williams, 2006). This
mode is unique for the Probit because the Hessian of the log-likelihood is negative deﬁ-
nite, and we can ﬁnd it by setting the ﬁrst derivative ∇Ψ of the unnormalized log posterior
Ψ= log p(C| f )+ log p( f ) to zero:
∇Ψ= ∇ log p(C| f )−K−1 f != 0 (B.3)
The second term in Equation (B.3) results from differentiating the GP prior p( f ). The mode
can then be found using the Newton-Raphson algorithm (Press et al., 2007) with the update
step:
f new = f − (∇2Ψ)−1∇Ψ
= (K−1+W )−1 (W f +∇ log p(y| f ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
= K (b−L(I+LTKL)−1LTKb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
The last step uses the matrix inversion lemma (Petersen and Pedersen, 2008), and is valid for
any symmetric decompositionW = LLT .
189_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
B.2. Tariffs Dataset Collection 177
Imagine having to choose between the following two tariffs for the household that you currently spend most of your
time in. Which one would you prefer?
1. A Fixed tariff with 100 percent renewable energy content. Your monthly cost of electricity will be
• 57.00$ if you consume 500 kWh,
• 106.00$ if you consume 1000 kWh, and
• 204.00$ if you consume 2000 kWh
under this tariff. You pay your monthly electricity bill at the end of each month. A 12 months notice period
applies before you can cancel this tariff.
2. A Variable tariff with 0 percent renewable energy content. The cost of electricity in the ﬁrst month will be
• 54.50$ if you consume 500 kWh,
• 101.00$ if you consume 1000 kWh, and
• 194.00$ if you consume 2000 kWh
under this tariff. After the ﬁrst month, the price of electricity may go up or down in accordance with the tariff’s
terms (and within legal bounds). You will have to pre-pay your monthly electricity bill at the beginning of the
month. You can cancel your tariff anytime.
Table B.1. Example Choice Situation Used for Collecting the Tariffs Dataset.
B.2 Tariffs Dataset Collection
For this study, we collected a dedicated set of pairwise choice data on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk, http://www.mturk.com), a commercial crowdsourcing platform. Several
scholars have studied the demographics of MTurk workers, and have proposed guidelines
for assuring the quality of data collected through MTurk tasks (Paolacci et al., 2010). These
studies give reason to believe that (1) MTurk data can be of equal or better quality than data
selected through channels such as student surveys, (2) MTurk workers are highly diverse
(increasing external validity), and (3) the unsupervised nature of MTurk tasks may reduce
the risk of experimenter bias (increasing internal validity), all if proper precautions are taken
against distractions and random responses.
Eighty adult American participants were invited to ﬁll in an academic survey about their
electricity tariff preferences in exchange for a payment of $0.30. All American MTurk work-
ers could theoretically preview our survey through the MTurk platform, and 80 workers ul-
timately self-selected to participate. The survey consisted of three parts:
1. First, we reviewed basic electricity tariff concepts: ﬁxed, variable, indexed tariffs, and
those guaranteeing that a certain percentage of delivered electricity is produced from
renewable sources.
2. Next, participants were asked to make ten choices between pairs of tariffs (see Ta-
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ble B.1 for an example). Each pair was randomly generated from a total of 261 tariffs
offered in Austin, Texas in February 2013. Texas has one of the most advanced retail
electricity markets in the United States and provides daily information on available
tariffs, see http://www.powertochoose.org.
3. Finally, we asked participants to answer ten questions on their demographics and elec-
tricity consumption behavior, some of which were attention checkers for which the
correct answer had to be consistent with an answer given to another question.
Participants had a maximum of thirty minutes to ﬁll out all questions, but could submit
their results before that time. Participants could also withdraw, allowing another MTurk
worker to ﬁll out the survey instead. Next to the given answers, we recorded the time
between self-selecting for participation and the submission of results. In pretests among
colleagues, we had established that it took a quick reader at least three minutes to process
all provided information. We therefore discarded surveys submitted before that time. As a
further safeguard against random answers, we asked two pairs of attention check questions
in the demographics section where the answers to one question depended on the answer of
the other. We also discarded surveys where at least one of the attention check pairs was
answered inconsistently, leaving us with a total of 61 surveys that met our quality standards.
191_Erim_PetersBW_Stand.job
Appendix C
Competitive Benchmarking of
Electricity Brokers
C.1 Power TAC and IS Research Agendas
Several scholars have recently outlined research agendas for addressing societal challenges
through IS research (Melville, 2010, Watson et al., 2010), and many of the abstract research
questions they propose can be instantiated for the case of sustainable energy provisioning
using Power TAC. In particular,
Energy Informatics is concerned with “analyzing, designing, and implementing systems to
increase the efﬁciency of energy demand and supply systems” (Watson et al., 2010),
an agenda that resonates with Power TAC’s goal of improving power systems through
IS research. The framework consists of a generalized supplier–consumer relationship,
mediated through Information Systems, and moderated through policies, regulations,
the laws of economics, and corporate and social norms, all of which are possible
subjects for study in Power TAC.
IS for Environmental Sustainability is deﬁned as “IS-enabled organizational practices and
processes that improve environmental and economic performance” (Melville, 2010).
An explicit account of the complexity arising from social interactions at the intersec-
tion of IS and sustainability phenomena is at the heart of the proposed Belief – Action
– Outcome (BAO) framework, and we contend that Power TAC’s agent-based model
is well-suited to study these complex interactions at scale.
179
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Smart Markets refer to an emerging class of fast-paced, information-rich markets in which
participants routinely use IS to support their trading and decision-making (Bichler
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the notion of real-time intelligence proposed by the au-
thors resembles the centralized, optimization-based view taken in Energy Informatics,
whereas the notion of collective intelligence is more closely related to the decentral-
ized, complexity-oriented perspective of Melville’s work. This suggests that the Smart
Markets idea can serve to connect the two frameworks, and to identify blind spots at
their seams.
Figure C.1 shows a model of an electric distribution system similar to that in Figure 4.8
where we indicated relationships to research questions from all three frameworks. We now
consider the signiﬁcance of each of these research questions in turn.
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Consumers / Prosumers Smart appliances, bidirectional customer-to-grid connectivity, and
the transformation of consumers into active “prosumers” with local production and
storage capabilities will have a signiﬁcant impact on the role of customers in fu-
ture power systems. The optimal granularity of information collection on customer
premises is currently contentious (EI1), as is the business case for providing customers
with smart metering capabilities (ES9) in exchange for greater visibility and control.
Perhaps more importantly, research is needed to establish (a) how customers form their
beliefs about electricity consumption, (b) how they derive actions from these beliefs,
and (c) how information systems can be designed to effectively inﬂuence such actions
and beliefs (ES5a/b, ES6a/b, EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute 2012).
Distribution Utility and Distribution Network Future distribution systems will possess im-
proved sensory and control capabilities at the network level. Regulators and DUs need
reliable insights into the effects of deploying these capabilities at the ﬁrm and econ-
omy level (EI6, ES7) so they can decide on optimal deployment levels (EI3, ES9). An
important factor in this equation is the degree to which they can anticipate customer
preferences and make control decisions that increase grid efﬁciency while respecting
customer convenience constraints (SM3.2).
Brokers Retail electricity markets create opportunities for intermediaries that offer per-
sonalized, sustainable, and affordable electricity services to digitally connected cus-
tomers. While this intermediation can, to some extent, be performed by traditional
retailers, we propose that the data-intensity and complexity of future retail electricity
markets will breed a sophisticated class of IS artifacts that we call Brokers, and that
will fulﬁll the role of the intermediary, ﬁrst in support of a human decision-maker but
increasingly also in an autonomous fashion (Davenport and Harris, 2005). The devel-
opment of a design theory for Brokers is one of the key challenges in creating a new
decentralized control paradigm for electric grids. Using work on electronic market-
places (EI6, SM2.1.1, SM2.1.2) and the design of IS artifacts for human use and their
affordances (ES5b, ES6b, SM3.2), IS scholars can contribute to creating this new class
of artifacts (ES5b, ES6b), and to understanding its implications for customers and the
electric grid (ES7, ES9).
Smart Energy Neighborhoods Closely related to Brokers are questions about optimal con-
trol structures. Given the availability of decentralized small-scale generation, storage,
and decentralized control strategies, the concept of Smart Energy Neighborhoods (also
called Virtual Power Plants or Microgrids, Pudjianto et al. 2008) comes within reach.
These partially autonomous self-organizing communities possess local high-efﬁciency
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power generation capabilities and only draw on the upstream grid when unable to
meet their requirements locally. The research questions surrounding Brokers can be
extended to artifacts for the organization and control of such smaller communities as
well.
Governance and Macro Results The conﬂuence of retail electricity markets, Brokers, and
new forms of consumer choice entails questions about how these entities and their
interactions should be governed to attain socially desired outcomes. Mechanism de-
signers have studied such questions (Parkes, 2007) but they are particularly difﬁcult
to answer given the real-time nature of the electric grid and its complicated control
structure. It is unclear what degree and granularity of disclosure will allow regula-
tors to determine and enforce effective policies (EI2, EI8); how policies should be
constructed and validated (EI4, EI5, SM2.2, SM3.1.1); and what the relationship is
between policies, IS artifacts, and macro-level results (ES8, ES10).
Distribution-Level Balancing / Transmission System Themost challenging cases of mech-
anism design arise where multiple interdependent markets operate concurrently. New
mechanisms will have to be explored (SM2.1.1, SM2.1.2); and new tools are needed
to understand the complex interplay between control at the distribution level and in
upstream markets (SM3.1.1, SM3.2.2).
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The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the ﬁeld of Research in Management
defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers afﬁliated
to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM
PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal http://
hdl.handle.net/1765/1. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School
of Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam (EUR).
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)MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS FOR SMART ELECTRICITY MARKETS
ESSAYS ON AUTONOMOUS ELECTRICITY BROKER DESIGN, PROBABILISTIC
PREFERENCE MODELING, AND COMPETITIVE BENCHMARKING
The shift towards sustainable power systems is one of the grand challenges of the
twenty-first century. Decentralized production from renewable sources, electric mobility,
and related advances are at odds with traditional power systems where central large-scale
generation of electricity follows inelastic consumer demand. Smart Markets and intelligent
Information Systems (IS) could alleviate these issues by providing new forms of coordina -
tion that leverage real-time consumption information and prices to incentivize consumer
behaviors that remain within the grid’s operational bounds. But the best design for these
systems, and the societal implications of different design choices is largely unclear. This
disser tation makes three contributions to the debate. First, we propose and evaluate a
design theory for Brokers, a novel class of IS-based intermediaries in retail electricity
markets that provide participants with additional information and fine-grained economic
incentives. Second, we study in greater detail the Broker’s core problem of learning from
past customer choices as basis for future decisions. We propose a probabilistic preference
model that addresses important features of electricity markets, and we demonstrate the
performance of this model on electricity tariff choice tasks. And third, we propose and
study Competitive Benchmarking, a novel research method for effective IS artifact design in
complex environments like power systems, where the social cost of failure is prohibitive.
Our results provide guidance on IS design choices for sustainable electricity systems, and
they contribute to the foundations for new Smart Grid business models.
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